Problems and prospects for democratic settlements: South Africa as a model for the middle east and Northern Ireland?

Politics and Society

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 277-326

  Jung, Courtney ^a   Lust Okar, Ellen ^b   Shapiro, Ian ^b,c  

^a NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Department of Political Science ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Democratic transition; Israel Palestine; Negotiations; Northern Ireland; South Africa

Indexed keywords

EID: 20744460721     PISSN: 00323292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0032329205275196     Document Type: Article

References (166)

1. See "Sharon Backtracks on Israeli 'Occupation'," Newsmax.com Wires (May 28, 2003) at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/5/28/100340.shtml (6/13/2003)
2. and James Bennett, "Hamas Breaks of Talks on Stopping Attacks on Israel," New York Times, June 11, 2003.
3. See Colin Knox and Paul Quirk eds., Peace building in Northern Ireland, Israel and South Africa: Transition, Transformation and Reconciliation (Basingstoke, Eng.: Palgrave, 2000);
4. Ian Lustick, "Necessary Risks: Lessons for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process from Ireland and Algeria." Middle East Policy, Vol. I, no. 2 (1994),
5. Ian Lustick, Unsettled states, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994);
6. Donald Akenson, God's Peoples: Covenant and Land in South Africa, Israel, and Ulster (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992);
7. Heribert Benjamin Gidron, Stanley Nider Katz, Yeheskel Hasenfeld, eds. Mobilizing for Peace: Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
8. So for example we rely on the work of Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991),
9. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986),
10. and Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) to think through the logic of SAMENI conflict resolution. These three negotiations have rarely been analyzed in the transplacement literature.
11. One notable exception is Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). In Jung and Shapiro, "South Africa's Negotiated Transition," we also used the model of transplacements to think through the dynamics of negotiation in South Africa.
12. Counterfactual speculation is inherently difficult, though we adduce considerable evidence in support of these claims below. With respect to South Africa, it merits reporting that F.W. De Klerk believes that had he been assassinated after the March 1992 referendum the negotiations would likely have been concluded successfully, but that this is much more doubtful had it occurred before the referendum when the government was losing by-elections to conservatives. De Klerk reports that the decision to call the referendum was the only unilateral decision of his presidency. He consulted no one in the cabinet or the National Party leadership because he knew they would oppose it. Even if a new leader wanted to call a referendum, he doubts that either of the likely contenders (Pik Botha and Roelf Meyer) would have been able to do so, given the need to establish themselves in the party leadership. At the very least the process would have been significantly delayed (interview with author, December 9, 2003). Given our discussion of the importance of timing below, this might well have been sufficient to derail it permanently.
13. If de Klerk had been killed, the only conceivable replacement who might have been able to carry the NP and the military through negotiations was Roelf Meyer. But Meyer was a very junior minister, without much standing in the party. It seems more likely that Pik Botha would have assumed leadership and resorted to reforming apartheid. SADF support for the transition was at best tenuous at the time of the referendum.
14. Under the Special Powers Act (1922) the Minister for Home Affairs could, among other things, "arrest without charge or warrant, intern without trial, prohibit the holding of coroners' inquests, flog, execute, use depositions of witnesses as 'evidence' without requiring them to be present for cross-examination or rebuttal, destroy buildings, requisition land or property, ban any organization, be it political, social, or trade; prohibit meetings, publications, and even gramophone records." John McGuffin, Internment! (Tralee, Ireland: Anvil Books, 1973), p. 22.
15. Proscription is the power to outlaw organizations, enshrined in the 1887 Criminal Law and Proceedings (Ireland) Act. "Proscription in its Contemporary Guise is Located in Section 21 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978." "A person is guilty of an offense if he belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organization." Clive Walker. "Political Violence and Democracy in Northern Ireland," The Modern Law Review, Vol. 51, no.5 (September, 1988), p. 612.
