What's lacking in the lack: 'A comment on the virtual'

Angelaki - Journal of the Theoretical Humanities

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 117-138

  Widder, Nathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EXETER   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 20444465890     PISSN: 0969725X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09697250020034797     Document Type: Note

References (36)

1. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London and New York: Verso, 1985). I intend to privilege Laclau's work because the ontological aspects I wish to challenge are more strongly developed there. But this is not at all to suggest that Mouffe's work is not important. See especially her The Return of the Political (London and New York: Verso, 1993)
2. In Lacanian discourse, the Real refers to a nonsymbolizable kernel around which psychic and linguistic structures are organized. It is not to be confused with a reality that discourse would represent, but is rather that which subverts all representation by exceeding its capacities. It is because of the Real that conscious and unconscious systems of representation can only operate through mechanisms which paper over this fissure in representation, operations which can never be adequate to this task. But if the Real is understood as that which escapes any discursivity, it appears within a discursive system precisely as a radical Lack. For elaboration see Slavoj ZÏizÏek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London and New York: Verso, 1989)
3. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 107
4. Ernesto Laclau, "Subject of Politics, Politics of the Subject" in Emancipation(s) (London and New York: Verso, 1996) 47-65, esp. 47
5. Ernesto Laclau, "The Impossibility of Society" in New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time (London and New York: Verso, 1990) 89-92, esp. 90-91
6. This seems consistent with Foucault's own assessment of his work: "I strive instead to avoid any reference to this [Kantian] transcendental as a condition of possibility for any knowledge. When I say that I strive to avoid it, I don't mean that I am sure of succeeding. My procedure at this moment is of a regressive sort, I would say; I try to assume a greater and greater detachment in order to define the historical conditions and transformations of our knowledge. I try to historicize to the utmost in order to leave as little space as possible for the transcendental. I cannot exclude the possibility that one day I will have to confront an irreducible residuum which will be, in fact, the transcendental" (Michel Foucault, "An Historian of Culture" in Foucault Live, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1989) 73-88, esp. 79)
7. This is not to suggest that hegemony is designed as a simple replacement for the transcendental. But neither is it simply an historical phenomenon. Its indispensability is historically contingent, in so far as it results from the dislocatory effects of modernity and capitalism that have destroyed traditional sites for the construction of meaning (see Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 135-45, and "New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time" in New Reflections 3-85, esp. 41-59). But it also provides a quasi-transcendental framework, albeit one which has no predetermined content. As Laclau has more recently put it: "'Hegemony' as a theoretical framework is both [a transcendental analytic and a description of an historically specific condition] at the same time and, however, none of them" ("Structure, History and the Political" in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj ZÏ izÏ ek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues of the Left (London and New York: Verso, 2000) 182-212, esp. 200)
8. See Ernesto Laclau and Lilian Zac, "Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics" in The Making of Political Identities, ed. Ernesto Laclau (London and New York: Verso, 1994) 11-39
9. Alexandre Kojève, An Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. (New York and London: Basic Books, 1969) chs. 1 and 2, passim
10. "The necessity, just because it cannot be grasped as an inner necessity of the creature, ceases to have a sensuous existence, and can no longer be observed in the world of reality, but has withdrawn from it. Finding no place in the actual creature, it is what is called a teleological relation, a relation which is external to the related terms, and therefore really the antithesis of law. It is a conception completely freed from the necessity of Nature, a conception which leaves that necessity behind and operates spontaneously above it" (G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977) sect. 255, 156)
11. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1952, 1967)
12. Michael Hardt uses the failure of the Hegelian dialectic as the starting point for developing Deleuze's ontology of positive difference and immanence. Hegel, he notes, bases his attack on Spinoza on the latter's own admission that determination requires negation ("Omnis determinatio est negatio"), showing how Spinoza's fully positive Being is unable to negate nothingness and so fades into it. But Deleuze counters Hegel by maintaining that the dialectic relies on a final cause that it posits external to Being. As Hegel himself maintained (see fn. 25), an external cause can only have an accidental relation to its effect, the result being that Hegel cannot maintain the necessity and determinateness of Being. From this, Deleuze develops an alternative ontology, in which Being, in order to be necessary, must be indeterminate. What establishes this necessary but indeterminate being is an immanent causality - the virtual, understood as a fully real excess inhering in Being. See Michael Hardt, An Apprenticeship in Philosophy: Gilles Deleuze (London: UCL P, 1993) esp. ch. 1
