Government Coercion of Dissidents: Deterrence or Provocation?

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 1993, Pages 301-339

  Gupta, Dipak K ^a   Singh, Harinder ^a   Sprague, Tom ^b  

^a SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b California ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 21144480065     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002793037002004     Document Type: Article

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