16. In this connection it is perhaps heartening that at a conference on democratic transitions and consolidation consisting of some 100 academic experts from 36 countries plus 33 heads and former heads of state held in Madrid in October/November 2001, a final report was adopted in which it was agreed that "rights of citizenship should apply equally to all citizens" and that the majority "must avoid all temptation to define the nation in ethnic terms in the constitutional text or its political practice." See Diego Hidalgo, ed., Conference on Democratic Transitions and Consolidation (Madrid, Spain: Siddharth Mehta Ediciones, 2002) p. 34.
17. See also Ari Shavit, "Cry, the Beloved Two-State Solution," Ha'aretz, August 7, 2003. http://www.jfjfp.org/BackgroundQ/two-states_aug03.htm
18. The language of hardliners and reformers, moderates and radicals, is used in the literature on democratic transitions. See in particular Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, pp. 67-70
19. and Huntington, The Third Wave, pp. 151-64. The terms reformers and moderates do not refer to the content of political ideologies. Rather, they denote players who are willing to entertain outcomes that differ from their political ideals in search of a mutually acceptable solution.
20. Moshe Halbertal, as quoted by Thomas Friedman, "Yasir Arafat's Moment," New York Times, July 28, 2000.
21. Elisabeth Wood, Forging Democracy From Below: Negotiated Transitions in El Salvador and South Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
22. A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in Ramallah and the Harry S Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem found that 55.7 percent of Israelis surveyed believed that "Israel made too much of a compromise" at the Camp David Summit. PCPSR, "Results of Israeli Public Opinion Poll: July 27-31, 2000," www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2002/p1israelipoll.html (6/17/03).
23. Some incentives are long standing. For example, most observers argue that business elites in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel have long favored a peace settlement, and we have found striking evidence of this in Israel, where eighteen out of twenty-five top business executives we surveyed in 2003 favored an Oslo-style solution and only two opposed it. (See appendix). However, there is no evidence in any of these cases that the pressure from the business community was responsible for either beginning or continuing negotiations.
24. The UDF was the backbone of internal opposition to apartheid in the 1980s and widely considered the internal wing of the then-banned ANC. Jeremy Seekings, The UDF: The United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983-1991 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000).
25. An antiapartheid Afrikaner intellectual movement had its foundation in the late 1960s. Heribert Adam and Hermann Giliomee, Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change? (New Haven and London: Yale University press, 1979).
26. Suzanne Booysen, "The Legacy of Ideological Control: The Afrikaner Youth's Manipulated Political Consciousness," Politikon, 16, no. 1 (1989), pp. 7-25
27. The acronym stands for Convention on a Democratic South Africa. These were part of the "prenegotiations" in that the government insisted in involving more than twenty interests, including those who had no interest in a democratic transition such as the extreme white right and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Predictably they went nowhere. See Courtney Jung and Ian Shapiro, "South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order." Politics and Society Vol. 23, No 3 (1995), pp. 285-86.
28. In fact white economic elites realized this before the politicians, and began secret talks with the ANC as early as 1986, in Lusaka and Dakar. See Timothy D. Sisk, Democratization in South Africa: The Elusive Social Contract (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 78.
29. "Statement of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress on the Question of Negotiations," Lusaka, 9 October, 1987,
30. cited in Steven Friedman, The Long Journey: South Africa's Quest for a Negotiated Settlement (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1993), pp. 10-11.
31. The Tricameral Parliament was a last-ditch attempt by the NP to refashion the tatters of apartheid's divide-and-rule strategy by creating separate houses of parliament for Coloreds and Indians (though none for Blacks).
32. Israeli support for talks with the PLO consequently increased. A New York Times poll in April 1987 found that only 42 percent of respondents favored such talks. In contrast, a New York Times poll conducted in March 1989 found 58 percent of Israelis supported negotiations with the PLO if it recognized Israel and ceased terrorist activity. A poll by Yediot Aharonot found similar results the following month, with 59 percent of respondents supporting talks with the PLO. Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994): 724-725.
33. An independent poll conducted for PM Rabin on the eve of the Oslo Agreement also confirmed that the public would support an agreement, even if Arafat was involved. David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), p. 62.
34. During the 1990s, 900,000 former Soviet immigrants arrived, the largest immigration to Israel since the mid-1950s. More than 330,000 of these arrived in 1990 and 1991. Nurit Yaffee and Dorith Tal, "Immigration To Israel From The Former Soviet Union," 2000, p. 4. http://www.cbs.gov.il/engprfl.htm. (6/18/03).
