Don't bite the PAC that feeds you: Business PAC punishment over the China vote

American Politics Research

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 138-154

  Jackson, David J ^a   Engel, Steven T ^b  

^a BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGIA SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Campaign financing; Labor politics; PAC punishment; Political action committees; Trade politics

Indexed keywords

EID: 21144442629     PISSN: 1532673X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X02250289     Document Type: Review

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