Bargaining under rules versus standards

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 1995, Pages 256-281

  Johnston, Jason Scott ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21844484742     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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