Rationality, rational analysis, and human reasoning

Psychology of Reasoning: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 43-74

  Chater, Nick ^a   Oaksford, Mike ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

^b CARDIFF UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21344452383     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203506936     Document Type: Chapter

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