Public mistrust of the law: A political perspective

University of Cincinnati Law Review

Volumn 66, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 847-874

  Tyler, Tom R ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 22044431690     PISSN: 00096881     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (109)

1. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995);
2. see also Laura B. Myers, Bringing the Offender to Heel: Views of the Criminal Courts, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 46, 59-61 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996);
3. KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBATZ, CRIME IN THE PUBLIC MIND 1-14 (1995);
4. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 201-15 (1995).
5. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 8-15 (1990).
6. See infra tbl.1. Negative views mean that those interviewed indicated that court performance was only "fair," "poor," or "very poor," not "very good" or "good."
7. See Gary A. Hengstler, The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 63-64.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See infra tbl.2. These data are from U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1973 146-47 tbls.2.36, 2.37 (Michael J. Hindelang et al. eds., 1973);
11. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1981 204-05 tbl.2.33 (Timothy J. Flanagan et al. eds., 1982);
12. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1994 174-75 tbl.2.43 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1995).
13. Data are from a sample of the citizens of Chicago (n = 1,575). See TYLER, supra note 2, at 51-53.
14. See infra tbl. 3. These data are for the period 1972-1994. See James Allan Davis, National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972-1994 (visited Mar. 12, 1998) .
15. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 755 (1994).
16. See id. at 754, 782.
17. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
18. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1994, supra note 8, at 148-49 tbl.2.13.
19. See infra tbl.4.
20. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J. DEMOCRACY 65, 68 (1995) ("The proportion of Americans who reply that they 'trust the government in Washington' only 'some of the time' or 'almost never' has risen steadily from 30 percent in 1966 to 75 percent in 1992.").
21. For an extended discussion of this issue, see generally, WHY PEOPLE DON'T TRUST GOVERNMENT (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al. eds., 1997).
22. See Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 10, at 782.
23. 408 U.S. 238, 361-63 (1972) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("'[T]he question with which we must deal is not whether a substantial proportion of American citizens would today . . . opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they would find it to be so in the light of all the information presently available.").
24. See id. ("[W]hether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on whether its mere mention 'shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people,' but on whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable."); see also Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 190, 194-95 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce eds., 1975).
25. See Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in 16 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992).
26. See id. at 109-12.
27. See id. at 117-21.
28. See Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 63 (1994).
29. See Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress, and "Last Cases:" The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1034 (1991).
30. See generally Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Sentencing of Convicted Offenders: An Analysis of the Public's View, 14 L. & SOC'Y REV. 223 (1980).
31. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Raising Images of Public Punitiveness: Sentencing by Lay and Professional English Magistrales, 15 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 191, 193, 201-04 (1990).
32. See TYLER, supra note 2, at 161; Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, A Relationship Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115, 117-19 (M. Zanna ed., 1992).
33. TYLER, supra note 2, at 19.
34. Lon Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 171, 201 (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971).
35. See TYLER, supra note 2, at 24-25.
36. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law, 133 SWISS J. ECON. & STAT. 219-40 (1997).
37. For example, increasing the severity of punishment by making a crime a capital crime has considerable public appeal. It seems to combat law breaking without requiring the use of public resources for an increased police force. However, research suggests that this approach to crime control is likely to be, at best, minimally effective. See
38. See Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug Prohibition, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 501 (1993).
39. SEE H. LAURENCE ROSS, DETERRING THE DRINGKING DRIVER: LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CONTROL 21-24 (1982).
40. See id.
41. See id. at 60-70, 71-90.
42. See id. at 106-07.
43. See id. at 107.
44. See JEFFREY PFEFFER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH PEOPLE: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF THE WORK FORCE 96-109 (1994).
45. See id. at 27-59.
46. See TYLER, supra note 2, at 44.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 45-50.
49. See id. at 60.
50. Other studies lead to similar findings. Raymond Paternoster examined the antecedents of everyday law-related behavior among a teenage sample. See Raymond Paternoster, Decisions to Participate In and Desist From Four Types of Common Delinquency: Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective, 23 L. & SOC. REV. 7 (1989).
51. He compared the influence of sanction threats to that of moral beliefs and other factors. Although sanction threats influenced behavior, he found that moral beliefs "dwarfed" the impact of such threats. Id. at 37-38. Across all four behaviors studied, moral beliefs were more central to behavioral decisions than were judgments of the perceived certainty or severity of punishment. See id. at 38. Harold Grasmick and Donald Green make a similar comparison using a sample of adults in an urban area. See Harold G. Grasmick & Donald E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal Behavior, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 325 (1980).
52. They find that moral judgments arc equal in importance to judgments of risk when predicting past law violations, but that moral judgments dominate judgments about the likelihood of committing future crimes. See id. at 331. Interestingly, their study also points to peer disapproval as an important element in law-related behavior. See id. at 333-34. A further study extends this analysis to tax cheating, theft, and drunk driving. See Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 837 (1990). That study finds that moral concerns are consistently as or more important than legal sanctions in explaining future intentions concerning crime. See id. at 853-54. Again, this study finds that embarrassment in front of peers plays an important role in crime-related behavior.
