Washington's smothering strategy American Interests in East Asia

World Policy Journal

Volumn 14, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 20-31

  Carpenter, Ted Galen ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21944438452     PISSN: 07402775     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. A graphic example ofthat tendency can be found in the comments of Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "1997 Forrestal Lecture: American Principle and Purpose in East Asia," United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, April 15,1997.
2. U.S. and Asia Statistical Handbook, 1996, compiled and edited by John T. Dori and Richard D. Fisher, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation Asia Studies Center, 1996).
3. Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, February 1995, PP- 9, 23.
4. Following the summit, U.S. officials stated that although they hoped for greater Japanese logistical support for U.S. military missions in East Asia, Japan was "far from ready to send troops into battle alongside U.S. forces," adding that that was "not something the United States wanted anyway" (Kevin Sullivan and John F. Harris, "Clinton Hails Partnership with Japan," Washington Post, April 18, 1996).
5. When asked what help the United States could expect from Japan, in light of the Clinton-Hashimoto summit, if a conflict were to break out in East Asia, former assistant secretary of defense Joseph Nye had extremely limited expectations. "If there were a war in Korea, I'm confident that we would have Japanese support, the use of Japanese bases, and help with supplies and so forth." Nye added that if the conflict were instead in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea, Washington would expect -and in his judgment, would need-"considerably less" support from Tokyo ("Treaty Ratification Reassures Region," interview with Joseph Nye, Washington Times, April 19, 1996).
6. "Excerpts from Pentagon's Plan: Prevent the Emergence of a New Rival," New York Times, March 8, 1992.
7. Philip Shenon, "Baker Asks Asians to Move Warily on New Pacts," New York Times, July 25, 1991-
8. U.S. and Asia Statistical Handbook, 1996, pp. 54-57.
9. Warren Christopher, "Strengthening Ties between the United States and South Korea," remarks at the inaugural reception for the KoreanUnited States Twenty-First Century Council, Washington, D. C, February 17, 1994, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, February 28, 1994, p. 104.
10. "Japan: Anger As Pentagon Chief Kicks Off Visit," South China Morning Post, April 8, 1997.
11. Hideshi Takeshida, a professor at Japan's Institute for Defense Studies, noted that his country "is always nervous when a problem arises with China." An important root ofthat nervousness, he contended, is the fear that China will retaliate against Japanese investors on the mainland. Quoted in Willis Witter, "U.S. Gets No Help from East Asians in Backing Taiwan," Washington Times, March 14, 1997.
12. Examples of the argument that China's objectives are defensive rather than offensive include Charles W. Freeman, "American Economic and Security Interests in China," paper presented to the fourth meeting of the Study Group on American Interests in Asia: Economic and Security Priorities, sponsored by the Economic Strategy Institute, Washington, D.C., January 16, 1997; and Andrew
13. J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (New York: Norton, 1997).
14. Georgetown University professor Earl Ravenal provides an even higher estimate: $82 billion. Earl C. Ravenal, Defending America in an Uncontrollable World: The Military Budget, 1998 to 2003 (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, forthcoming 1998).
15. Beijing reacted badly even to the meager changes in the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines. See Willis Witter, "Japan's Hints of Defense of Taiwan Enrage China," Washington Times, August 25, 1997;
16. Chalmers Johnson, "Who Is U.S.-Japan Pact Aimed At?" Los Angeles Times, September 8, 1997;
17. and "China Warns U.S., Japan on Security Pact," Washington Post, September 1997.
18. That strategy would require the reversal of recent policies that envision the closing of some installations on Guam. It is a measure of the perversity of U.S. strategy in the western Pacific and East Asia that Washington contemplates drawing down forces stationed in American territories while it maintains, or in the case_of South Korea actually strengthens, forces used to subsidize the defense of allies and clients.
19. Author's conversations with Japanese Foreign Ministry and Defense Agency officials, Tokyo, July 10-14,1995.
20. Author's conversations with South Korean Defense Ministry officials, Seoul, July 18, 1995.