Corporate bankruptcy as a filtering device: Chapter 11 reorganizations and out-of-court debt restructurings

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 1994, Pages 268-295

  White, Michelle J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21844487253     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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