Settlement bargaining and the design of damage awards

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 1994, Pages 84-95

  Spier, Kathryn E ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21844506519     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/10.1.84     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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22. United States Sentencing Commission. 1990. Guidelines Manual