The international labor organization and the welfare state: Institutional effects on national welfare spending, 1960–80

International Organization

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 1993, Pages 235-262

  Strang, David ^a   Chang, Patricia Mei Yin ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 21144481741     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: 15315088     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300027934     Document Type: Article

References (90)

1. For arguments concerning organized labor, see Francis G. Castles and R. D. McKinlay “Public Welfare Provision and the Sheer Futility of a Sociological Approach to Politics,” British Journal of Political Science 9 (April 1979), pp. 157-72;
2. John D. Stephens, The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980);
3. Gosta Esping-Andersen, Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985);
4. Walter Korpi, “Power, Politics, and State Autonomy in the Development of Social Citizenship: Social Rights During Sickness in Eighteen OECD Countries Since 1930,” American Sociological Review 54 (June 1989), pp. 309–28.
5. For a discussion emphasizing the middle class, see Peter Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
6. Finally, for an argument that focuses on the elderly, see Fred C. Pampel and John B. Williamson, “Welfare Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950–1980 ” American Journal of Sociology 93 (May 1988), pp. 1424–56.
7. Examples of arguments stressing the structural consequences of industrialization include Clark Kerr's works Labor and Management in Industrial Society (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1964) and The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or Continuing Diversity? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).
8. The seminal empirical analysis of welfare expenditures, flowing mainly from this tradition, is Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of Public Expenditure (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975).
9. For a more historical discussion, see Peter Flora and Jens Alber, “Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe,”
10. Peter Flora and J.A. Heidenhammer, eds., The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1981), pp. 37–80.
11. For Marxist formulations, see James O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973); and the essays collected in Claus Offe, ed., Contradictions of the Welfare State (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984).
12. Foundational analyses of this type include Hugh Heclo, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974);
13. Ann S. Orloff and Theda Skocpol, “Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Public Social Spending in Britain, 1900–1911, and the United States, 1880s—1920,” American Sociological Review 49 (December 1984), pp. 726-50;
14. Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, “State Structures and the Possibilities for ‘Keynesian’ Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 107–68.
15. This work is sometimes referred to as the “new” institutionalism to distinguish it from “old” institutionalism of Talcott Parsons and Philip Selznick. The new institutionalism grew out of the study of formal organizations; see the papers collected in Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
16. For a programmatic statement, see John W. Meyer, John Boli, and George M. Thomas, “Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account,” in George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli, eds., Institutional Structure (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1987), pp. 12–38.
17. Most empirical work centers on the worldwide expansion of mass schooling and the parallel homogenization of the curriculum; see, for example, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and Yasemin N. Soysal, “World Expansion of Mass Education, 1870-1980,” Sociology of Education 63 (April 1992), pp. 128-49;
18. Aaron Benavot, Yun-Kyung Cha, David Kamens, John W. Meyer, and Suk-Ying Wong, “Knowledge for the Masses: World Models and National Curricula, 1920-1986,” American Sociological Review 56 (February 1991), pp. 85–100.
19. Other concerns include the expansion of codified statuses and the cultural expansion of the nation-state system. On personal status, see John Boli and John W. Meyer, “The Ideology of Childhood and the State: Rules Distinguishing Children in National Constitutions, 1870-1970,” American Sociological Review 43 (December 1978), pp. 797–812.
20. On collective status, see David Strang, “From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of Decolonization, 1870-1987,” American Sociological Review 55 (December 1990), pp. 846–60.
21. The direction of influence thus parallels that explicated in Peter A. Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” International Organization 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881–912.
22. Much of its substance also turns on the role of scientists and professionals, in ways consistent with the arguments voiced by Peter Haas. See “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control,” International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 377-404; and Peter Haas, ed., “Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination,” special issue, International Organization (Winter 1992), an issue devoted to epistemic communities. Some parallels here are spelled out in David Strang and John W. Meyer, “Institutional Conditions for Diffusion,” Theory and Society, in press.
23. Excellent expositions and discussions of the regime concept include Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983);
24. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984);
25. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753-75;
26. Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes,” International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 491–517.
27. The “reflexive” or “constructivist” positions adopted by these authors undergird this article's discussion of regimes. For an argument connecting debates within international relations to sociological concerns, see Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425. Regime analysis of the type labeled “modified structural” by Stephen Krasner sees regimes as mediating between interests and capabilities on the one hand and behavior on the other. For example, regimes may be characterized as solutions to problems of complex interdependence where the uncoordinated pursuit of self-interest produces suboptimal outcomes for all.
28. Haggard and Simmons, “Theories of International Regimes.”
29. Stein Kuhnle, “The Growth of Social Insurance Programs in Scandinavia: Outside Influences and Internal Forces,” in Flora and Heidenheimer, The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, pp. 125–50.
30. David Collier and Richard E. Messick “Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption,” American Political Science Review 69 (December 1975), pp. 1299–315. Today, 142 countries have some type of national welfare legislation.
31. Chikako Usui, “The Origin and the Development of Modern Welfare States: A Study of Societal Forces and World Influences on the Adoption of Social Insurance Policies Among Sixty-three Countries, 1880-1976,” Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1987.
32. George M. Thomas and Pat Lauderdale, “State Authority and National Welfare Programs in the World System Context,” Sociological Forum 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 383–99.
33. See Patricia M. Y. Chang and David Strang, “Internal and External Sources of the Welfare State: A Cross-National Analysis, 1950-1980,” presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Washington, D.C., 11–15 August 1990;
34. Fred C. Pampel and John B. Williamson, Age, Class, Politics and the Welfare State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 4.
35. See Peter J. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984) and Small States in World Markets (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
36. David R. Cameron, “The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 72 (December 1978), pp. 1243–61.
37. See Thomas and Lauderdale, “State Authority and National Welfare Programs in the World System Context”; and Chang and Strang, “Internal and External Sources of the Welfare State.”
38. Pampel and Williamson, Age, Class, Politics, and the Welfare State.
39. See Cameron, “The Expansion of the Public Economy”; and Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change and Small States in World Markets.
40. We can give only the most cursory overview of ILO history and organizational structure. Detailed accounts include James T. Shotwell, The Origins of the International Labor Organization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934);
41. Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964);
42. Robert W. Cox, “ILO: Limited Monarchy,” in Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., The Anatomy of Influence (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 59-101;
43. Walter Galenson, The International Labor Organization (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981);
44. Victor-Yves Ghebali, The International Labour Organisation (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989). Galenson also provides some preliminary evidence about the impact of ILO conventions.
45. We use the term “corporatism” after the fashion illuminated by Phillippe C. Schmitter, “Still the Century of Corporatism?” The Review of Politics 36 (January 1974), pp. 85–131.
46. See Robert W. Cox, “Labor and Hegemony,” International Organization 31 (Summer 1977), pp.385-424.
47. For details of ILO reporting requirements and its review process, see E. A. Landy, The Effectiveness of International Supervision (London: Stevens and Sons, 1966); and Ghebali, The International Labour Organisation, pp. 220–41.
48. Ghebali, The International Labour Organisation, pp. 225–28.
49. James M. Malloy, The Politics of Social Security in Brazil (Pittsburgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979).
50. Landy, The Effectiveness of International Supervision.
51. See Ernst B. Haas's works Beyond the Nation-State, and Human Rights and International Action (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970).
52. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 12–13.
53. Stina Lagregen, “The Influence of ILO Standards on Swedish Law and Practice,” International Labour Review 125 (May/June 1986), pp. 305–28. The law is quoted on p. 319.
54. E. A. Landy, “The Influence of International Labour Standards: Possibilities and Performance,” International Labour Review 101 (June 1970), p. 566.
55. Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
56. C. E. Landau, “The Influence of ILO Standards on Australian Labour Law and Practice,” International Labour Review 126 (November-December, 1987), pp. 669–90, particularly p. 677.
57. Alexandre Berenstein, “The Influence of International Labour Conventions on Swiss Legislation,” International Labour Review 77 (June 1958), pp. 495–518.
58. Consideration of ILO conventions may stimulate activities that affect state policy without leading to ratification. For example, Britain's failure to ratify the ILO's convention on equal pay for equal work mobilized constituencies that successfully pressed for new policy; see Evan Luard, International Agencies (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1977). If substantial numbers of countries did not belong to the ILO, it would be possible to assess a broad range of direct and indirect effects by examining the effect of membership. However, virtually all states are members of the ILO today, as has been true through most of the organization's history. We study the effects of ratification because this seems to provide the best opportunity for analytic leverage.
