Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 1993, Pages 692-708

  Brams, Steven J ^a   Doherty, Ann E ^b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Andover Newton Theological School   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21344476704     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002793037004006     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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