Wage-employment determination and a union tax on capital: Can theory and evidence be reconciled?

Economics Letters

Volumn 48, Issue 1, 1995, Pages 61-71

  Hirsch, Barry T ^a   Prasad, Kislaya ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21844500053     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(94)00589-T     Document Type: Article

References (18)

1. The effect of wage bargains on the stock market value of the firm
2. Productivity and labor unions An application of the theory of self-enforcing contracts
3. Testing the efficiency of employment contracts
4. Efficient bargains and the McDonald-Solow conjecture
5. Unionization and firm performance: The impact on profits, growth, and productivity
6. Why capital hires labor: A bargaining perspective
7. Efficient wage bargaining as a repeated game
8. Investment and wages in the absence of binding contracts A Nash bargaining approach
9. Work rules featherbedding and Pareto-optimal union-management bargaining
10. Manufacturing wage dispersion An end game interpretation
11. Testing between competing models of wage and employment determination in unionized markets
12. An integration of trade union models in a sequential bargaining framework
13. How robust is microeconomic theory of the trade union?
14. Wage bargaining and employment
15. Efficient contracts are on the labor demand curve: Theory and facts
16. Do unions contract for added employment?