Setting precedents in anarchy military intervention and weapons of mass destruction

International Security

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 77-106

  Kier, Elizabeth ^a   Mercer, Jonathan ^a  

^a Department at the University of California ^*

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 21344439049     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.20.4.77     Document Type: Article

References (109)

1. Quoted in Steven A. Holmes,State Dept. Specialist on Croatia Quits to Protest Policy in Balkans,New York Times, August 24,1993, AS.
2. Brent Scowcroft,Who Can Harness History? Only the U.S.,Neiu York Times, July 2, 1993, A15.
3. Anthony Lewis,The End of an Era, New York Times, May 24,1993, A15.
4. Excerpts From Bush's Remarks on His Order to Enlarge U.S. Gulf Force, New York Times, November 9, 1990, A12.
5. Madeleine Albright quoted in Paul Lewis,West, at UN, Warns Serbs of its Resolve to Use Force, New York Times, February 15, 1995, A4.
6. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Robert Jervis,Security Regimes, in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983);
7. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977);
8. Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
9. Nina Tannenwald,Dogs that Don't Bark: The United States, the Role of Norms and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons in the Post-World War II Period, Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1995; Richard Price,A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, International Organization, . 49, No. 1 (Winter 1995);
10. and Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modem Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). - '
11. Personal correspondence. Also see Richard Price,A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1994, . 140-144, 147-156, and es. 164-167.
12. On multi-Iateralism, see John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: Tlie Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). For a discussion of customary law in international politics, see Anthony D'Amato, Tlie Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971).
13. Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare, 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System (New York: Holmes and Meiers, 1980).
14. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I960), 107.
15. Schelling, Anns and Influence, 134.
16. For examples, see the chapters by Oran Young and by Donald J. Puchala and Raymold F. Hopkins in Krasner, International Regimes.
17. This has been the focus of much of the work on regimes by neoliberal institutionalists. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
18. For further discussion, see Steven R. Ratner,The Gulf of Sidra Incident of 1981: The Lawfulness of Peacetime Aerial Engagements, in W. Michael Reisrnan and Andrew R. Willard, eds., International Incidents: Tlie Law that Counts in World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988);
19. and Scott Sagan,Rules of Engagement, in Alexander George, ed., Inadvertent War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991).
20. For further discussion of how and when reputations form, see Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
21. For example, see Martha Finnemore,Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention, in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
22. We thank Robert Jervis for help on this point.
23. Making Rules for War: The World Tries Again/' The Economist, March 11,1985, 21.
24. White House press briefing to announce the GLOBE Program, March 22, 1994.
25. William Drozdiak,Dole Places Bosnia Atop Senate Agenda, Washington Post, November 30, 1994, Al.
26. Daniel Williams,West Begins New Effort On Bosnia, Washington Post, December 5, 1994, A25.
27. Quoted in Chuck Sudetic,Peace Plan Spurs New Serb Attacks, New York Times, February 8, 1993, A8.
28. See Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns.
29. See Schelling, Arms and Influence, . 156-157.
30. Roger Dingman,Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War, International Security, . 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), . 50-91.
31. Daniel Calingaert,Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War, Journal of Strategic Studies, . 11, No. 2 Gune 1988), . 177-202.
32. Calingaert,Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War, 193. On Elsenhower's fear of the negative international reaction to the use of nuclear weapons, see John Lewis Gaddis,The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System, International Security, . 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), . 136-137.
33. Brad Roberts,The Chemical Weapons Convention and World Order, in Benoît Morel and Kyle Olson, eds., Shadows and Substance: The Chemical Weapons Convention (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 3.
34. Kathryn Sikkink,The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), . 139-170, es145.
35. Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy: Hie Role of Ethics in International Affairs (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 88.
36. Quoted in James W. Davis, Jr.The Forgotten Variable: The Role of Promises in Deterrence, Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1995, . 291-292.
37. Helen Dewar and David Huffman,Baker Denies Contra-Aid Agreement Sets Precedent for Power-Sharing, Washington Post, April 8,1989, A9.
38. Martine Letts, Robert Mathews, Tim McCormack, and Chris Moraitis,The Conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention: An Australian Perspective, Arms Control, . 14, No. 3 (December 1993), 319. Unlike the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits not only the use of chemical weapons, but also the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The negotiations were concluded in August 1992 and the Convention was opened for signature in January 1993.
