A theory of strategic oversight: Congress, lobbyists, and the bureaucracy

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 227-255

  Epstein, David ^a   O'halloran, Sharyn ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21844494533     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen (1985) and Banks (1989) are other examples in which Congress can perform a costly audit of budget-maximizing agencies.
2. Ainsworth, Scott. 1993. “Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence,” 55; Journal of Politics, 41-56.
3. Austen-Smith, David. 1993. “Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes,” 37 American Journal of Political Science 799-833.
4. Ainsworth, Scott and John Wright. 1992. “Competitive Lobbying for a Legislator’s Vote,” 9 Social Choice and Welfare 229-57.
5. Banks, Jeffrey. 1989. “Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing,” 33 American Journal of Political Science 670-99.
6. Banks, Jeffrey, and Barry Weingast. 1992. “Political Control of Bureaucracies Under Asymmetric Information,” 36 American Journal of Political Science 509-24.
7. Bendor, Jonathon, Serge Taylor, and Roland Van Gaalen. 1985. “Bureaucratic Expertise vs. Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting,” 79 American Political Science Review 1041-60.
8. Calvert, Randall. 1985. “The Value of Biased Information: A Rational Choice Model of Political Advice,” 47 Journal of Politics 530-55.
9. Cameron, Charles, and Joon Pyo Jung. 1992. “Strategic Endorsements,” manuscript, Columbia University.
10. Crawford, Vincent, and Joel Sobel. 1982. “Strategic Information Transmission,” 10 Econometrica 1431-51.
11. Epstein, David. 1993. “Legislating From Both Sides of the Aisle,” manuscript, Columbia University.
12. Epstein, David, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 1994. “Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion,” 38 American Journal of Political Science 697-722.
13. Gilligan, Thomas, and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. “Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures,” 3 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 287-335.
14. Gilligan, Thomas, and Keith Krehbiel. 1989. “Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous Committee,” 33 American Journal of Political Science 459-90.
15. Jones, Charles O. 1979. “American Politics and the Organization of Energy Decision Making,” 4 Annual Review of Energy 99-121.
16. Lohmann, Susanne. 1993. “A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action,” 87 American Political Science Review 319-33.
17. Lowi, Theodore. 1969. The End of Liberalism. New York: W. W. Norton.
18. Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew McCubbins. 1994. “Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed,” 10 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 96-125.
19. McCubbins, Mathew, and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,” 2 American Journal of Political Science 165-79.
20. McKelvey, Richard, and Peter Ordeshook. 1985. “Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources,” 36 Journal of Economic Theory 55-85.
21. Moe, Terry. 1989. “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure,” in J. Chubb and P. Peterson, eds., Can the Government Govern? Washington, D.C.: Brookings.
22. Potters, J., and F. Van Winden. 1992. “Lobbying and Asymmetric Information,” 74 Public Choice 269-92.
23. Rabin, Matthew. 1994.'“A Model of Pre-Game Communication,” 63 Journal of Economic Theory 370-91.
24. Ripley, Randall, and Grace Franklin. 1984. Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy. Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press.
25. Romer, Thomas, and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agencies, and the Status Quo,” 33 Public Choice 27-43.
26. Rothenberg, Lawrence. 1992. Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at Common Cause. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
27. Salisbury, Robert. 1990. “The Paradox of Interest Groups in Washington-More Groups, Less Clout,” in A. King, ed., The New American Political System. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press.
28. Wallich, Paul. 1994. “Lies, Damned Lies and Models,” 270(1) Scientific American 151.
29. Weingast, Barry. 1984. “The Congressional Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (With Applications to the SEC),” 44 Public Choice 147-91.
30. Wilson, James. 1989. Bureaucracy. New York: Basic Books.