53. See TYLER, supra note 2, at 56.
54. The entries listed are beta weights, which reflect the independent contribution of each factor controlling on the influence of other factors in the equation. Those entries that are starred indicate a statistically significant influence upon the dependent variables, at either the p < .05 level (*), the p < .01 level (**), or the p < .001 level (***). The proportion of variance explained is the adjusted R-squared and shows how much all factors explain when considered together.
55. See id. at 57-60.
56. The entries listed are beta weights, which reflect the independent contribution of each factor controlling on the influence of other factors in the equation. Those entries that are starred indicate a statistically significant influence upon the dependent variables, at either the p < .05 level (*), the p < .01 level (**), or the p < .001 level (***). The proportion of variance explained is the adjusted R-squared and shows how much all factors explain when considered together.
57. The entries listed are beta weights, which reflect the independent contribution of each factor controlling on the influence of other factors in the equation. Those entries that are starred indicate a statistically significant influence upon the dependent variables, at either the p < .05 level (*), the p < .01 level (**), or the p < .001 level (***). The proportion of variance explained is the adjusted R-squared and shows how much all factors explain when considered together.
58. The entries listed are beta weights, which reflect the independent contribution of each factor controlling on the influence of other factors in the equation. Those entries that arc starred indicate a statistically significant influence upon the dependent variables, at either the p < .05 level (*), the p < .01 level (**), or the p < .001 level (***). The proportion of variance explained is the adjusted R-squared and shows how much all factors explain when considered together.
59. TYLER, supra note 2, at 46.
60. Id. at 45.
61. See Richard G. Niemi, Political Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 117 (Jeanne N. Knutson ed., 1973).
62. See GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS (1963);
63. S.P. Huntington, Will More Countries Become Democratic?, 99 POL. SCI. Q. 193, 209 (1984);
64. RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURAL SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (1990);
65. GIUSEPPE DEPALMA, TO CRAFT DEMOCRACIES: AN ESSAY ON DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS (1990).
66. James L. Gibson et al., Democratic Values and the Transfomation of the Soviet Union, 54 J. POLITICS 329, 331-32 (1992).
67. See id. at 333-34.
68. See TYLER, supra note 2, at 12-13. This study examines experiences with the police and the courts. However, I will include both types of experiences in this discussion because people are generally concerned about the same types of issues when dealing with the police and with the courts.
69. See infra tbl.10.
70. Studies of authority in managerial settings also support the suggestion that trust is central to reactions to authorities. See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Motive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS 331, 336 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom Tyler eds., 1996).
71. See Tyler & Degoey, supra note 60, at 336.
72. See id. at 346.
73. See, e.g., TYLER, supra note 2.
74. See id. at 135-40.
75. The entries listed are beta weights, which reflect the independent contribution of each factor controlling on the influence of other factors in the equation. Those entries that arc starred indicate a statistically significant influence upon the dependent variables, at either the p < .05 level (*), the p < .01 level (**), or the p < .001 level (***). The proportion of variance explained is the adjusted R-squared and shows how much all factors explain when considered together.
76. See TYLER, supra note 2, at 136.
77. See Tyler & Degoey, supra note 60, at 342.
78. See id. at 332-33, 339-40.
79. See id. at 333.
80. See JOHN THIBAUT & LAVIRENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 94 (1975) ("One of the most intriguing findings for participant subjects was the linear increase in satisfaction with the procedure, perceived fairness of the procedure, and opportunity for evidence presentation as the procedural mode moved along the continuum from the inquisitorial to the choice adversary method.").
81. The entries listed are beta weights, which reflect the independent contribution of each factor controlling on the influence of other factors in the equation. Those entries that are starred indicate a statistically significant influence upon the dependent variables, at either the p < .05 level (*), the p < .01 level (**), or the p < .001 level (***). The proportion of variance explained is the adjusted R-squared and shows how much all factors explain when considered together.
82. Anne M. Heinz & Wayne A. Kerstetter, Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluation of a Reform in Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & SOC'Y REV. 349, 362-65 (1979).
83. See JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O'BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE 34, 174 (1990).
84. See id. at 176.
85. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 261 (1981).
86. See id. at 259.
87. See id. at 265.
88. See Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in the Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and Case Characteristics, 29 L. & SOC'Y REV. 323, 351 (1995).
89. See Jonathan D. Casper, Having Their Day in Court: Defendant Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 L. & SOC'Y REV. 237 (1978);
90. see also Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 483 (1988).
91. See Casper, supra note 79, at 243 tbl.1.
92. See id.
93. See Casper et al., supra note 79, at 499-500.
94. See JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: HOW LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1983).
95. See id. at 46.
96. See id. at 65.
97. See E. Allen Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & SOC. REV. 953, 965-67 (1990).
98. See id. at 963.
99. See infra tbl.12.
100. The entries listed are beta weights, which reflect the independent contribution of each factor controlling on the influence of other factors in the equation. Those entries that are starred indicate a statistically significant influence upon the dependent variables, at either the p < .05 level (*), the p < .01 level (**), or the p < .001 level (***). The proportion of variance explained is the adjusted R-squared and shows how much all factors explain when considered together.
101. Interestingly, people evaluate the fairness of treatment in terms of trustworthiness. See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997).
102. See Tom R. Tyler & Wayne Kerstetter, Moral Authority in Law and Criminal Justice, 13 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1994, at 44, 46.
103. See id. at 48.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.