35. James A. Baker III (with Thomas DeFrank), The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1995), p. 422.
36. On the development of business community support for agreement/ continuing peace process, see "In the Middle East: 'Peace is now irreversible,'" Business Week, November 20, 1995, pp. 62-4. A survey we conducted showed that twenty-two of twenty-five business executives believed the peace agreement would have a positive impact on their businesses, and twenty of twenty-four believed that it was of major importance. See appendix.
37. David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO, p. 12.
38. Rabin continued to oppose direct deals with the PLO until mid-1993, and only after August approved the draft Oslo Accord. Avi Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 91 (Spring 1994), p. 32.
39. Pamphlets distributed during the intifada, as well as a coordinated demonstration of Palestinian, Israeli, and international actors in 1990, called for "Two States for Two Peoples," a marked contrast from earlier calls for the elimination of Israel. Hanan Ashrawi, This Side of Peace (New York: Touchstone, 1995).
40. Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
41. PLO coziness with Iraq was not new. In the late 1980s, Iraq had promised it that it would commit fifty-four army divisions against Israel after the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and Arafat had described Iraq as defender of the "eastern gate" of the Arab nation. Similarly, in December 1989, Arafat praised the unveiling of a new Iraqi ballistic missile as a "gift to the intifadah." Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 640-1.
42. Approximately 400,000 Palestinians were thrown out of the Gulf countries, and the PLO lost an estimated $10 billion between 1991-93. Graham Usher, Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo (London: Pluto Press, 1995.), pp. 1-2.
43. Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State (Oxford University Press, 1997) p. 660.
44. The difference between what Northern Ireland collects in revenue and what it receives in transfers from London is the subvention. Northern Ireland's is higher than Scotland or Wales's. Interview with Dr. Esmond Birnie, former MLA, UUP July 29, 2003.
45. See Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland (N.J.: Athlone: London & Atlantic Heights (1996), p. 226,
46. and John Darby, Scorpions in a Bottle (London: Minority Rights Group, 1997)
47. and Eamonn Mallie and David McCittrick, The Fight for Peace: The Secret Story Behind the Irish Peace Process (London: Heinemann, 1996).
48. John Darby, "The Background to the Peace Process" (2003) http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm (6/17/03).
49. We are grateful to Brendan O'Leary for suggesting this interpretation of the effect of the Declaration on aspirations. See his "Afterword: What is Framed in the Framework Documents?" Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 18 (1995), pp. 862-72.
50. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
51. See Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
52. chapter one and "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense." In Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordón, eds., Democracy's Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 23-55.
53. For elaboration see Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory, pp. 88-93.
54. "From Setbacks To Living Together," New York Times, September 5, 1993.
55. See Jung and Shapiro, "South Africa's Negotiated Transition," pp. 280-82.
56. Ibid., p. 288.
57. Ibid., pp. 290-91.
58. Inkatha played an important role in the government of national unity in the decade after the transition, but on sufferance from the ANC which found it expedient to co-opt Buthelezi by keeping him in the cabinet.
59. However, there is meaningful local and regional political competition. In the Eastern Cape, the United Democratic Movement (UDM) formed by Bantu Holomisa who was expelled from the ANC in 1997 and Roelf Meyer, who had led the NP negotiating team in the transition, took away a substantial portion of the ANC vote to become the official opposition party in 1999. The Christian Democratic Party did the same thing in the Northern Transvaal. In both 1994 and 1999 Inkatha won elections in Natal, and the NP (in coalition with the DP after 1999) governs the Western Cape.
60. After the first election much of the NP defected to other opposition parties, and in 2004 the party effectively ceased to exist when its leaders decided to join the ANC.