59. Kratochwil and Ruggie, “International Organization,” pp. 764–66.
60. Robert H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
61. This notion is strongly expressed in John W. Meyer, “The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State,” in Albert Bergesen, ed., Studies of the Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1980), pp. 109–38.
62. International Labour Organisation (ILO), The Cost of Social Security (Geneva: ILO, various years).
63. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality.
64. See Nancy B. Tuma and Michael T. Hannan, Social Dynamics (Orlando, Fla.: Academic Press, 1984), pp. 430-47.
65. James A. Stimson, “Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay,” American Journal of Political Science 29 (1985), pp. 914–47.
66. The federal structure of the U.S. government is sometimes cited to explain low levels of ratifications. While a federal structure does pose certain difficulties for ratification, on average federal states have ratified ILO conventions more frequently than have unitary states. See Karl N. Dahl, “The Role of ILO Standards in Global Integration Process, ” Journal of Peace Research vol. 5, no. 4,1968, pp. 309–51.
67. Stephens, Transition from Capitalism to Socialism, p. 149.
68. See the essays in Margaret Weir, Ann S. Orloff, and Theda Skocpol, eds., The Politics of Social Policy in the United States (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
69. An excellent review is provided by Michael Shalev, “The Social Democratic Model and Beyond: Two ‘Generations’ of Comparative Research on the Welfare State,” in Richard Tomasson, ed., Comparative Social Research (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1983), pp. 315–52.
70. Pampel and Williamson, “Welfare Spending in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950—1980.”
71. See Katzenstein's works Corporatism and Change and Small States in World Markets', and Cameron, “The Expansion of the Public Economy.”
72. We do not wish to make much of these results, however. We continue to ignore the potential effects of autocorrelation bias and multicollinearity where they solely concern variables added as statistical controls, since our goal is to test the robustness of the effect of ILO ratifications (which is unaffected by relationships among the regressors with which it is uncorrelated—here, all other effects in the model). Excellent quantitative analyses of the effects of internal characteristics are noted above. See also Alexander Hicks and Duane Swank, “On the Political Economy of Welfare Expansion: A Comparative Analysis of Eighteen Advanced Capitalist Democracies, 1960-71,” Comparative Political Studies 17 (April 1984), pp. 81–120.
73. See Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, pp. 447-48.
74. Haas, Human Rights and International Action, p. 117.
75. Tadashi Hanami, “The Influence of ILO Standards on Law and Practice in Japan,” International Labour Review 120 (November-December 1981), pp. 765–79.
76. Maurice Cashiell, “The Influence on Irish Law and Practice of International Labor Standards,” International Labour Review 106 (July 1972), pp. 47–74.
77. Kent E. Calder, “Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State,” World Politics 40 (July 1988), pp. 517–41.
78. Maria Maguire, “Ireland,” in Peter Flora, ed., Growth to Limits, vol. 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981), pp. 241–384.
79. See Karl N. Dahl, “The Influence of I.L.O. Standards on Norwegian Legislation,” International Labour Review 90 (September 1964), pp. 226-51.
80. Gerhard Schnorr, “The Influence of ILO Standards on Law and Practice in the Federal Republic of Germany,” International Labour Review 110 (December 1974), pp. 539-64.
81. Stina Lagregen, “The Influence of ILO Standards on Swedish Law and Practice.” International Labour Review.
82. Alfonso Plata-Castilla, “International Labour Standards and Colombian Legislation,” International Labour Review 99 (February 1969), pp. 137–58.
83. See V. K. R. Menon, “The Influence of International Labour Conventions on Indian Labour Legislation,” International Labour Review 73 (June 1956), pp. 551-71.
84. Amor Abdeljaouad, “The Influence of International Labour Conventions on Tunisian Legislation,” International Labour Review 91 (March 1965), pp. 191–209.
85. ILO, “Social Security and I.L.O. Technical Cooperation in Libya,” International Labour Reviews 91 (April 1965), pp. 292–320.
86. The best statement of this argument is Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields,” American Sociological Review 48 (April 1983), pp. 147–60.
87. The best statement of this argument is found in John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of Sociology 83 (September 1977), pp. 340–63.
88. See Robert W. Cox, “The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization,” International Organization 23 (Spring 1969), pp. 205-30.
89. Cox, “Labor and Hegemony.” The argument central to much contemporary organization theory that organizations are interpenetrated by their institutional environments is discussed by Gayl D. Ness and Steven R. Brechin, “Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations,” International Organization 42 (Spring 1988), pp. 245–73.
90. G. John Ikenberry, “Explaining the Diffusion of State Norms: Coercion, Competition, and Learning in the International System,” presented at the meetings of the International Studies Association, London, 28 March 1989.