Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 43-61

  Ellingsen, Tore ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Pricing; Product quality; Separating equilibrium; Signalling

Indexed keywords

EID: 21944441344     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(96)01040-5     Document Type: Article

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