61. See, for instance, Jung and Shapiro, "South Africa's Negotiated Transition," pp. 300-01.
62. Uri Savir, The Process, p. 5;
63. David Makovsky, Making Peace with the PLO, p. 39.
64. Yazid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for a State, pp. 658-60.
65. According to Edward Said, as early as 1992 Arafat seemed to be "staking his entire future on Rabin's electoral win." "Interview with Edward Said by Abdullah al-Sinnawi, al'Arabi," Cairo (January 30, 1995), trans. Joseph Massad in Edward Said, Peace and its Discontents (London: Random House, 1995), p. 179.
66. Ibid.;
67. Usher, Palestine in Crisis, pp. 14-20, 25-34.
68. On opposition in the Settlements, see Robert Friedman, "Report from the West Bank: An Unholy Rage," The New Yorker, March 7, 1994, pp. 54-56;
69. Ehud Sprinzak, Brother vs. Brother;
70. "Rabin Decides to Close Gazan Roads Near Settlements, Arafat Condemns Attacks," New York Times, October 4, 1995;
71. "Five Killed in Suicide Bombing of Bus 26 in Jerusalem," New York Times, August 21, 1995.
72. Barton Gellman, "Likud Leader Hammers Rabin, PLO Premier; Hopeful Netanyahu Claims Ascendancy of Israeli Opposition," Washington Post, September 9, 1995.
73. "Rabin Decides To Close Gazan Roads Near Settlements, Arafat Condemns Attacks;"
74. see also Conni Bruck, "A Reporter At Large: The Wounds of Peace" The New Yorker, October 8, 1995, pp. 64-91.
75. Janet Wallach and John Wallach, Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder (New York: Birch Lane, 1997), p. 460.
76. In our survey of business executives in 2003 twenty of twenty-five respondents believed that Rabin's assassination increased the likelihood that Oslo would fail. However, only twelve of them said that they recognized this in 1995.
77. Fifteen out of the top business executives we surveyed in 2003 thought this had been a strategic mistake by Peres. Nine of them thought his hard-line strategy in the run-up to the 1996 election harmed the prospects for peace.
78. According to polls conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research (TSC) at the University of Tel Aviv, the Oslo peace index of Israeli public opinion rose from 46.9 in October 1995 to 57.9 on November 8, immediately following Rabin's assassination. The index remained at 58 at the end of November, dropping to 55.8 in December. TSC, "Peace Index, 1995," http://spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace/ (6/18/03).
79. percent of Palestinians polled in October 1995 supported the peace process. JMCC Public Opinion Poll no. 10 http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/1995/no10.htm. For additional discussion of the missed opportunities for settlements under Rabin and Peres,
80. see Ellen Lust-Okar and A.F.K. Organski, "Coalitions and Conflict: The Case of Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations over the West Bank," Journal of Conflict Management and Peace Science (Spring, 2002).
81. By March 1996, Israelis had experienced 12 suicide bombings during the Oslo process. Four of these came in February and March 1996 alone, killing fifty-nine Israelis. Aish HaTorah, "Myths and Facts," http://www.aish.com/Israel/articles/Suicide_Bombings.asp (6/25/03).
82. A June 1996 poll by the TSC found that 70.7 percent of Israeli Jews supported a firmer stance towards the Palestinians. TSC, "Peace Index June 1996," spirit.tau.ac.il/socant/peace/peaceindex/ 1996/files/JUNE96e.pdf (6/25/03).
83. The number of settlers rose from 99,065 in 1991 to 186,135 in 1999. Foundation for Middle East Peace, "Special Report," 11 (6), November-December 2001, http://www.fmep.org/reports/2001/v11n6.html (6/25/03).
84. Had the aborted Wye Memorandum of October 1998 been implemented, Palestinians would have had control of more than 18.2 percent (Area A) of the West Bank and shared control (Area B) of more than 21.8 percent. Israelis would maintain full control of (Area C) more than 60 percent of the territory. Of the scheduled transfers, only 1 percent was territory moved from Area C to Area A, and 3 percent of territory designated Area B would have remained in "nature reserves" in which Palestinians would be prohibited from building. This agreement was signed after the initially declared deadline for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Wye Memorandum Agreement, October 23, 1998," http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH07o10 (6/25/03).