39. See Nicholas Kristof,Japan Confronting Gruesome War Atrocity, New York Times, March 17, 1995, . Al, 14.
40. Bull, Wie Anarchical Society, . 33-34, 3S-39,115, 316-317.
41. For cultural and social psychological accounts, respectively, of why people often interpret the same behavior differently, see Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: France and Britain Between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, forthcoming); and Mercer, Reputation and International Politics.
42. Quoted in Schelling, Anns and Influence, 141.
43. Even in 1966 when Schelling made this argument, he cautioned that theseevents may not have been as plain to the North 'Vietnamese as they were to others. See ibid., . 145, 151.
44. The following discussion is from The Pentagon Papers (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), . 234-261.
45. Quoted in Tim Larimer,In Hanoi, Ex-Foes Revisit Vietnam War's Turning Point, New York Times, November 10,1995, A3. When MacNamara testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1968, he claimed he hadunimpeachable proof of the second attack.
46. See George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Inved in Vietnam (New York: Knopf, 1986), . 219-225.
47. North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap viewed the Tonkin Gulf incident as part ofa plan of sabotage activities on the sea and in the air in order to seek the aroval of Congress for widening the war. Quoted in Larimer,In Hanoi, Ex-Foes Revisit Vietnam War's Turning Point.
48. See Elaine Sciolino,Distrust of U.S. Hinders Iran Chief, Nezv York Times, April 10,1992, A3.
49. SeeSenator Hayakavva's Meetings with President and Mrs. Marcos, January 23,1980, in the National Security Archive's Philiines collection, fiche item number 01586;Is the Soviet Union Next? U.S. Neivs and World Report, January 15,1990, 34; Alan Cooperman,The Wages of War, U.S. Neivs and World Report, January 16, 1995, . 41-43;
50. Professor Xue Mouhong, Beijing University,China's Role in Asian-Pacific Security, Seminar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, March 1,1995.
51. John M. Goshko,Baker Urged to Aid ANC in S. Africa, Washington Post, March 13, 1990, A13.
52. Terry Nardin,The Laws of War and Moral Judgment, in Richard Falk, Friedrich Kratochwil, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., International Law: A Contemporary Perspective (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 451.
53. Paul Lewis,Haiti Wants U.N. to Monitor Vote, New York Times, July 22,1990, A10.
54. David Halloran Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 19491989 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), . 25-26.
55. Steven Greenhouse,Clinton Thanks Ukraine With $200 Million, New York Times, November 23,1994, A8.
56. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 153.
57. See Jervis,Security Regimes, 194;
58. Herman Kahn, Thinking About the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), . 148-149.
59. On the importance of sunk costs in the maintenance of international regimes, see Keohane, After Hegemony, 102.
60. Quoted in John Damton,Catholics and Protestants Parade Together in Ulster for St. Patrick, New York Times, March 18,1995, Al.
61. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 138.
62. James Ray,The Abolition of Slavery and the End of International War, International Organization, . 43, No. 3 (Summer 1989), . 405-439.
63. For example, see Keohane, After Hegemony; Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986).
64. Larry B. Stammer,Attacks on Reactors Set a Precedent/' Los Angeles Times, January 26,1991, A6.
65. J.P. Perry Robinson, Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention, in Morel and Olson, Shadows and Substance, p. 44.
66. George Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree? Wisconsin Law Revieiv, Vol. 1969, No. 2 (1969), p. 403. Whether the use of herbicides or defoliants in war is a violation of the protocol is disputed. See ibid., pp. 406-407.
67. George Bunn, The Banning of Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: The U.N. Role, Proceedings of the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 64, No. 4 (September 1970), p. 198.
68. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Incendiary Weapons (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1975), pp. 23-24. Also see discussion in Bunn, The Banning of Poison Gas, pp. 202-208.
69. Bureau of Naval Personnel, Gas! Know Your Chemical Warfare (Washington, D.C., June 1945).
70. Quoted in SIPRI, Incendiary Weapons, p. 202.
71. Quoted in Bunn, Banning Poison Gas, Wisconsin Law Review, p. 400.
72. Ibid., pp. 404-405.
73. See, for example, Kratochwil, Rules, Nonas, and Decisions, pp. 45-68;
74. and Helen Milner, The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory, Review of International Studies, Vol. 17 (January 1991), pp. 67-85.
75. Stare decisis is the legal principle that requires courts to abide by laws and precedents previously laid down as applicable to a similar set of facts.
76. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 96, No. 4 (February 1983), pp. 781-827.
77. W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of International Law, in Reisman and Willard, eds., International Incidents.
78. Anthony Lewis, . .. Or Karadzic Dead, New York Times, May 29, 1995, p. A17.
79. Quoted in Ernst B. Haas, Collective Conflict Management: Evidence for a New World Order? in Thomas G. Weiss, ed., Collective Security in a Changing World (London: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 81.
80. Ibid.
81. Non-lethal weapons are probably also under development in France, Israel, Italy, Russia, and the United Kingdom. See Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and Implications, Report of an Independent Task Force, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (1995), p. ix.
