Information and sorting in the market for obstetrical services

Health Economics

Volumn 14, Issue 7, 2005, Pages 703-719

  Grant, Darren ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

Cesarean section; Consumer information

Indexed keywords

ACCURACY; ARTICLE; CALCULATION; CESAREAN SECTION; CONSUMER; CONTROLLED STUDY; EMPIRICISM; FEMALE; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HEALTH ECONOMICS; HUMAN; MARKETING; MEDICAL DECISION MAKING; MEDICAL INFORMATION; METHODOLOGY; OBSTETRIC CARE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; REGRESSION ANALYSIS; RISK ASSESSMENT; STATISTICAL MODEL;

CESAREAN SECTION; CONSUMER ADVOCACY; DECISION SUPPORT TECHNIQUES; DELIVERY, OBSTETRIC; FEMALE; HUMANS; INFORMATION DISSEMINATION; MODELS, ECONOMIC; MODELS, STATISTICAL; PATIENT PARTICIPATION; PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE PATTERNS; QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE;

EID: 21844433717     PISSN: 10579230     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/hec.968     Document Type: Article

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