85. Rex Brynen, A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza (Washington: USIP, 2000), pp. 140-44.
86. A poll conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) from 3-5 June 1999 found that 71 percent of Palestinians believed the PA was corrupt, and 66 percent believed that the level of corruption would remain the same or increase in the future. CPRS, "Public Opinion Poll no.41," www.pcpsr.org/survey/cprspolls/99/poll41a.html (6/17/03).
87. The CPRS poll conducted from 3-5 June 1999 found that 70 percent of Palestinians surveyed supported the peace process, while 27 percent opposed it. At the same time, however, 66 percent of the respondents did not trust the peaceful intentions of the Barak government, in contrast to 23 percent expressing trust in the newly elected Israeli government. Similarly, 55 percent did not believe that final status negotiations would lead successfully to a permanent settlement, and 45 percent supported the continuation of armed attacks against Israel. Ibid.
88. The extent to which concessions offered at Camp David were "major" and intended to meet Arafat halfway remains controversial. However, it appears clear that these concessions went beyond previous Israeli offers (much to many Israelis' dismay), and indeed exceeded offers which Arafat had previously found more acceptable.
89. Barak won the 1999 elections for prime minister with 56.08 percent of the popular vote, vs. 43.92 percent for Netanyahu. See "Election Results 1999," Jerusalem Post, http://info.jpost.com/1999/Supplements/Elections99/final.html (6/22/03).
90. "Barak Survives No-Confidence Vote as Raids on Lebanon Resume, " CNN.com World, February 14, 2000, http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/02/14/mideast.02/ (6/22/03).
91. Thus, William Safire would attack Barak for making concessions in violation of his own election pledges by offering Arafat virtually all of the West Bank (including the Jordan Valley which would have meant relocating 40,000 Israeli settlers), a virtual guarantee of a right of return to all Palestinians around the world, and shared sovereignty with a new Palestinian state over portions of Jerusalem, "unthinkable only a year ago." "Why Is Arafat Smiling?" New York Times, July 27, 2000.
92. "Barak Survives No-Confidence Vote in Parliament," CNN.com World, July 10, 2000. http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/07/10/mideast.summit.02/ (6/22/03).
93. A Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre (JMCC) poll conducted 16-17 July 2000 found that 52.8 percent of respondents did not expect the delegations to reach an acceptable final agreement, while only 37.3 percent expected an agreement. More importantly, when asked "Are you confident or not confident in the Palestinian negotiating delegation in Camp David?" 34.7 percent lacked confidence and 7.8 percent "did not know." JMCC, "JMCC Public Opinion Poll no. 38 on Palestinian Attitudes towards the Camp David Summit, July 2000," www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2000/no38.html (6/17/03).
94. According to a Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) poll, 68 percent of Palestinians believed Arafat's overall position at Camp David was "just right," while 15 percent believed he had compromised too much. PCPSR, "Public Opinion Poll no. 1," 27-29 July 2000, www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2000/pla.html (6/17/03).
95. "The Ballad of Camp David," The Economist, July 2, 2000, p. 43.
96. For data supporting this conclusion, see PCPSR, "Public Opinion Poll no. 1."
97. James A. Baker III, "Peace, One Step at a Time," New York Times, July 27, 2000.
98. Even those who question whether Arafat turned Hamas and the Islamic Jihad "loose" on the Israelis argue that he did so in order to increase his bargaining position and ultimately gain a better settlement. Few seriously question whether he really sought to end the conflict and see a Palestinian state develop before his imminent death. As he made clear in his March 2002 interview with Christiane Amanpour, he sees the establishment of the Palestinian state (including East Jerusalem) not only as his personal mission, but as the very definition of who he is. See http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/03/29/arafat.cnna/ (3/29/2002).
99. In July 2000, 75 percent of Palestinians polled supported the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, but 60 percent believed that lasting peace was impossible. Moreover, 66 percent of Palestinians polled also believed that Israelis do not believe lasting peace is possible with Palestinians. PCPSR, "Public Opinion Poll no. 1."
