The institutional foundations of regulatory commitment: A comparative analysis of telecommunications regulation

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 1994, Pages 201-246

  Levy, Brian ^a   Spiller, Pablo T ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21844518521     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (86)

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