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Volumn 48, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 173-194

Disclosure as a strategy in the patent race

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 20744452342     PISSN: 00222186     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/426879     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (78)

References (14)
  • 1
    • 0038675202 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Patents, invalidity, and the strategic transmission of enabling information
    • Anton, James J., and Yao, Dennis A. "Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling Information." Journal of Economies and Management Strategy 12 (2003): 151-78.
    • (2003) Journal of Economies and Management Strategy , vol.12 , pp. 151-178
    • Anton, J.J.1    Yao, D.A.2
  • 3
    • 0742324003 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The value of giving away secrets
    • Bar-Gill, Oren, and Parchomovsky, Gideon. "The Value of Giving Away Secrets." Virginia Law Review 89 (2003): 1857-95.
    • (2003) Virginia Law Review , vol.89 , pp. 1857-1895
    • Bar-Gill, O.1    Parchomovsky, G.2
  • 4
    • 0000662266 scopus 로고
    • Innovation and communication: Signalling with partial disclosure
    • Bhattacharya, Sudipto, and Ritter, Jay R. "Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure." Review of Economic Studies 50 (1983): 331-46.
    • (1983) Review of Economic Studies , vol.50 , pp. 331-346
    • Bhattacharya, S.1    Ritter, J.R.2
  • 6
    • 0346966898 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The promise and perils of strategic publication to create prior art: A response to professor parchomovsky
    • Eisenberg, Rebecca A. "The Promise and Perils of Strategic Publication to Create Prior Art: A Response to Professor Parchomovsky." Michigan Law Review 98 (2000): 2358-70.
    • (2000) Michigan Law Review , vol.98 , pp. 2358-2370
    • Eisenberg, R.A.1
  • 8
    • 0242652291 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Patents as incomplete contracts: Aligning incentives for R&D investment with incentives to disclose prior art
    • Kesan, Jay, and Banik, Marc. "Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art." Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 2 (2000): 23-54.
    • (2000) Washington University Journal of Law and Policy , vol.2 , pp. 23-54
    • Kesan, J.1    Banik, M.2
  • 9
    • 4243124519 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Rational ignorance at the patent office
    • Lemley, Mark A. "Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office." Northwestern University Law Review 95 (2001): 1495-1532.
    • (2001) Northwestern University Law Review , vol.95 , pp. 1495-1532
    • Lemley, M.A.1
  • 10
    • 0347110004 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strategic disclosure in the patent system
    • Lichtman, Douglas; Baker, Scott; and Kraus, Kate. "Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System." Vanderbilt Law Review 53 (2000): 2175-2217.
    • (2000) Vanderbilt Law Review , vol.53 , pp. 2175-2217
    • Lichtman, D.1    Baker, S.2    Kraus, K.3
  • 12
    • 70350095836 scopus 로고
    • The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion
    • edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, New York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co.
    • Reinganum, Jennifer. "The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion." In Handbook of Industrial Organization, edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, pp. 1:849-908. New York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co., 1989.
    • (1989) Handbook of Industrial Organization
    • Reinganum, J.1
  • 14
    • 0345818393 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Collusion and collective action in the patent system: A proposal for patent bounties
    • Thomas, John R. "Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties." University of Illinois Law Review (2001): 305-53.
    • (2001) University of Illinois Law Review , pp. 305-353
    • Thomas, J.R.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.