100. Richard W. Stevenson "Bomb Wounds 100 in London as IRA Truce is Said to End," New York Times, February 10, 1996.
101. The idea of sufficient consensus was drawn directly from the South African CODESA negotiations, and predictably facilitated Unionist stonewalling. See Robert H. Mnookin "Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multi-lateral Negotiations" Journal of the Institute of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 159, no. 1 (2003). http://www.mohr.de/jrnl/jite/jite1591.htmno.Mnookin.
102. George J. Mitchell, Making Peace (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1999), p. 101.
103. Ibid., p. 104.
104. No agreement was in fact reached over decommissioning however, which of course continued to act as a stumbling block to implementation as late as 2005.
105. Mitchell, Making Peace, p. 108.
106. Ibid., p. 109.
107. Ibid., pp. 111, 117.
108. Ibid., p. 166.
109. John Darby, "Northern Ireland: The background to the Peace Process," CAIN Web Service http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/darby03.htm (June 5, 2003), p. 7.
110. Paul Bew "Initiative to Trimble but his edge over opponents is thin," The Path to Peace, Web site, April 1998 http://www.ireland.om/special/peace/results/analysis/analysis10.htm (5/25/2000) p. 1. 55 percent of Protestants approved the agreement.
111. In late 2000 The Northern Ireland Life and Times survey found that 14 percent of Protestants who voted "yes" in 1998 would now vote against the Agreement because of declining support for devolution and lack of progress on decommissioning. Hayes and McAllister, "Who Voted for Peace?"
112. and Bernadette Hayes and Lizanne Dowds "Underpinning Opinions: Declining Levels of support Among Protestants for the Good Friday Agreement," Paper presented at roundtable discussion by Democratic Dialogue 10 April 2001, Europa Hotel, Belfast
113. Ibid., p. 2;
114. Frank Millar, "London is Relieved but Difficulties Lie Ahead," http://www.ireland.om/special/peace/results/road/ahead3.htm, p. 1 (5/25/2000).
115. Suzanne Breen, "United No Parties Set Their Sights on Assembly," http://www.ireland.om/special/peace/results/road/ahead3.htm (5/25/2000).
116. Sydney Elliot and W.D. Flackes. Conflict in Northern Ireland: An Encyclopedia (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1999), p. 125.
117. Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, "Who Voted for Peace? Public Support for the 1998 Northern Ireland Agreement," Irish Political Studies, Vol. 16, 2001 (PSAI Press), p. 81.
118. Gerry Moriarty, "How the Parties Could Share Out Seats," Path to Peace Web site, http://www.ireland.om/special/peace/results/road/ahead4.htm (5/25/2000), p. 2.
119. Gerry Moriarty, "Even Split for Anti, Pro-Agreement Parties," http://www.ireland.om/special/peace/results/news/news3.htm (5/25/2000).
120. Paul Bew, "Initiative to Trimble but his Edge over Opponents Is Thin," The Path to Peace, Web site, April, 1998 http://www.ireland.om/special/peace/results/analysis/analysis10.htm (5/25/2000), p. 1.
121. Jonathan Tonge and Jocelyn A.J. Evans, "Faultlines in Unionism: Division and Dissent Within the Ulster Unionist Council," Irish Political Studies, Vol. 16 (2001), pp. 113-14.
122. At the time, Trimble insisted that his hands were tied, and Ken Maginnis, a leading moderate within the party, agreed that the plan would split the party and was impossible to sell to rank and file supporters. Shawn Pogtchnik, "Ultimatum Irks Northern Ireland" Detroit News, July 4, 1999. http://www.detnews.com/1999/nation/9907/04/07049902.htm (5/18/2000).
123. Warren Hoge, "Ulster Unionists Open Way for Ruling with Sinn Fein," New York Times, November 28, 1999.
124. Warren Hoge, "Britain Suspends System of Power Sharing in Ulster," New York Times, February 12, 2000.
125. Warren Hoge, "Ulster Leader Holds on, but Power Lessens in Unionist Vote," New York Times, March 26, 2000.
126. Frank Millar, "Trimble Stakes His Future on the Drive to Modernise," Irish Times, April 21, 2000.
127. Suzanne Breen, "Most Ulster Unionists want Trimble in Executive," Irish Times, May 12, 2000.
128. Reuters "Northern Ireland Rivals Try for Home Rule Again" New York Times May 30, 2000.
129. Text of a Speech made by Gerry Adams, Monaghan, 26/10/2002, CAIN Web Service http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ga261002.htm (11/11/2002) p. 6.
