Learning from oversight: Fire alarms and police patrols reconstructed

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 1994, Pages 96-125

  Lupia, Arthur ^a   Mccubbins, Mathew D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21844485445     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/10.1.96     Document Type: Article

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