Asymmetric information and the settlement of insurance claims

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 68, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 615-630

  Fenn, Paul ^a   Rickman, Neil ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SURREY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2242460458     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2691541     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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