130. Text of Document agreed at the Ulster Unionist Council meeting on Saturday 21 September, 2002; CAIN Web Service http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/uup/uup210902.htm (11/11/2002).
131. This occurred after a scandal in which Sinn Fein was accused of spying on other parties and government at Stormont.
132. Speech by Tony Blair, Harbor Commissioners' Office, Belfast, 10/17/02 CAIN Web Service http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/tb171002.htm (11/11/2002).
133. Speech made by Gerry Adams, Monaghan 10/26/02, CAIN Web Service http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ga261002.htm (11/11/2002).
134. CAIN Web Service, Chronology of the Conflict, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch00.htm (06/05/03).
135. Full text of IRA statement of apology, 16 July 2002; CAIN Web Service http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira160702.htm (6/5/2003).
136. The IRA suspended contact with the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) on 30 October, 2002, full text of IRA statement, CAIN Web Service, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ira301002.htm (11/11/2002).
137. Hayes and McAllister, "Who Voted for Peace," p. 88.
138. DUP party member David Ervine argues for example that it was destructive of the UUP to insist on a condition that they should have known the IRA would be unable to comply with. (Interview, June 20, 2003).
139. Warren Hoge "Sinn Fein leader Pledges Full Disarmament of the I.R.A." New York Times, April 18, 2003.
140. Brian Lavery "U.S. Envoy Wants Elections" New York Times, May 8,2003.
141. Interviews with David McNarry and Dr. Esmond Birnie (UUP), Rachel Steert (Women's Coalition), David Ervine (DUP), and James Cooper (UUP).
142. Interviews with Dr. Esmond Birnie and James Cooper (UUP).
143. In the 1999-2000 Northern Ireland Life and Times survey, respondents were asked to identify the most important priorities for the new assembly. Forty percent chose improving health services and 37 percent cited employment, www.qub.ac.uk/ss/csr/nilt (6/5/2003).
144. The Oslo process weakened Fateh and the PA vis-à-vis Hamas, which both provided critical social services to an increasingly impoverished Palestinian people. (See Ian Fisher, "Defining Hamas: Roots in charity and branches of violence," New York Times, June 16, 2003.) Support for Hamas grew at Fateh's expense. In December 1996, support for Fateh was 35.2 percent and for Hamas 10.3 percent. Similarly, 41.2 percent of Palestinians most trusted Yasser Arafat, and 4.8 percent trusted Sheikh Yassin. Only 19.5 percent of Palestinians did not trust anyone. By December 2001, support for Fateh dropped to 26.1 percent, while that for Hamas rose to 21.3 percent. Similarly, trust in Arafat declined to 24.5 percent and that in Yassin rose to 12.8 percent. This trend has continued. By April 2003, Fateh remained the single most-trusted faction in Palestinian politics, with 22.6 percent, although overall support for Fateh trailed the combined support for Hamas and leftist factions (22.0 percent), Islamic Jihad (6.3 percent), PFLP (2.0 percent), and other factions (3.1 percent). However, more than 34.3 percent responded they "don't trust anyone."
145. Ibid.;
146. JMCC, "Public Opinion Poll no. 43," http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2001/no43.htm (6/25/03);
147. JMCC, "Public Opinion Poll no. 18," http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/1996/no18.htm (6/25/03).]
148. A poll conducted by JMCC in April 2003 found that the majority of Palestinians believed that Abbas's appointment as Prime Minister would have little effect on the PA reform process: of respondents, 28.7 percent felt the appointment would further PA reforms, 17.4 percent felt it would hinder reforms, and 43.2 percent felt it would have no effect. It is telling that 67.8 percent of respondents believed that the creation of a prime ministry was due to external influences alone, 19.2 percent felt that it was due to external influences and a conviction that the reforms were in the interests of the Palestinian people, and only 6.2 percent believed the reform was undertaken purely in order to benefit the Palestinian people. Furthermore, only 1.8 percent of respondents named Abu Mazen as the Palestinian personality that they most trust, vs. 21.1 percent for Yasser Arafat and 9.7 percent for Ahmed Yassin. [JMCC, "JMCC Public Opinion Poll no. 48," April 2003, http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2003/no48.htmno.results (6/22/03).]