82. See SASC Provides $37.2 Million for New Non-Lethal Weapons Office, Aerospace Daily, Vol. 175, No. 18 (July 28, 1995), p. 141.
83. Some of these weapons might better be called pre-lethal, since their intent is to immobilize an adversary to make the kill easier. See Charles Swett, Strategic Assessment: Non-Lethal Weapons, unpublished memorandum, November 9,1993, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict); Steven Aftergood, The Soft-Kill Fallacy, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1994, pp. 40-45.
84. Swett, Strategic Assessment, p. 14;
85. Arthur Knoth, Disabling Technologies: A Critical Assessment, International Defense Review, Vol. 27, No. 7 (1994), p. 38.
86. Knoth, Disabling Technologies, p. 35;
87. John Lancaster, Pentagon, Justice Dept. Set Plans for Sharing Nonlethal Technology, Washington Post, March 23, 1994, p. A3.
88. Swett, Strategic Assessment, p. 14.
89. Knoth, Disabling Technologies, p. 35.
90. Ibid.
91. Knoth, Disabling Technologies, pp. 38-39; Lancaster, Pentagon, Justice Dept. Set Plans for Sharing Nonlethal Technology, p. A3. Sandia National Laboratory is developing skunk shots which are described as malodorous paints delivered as sprays.
92. See William B. Scott, Panel's Report Backs Nonlethal Weapons, Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 16,1995, p. 50.
93. For a discussion of whether these and other NLWs violate existing weapons treaties, see Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, 'Non-lethal' weapons may violate treaties, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1994, pp. 44-15.
94. See especially Robert Jervis, The Symbolic Nature of Nuclear Politics, in The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
95. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment, Washington, D.C., August 1992, p. 2-12. Cited by Hans M. Kristensen and Joshua Handler, Changing Targets: Nuclear Doctrine from the Cold War to the Third World, published by Greenpeace, March 1, 1995. Also see Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, JCS, April 1993, ibid.
96. Bruce G. Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1995), pp. 5-8.
97. For an opposing view, see the carefully reasoned articles by scholars from RAND and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: David Gompert, Kenneth Watman, and Dean Wilkening, Nuclear First Use Revisited, Survival, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Autumn 1995), pp. 27-44; Kathleen C. Bailey, Deterrence of Biological Weapons, paper presented at a Security Studies conference on Deterrence after the Cold War: Theoretical Perspectives and Policy Implications of Enduring Rivalries, September 13-15, 1995, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
98. The yields of these new weapons range from about one ton of TNT to about ten thousand tons. The nuclear bombs dropped over Japan were equivalent to about 20,000 tons of TNT. Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S. Howard II, Countering the Threat of the Well-Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Review, Vol. 4, No. 19 (Fall 1991), pp. 34-40.
99. John Nuckolls, A Legacy of Achievement, An Agenda for Shaping the Future, Preparing for the 21st Century: 40 Years of Excellence, Department of Energy and University of California, UCRLAR-108618 (late 1992), p. 164, cited in Kristensen and Handler, Changing Targets.
100. Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 29, 1993, p. 13, reprinted in Kristensen and Handler, Changing Targets. For more on Precision Low-Yield Weapons Design and small-yield nuclear weapons, see William Arkin, Nuclear Junkies: Those Lovable Little Bombs, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1993, pp. 22-25.
101. See Bailey, Deterrence of Biological Weapons. Daniel Goure of the Center for Strategic and International Studies also calls for the development of very low yield nuclear weapons. See Goure's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, May 5,1995.
102. See the U.S. Navy, STRATPLAN 2010, Phase II (June 1992), p. 94. STRATPLAN 2010 is the U.S. Navy's assessment of its role in both long-range strategic nuclear deterrence and emerging non-nuclear missions. A declassified version is reprinted in Kristensen and Handler, Changing Targets. It is not dear how the NDRF warhead differs from an electromagnetic pulse generated by a high-altitude burst of a nuclear weapon. See Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, comp. and ed., The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense and the Energy Research and Development Administration, 1977), pp. 514-540.
103. In the case of the NDRF warhead, no trade-off may be necessary between battlefield utility and preservation of the convention against the use of nuclear weapons. The labs are developing a non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NNEMP) warhead that has the same effects as the NDRF warhead, but would not put at risk the convention against the use of nuclear weapons. Knoth, Disabling Technologies, p. 37.
104. Quoted in Schelling, Arms and Influence, p. 134.
105. See John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; Steven E. Miller, The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 67-80; Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).
106. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p. 257.
107. For example, see Mark Neufeld, Interpretation and the 'Science' of International Relations, Review of International Studies, Vol. 19 (1993), pp. 39-61.
108. Burdick H. Brittin, International Law for Seagoing Officers (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981), pp. 65-67. We thank George Bunn for bringing this example to our attention.
109. We thank David Dessler for helping us develop this concluding argument.