Judicial modification of contracts between sophisticated parties: A more complete view of incomplete contracts and their breach

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 9, Issue 2, 1993, Pages 230-255

  Hermalin, Benjamin E ^a   Katz, Michael L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21344492543     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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