149. By April 2003, Fateh remained the single most-trusted faction in Palestinian politics, with 22.6 percent, although overall support for Fateh trailed the combined support for Hamas (22.0 percent), Islamic Jihad (6.3 percent), PFLP (2.0 percent), and other factions (3.1 percent). However, more than 34.3 percent responded they "don't trust anyone." Ibid.
150. Hamas moderates have signaled their willingness to enter negotiations. See Amira Hass, "What the Doctor Orders," Ha'aretz, June 20, 2003.
151. See John Diamond, "Sharon's Support for Road Map Historic," USA Today, May 26, 2003.
152. "Powell Condemns Hamas Role," June 21, 2003, 00:53 GMT 01:53 UK, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3008420.stm. (6/24/03). Note that the 2003 Geneva Accord recognizes the importance of moving quickly toward a final settlement which is specified with a degree of detail that would not have been possible but for the Oslo Accord.
153. Author interview with Esmond Birnie. A poll conducted in January 2003 showed that only 36 percent of Protestants would still vote for the Good Friday Agreement. But 60 percent of Protestants would be willing to support the peace process if it could be made to work. Colin Irwin, "Devolution and the State of the Northern Ireland Peace Process," http://www.peacepolls.org (01/12/2004).
154. See footnote 113, http://www.qub.ac.uk/ss/csr/nilt (06/05/2003).
155. We should not be surprised, therefore, by his equivocal statements on Israel's "occupation" of the West Bank in May and June 2003. John Kifner, "The Bush Plan: Put the Toughest Hurdles First," New York Times, June 8, 2003;
156. David K. Shipler, "Sharon Has a Map. Can He Redraw It?" New York Times, June 1, 2003.
157. Edward R.F. Shaheen, "The Map and the Fence," New York Review of Books, 50 (11), July 3, 2003.
158. The fence is expected to affect the lives of 600,000 West Bank Palestinians. See "U.N. Estimates Israeli Barrier Will Disrupt Lives of 600,000," New York Times, November 12, 2003.
159. According to a 2003 poll, 54 percent of settlers stated that they would resist forced dismantlement, but 74 percent would entertain moving inside the Green Line in return for compensation. Moreover, 71 percent of settlers thought a peace agreement should be reached (up from about 55 percent in 2002) and 44 percent accepted a Palestinian state (up from 19 percent the previous year). Israelis also increasingly see settlers as isolated in their struggle to secure settlement. The same survey found that about 64 percent of settlers expect themselves to be alone, and 75 percent of Israelis inside the Green Line see settlers as isolated in their struggle with the government. "Poll: 71 percent of settlers say there will be deal with the Palestinians" Ha'aretz, July 23, 2003.
160. Ellen Lust-Okar, "Israeli Elections 2003: What Likud's Victory Doesn't Tell You," Yale Israel Journal, Spring 2003, pp. 3-7.
161. "Memorandum no. 61: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security," Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, July 2002.
162. See also "Growing Popularity Of A Transfer In Israel, Removing Palestinians From The West Bank And Gaza And Distributing Them Throughout The Arab World," National Public Radio Morning Edition, October 21, 2002. http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/transcripts/2002/oct/021021.gradstein.html. (6/24/03).
163. Hamas moderates have signaled their willingness to enter negotiations. Amira Hass, "What the Doctor Orders," Ha'aretz, June 20, 2003.
164. People-to-people programs and efforts to revise history textbooks on both sides are part of the efforts to change fundamental attitudes toward "the other" on both sides. See "The Politics of Palestinian Textbooks" in vol. 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001): 5-19;
165. Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information program on Peace Education (see http://www.ipcri.org/indexl.html
166. and Jerusalem Post (Internet edition), "Teachers Greet the Enemy," April 3, 2003 at http://www.ipcri.org/index1.html.