13. See Richard Rorty, "Relations, Internal and External" in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1967) vol. 7, 125-33
14. This is exactly the viewpoint held by Slavoj ZÏ izÏ ek, "The Wanton Identity" in For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (London: Verso, 1991) in his encounters with Derrida, and which, as Rodolphe Gasché, "Yes Absolutely: Unlike Any Writing Pen" in The Making of Political Identities 76-102, has argued, is the source of numerous fallacious readings. ZÏ izÏ ek maintains that Derrida's deconstructive attacks on Hegel are doomed to fail precisely because Hegel has indeed accounted for all forms of difference as various moments of opposition to identity. But Gasché shows how this depends upon not only a fundamental reduction of Hegel's thinking, by which ZÏ izÏ ek implies that "Hegel's concept of identity is always already bereft of its absolute telos" (Gasché 101, n. 17), but also an illicit subsumption of Derridean différance into an Otherness that is merely the negation of identity. Derrida thus appears as a thinker who fails to recognize how much he is uncannily "Hegelian" ... Consequently, what is wrong with deconstruction is that it "seems unable to accomplish ... the step" of recognizing that there is no escape from the logic of binary opposition. Rather than joyfully espousing the dialectic of opposition and inversion as an iron law, as ZÏ izÏ ek does, deconstruction fools itself by believing in the possibility that the limits of dialectical mediation can be thought. This is the delusion of deconstruction that ZÏ izÏ ek has set to unground. For the champion of dialectics, any such attempt falls flat on its face in that it merely confirms the logic of opposition that it sought to delimit. It is here that the high price for having overlooked the dynamics of Hegel's critical treatment of identity ... become evident ... The sphere beyond representation is, indeed, that of thinking. If thinking, as philosophical thinking, is the thinking of limits, then the step that ZÏ izÏ ek's cheerful embrace of the logic of opposition is unable to accomplish is the step toward philosophical thinking. (ibid.) In short, what deconstruction locates is precisely a heterogeneous difference irreducible to a negativity, while ZÏ izÏ ek has already committed himself to a treatment of all difference as negative. It is not Derrida who fails to take a step, but rather ZÏ izÏ ek who fails to recognize how the play of negativity gives way to a new form of difference. While Laclau has stated his disagreements with ZÏ izÏ ek's readings of both Hegel and Derrida (see "Identity and Hegemony" 59-64, esp. 73-76), he none the less seems to adopt a similar stance with respect to Foucault
15. Jean-François Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews," trans. Andreas Michel and Mark S. Roberts (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1990) 12
16. This conception of the singular is obviously different from Hegel's. The latter both mediates and is mediated by the universal and particular in such a way that each term, while different, is none the less nothing but the other two terms. For in Hegel's scheme, the concrete universal is no more than the totality of particulars, which itself is nothing other than the totality of individual singularities. Each term is identical to the others, yet distinct as well. For elaboration, see W.T. Stace, The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition (London: Macmillan, 1924) esp. 226-62
17. In Sue Golding's terms, this would be a "multiple negation," a negativity not in a dialectical sense, but rather as a neither/nor exceeding any oppositional either/or. It is a negation as multiplicity, precisely because it cannot be seen as producing or simply giving rise to a multiplicity that might be separate from it. Briefly: a "something" which is a "not" (and hence, an excess) of that very [dialectical] identity relation. This, then, is to say, further, and on the other hand, that this "something- which-is-anot" is utterly part and parcel of the is, standing neither outside nor inside. But it is to say, also (though not as "addendum"), that because of this peculiar relation to the space (and time) of the outside or the in, which both contains the "something-which-is-anot" while simultaneously noting its necessary "excessiveness" (to the very thing to which it's bound), this strange kind of negation situates any identity, indeed constitutes and establishes its meaning. (Sue Golding, "Curiosity" in The Eight Technologies of Otherness, author/editor Sue Golding (New York and London: Routledge, 1997) 11-27, esp. 15)
18. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Athlone, 1994) 211
19. See Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Athlone, 1983) I.4, 8-10
20. "It was out of this pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create values and to coin names for values: What had they to do with utility!" (Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967) I.2, 26)
21. "Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength - life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results" (Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1966) n. 13, 21)
22. Descombes challenges Deleuze's claim that noble affirmation of difference and slavish affirmation through opposition can be distinguished. If the master does not oppose but rather differentiates in a non-negative fashion, then even the oppositional logic of the slave will appear as itself another difference. If the slave recognizes only oppositions to his identity, then the master's affirmation of difference will appear only as another negation. From the perspective of each, then, non-negative difference and negative opposition seem identical. Descombes goes on to argue that this leaves Deleuze with two options: if the master simply affirms himself without any relation to the slave, it will not be an affirmation of difference but rather one of identity-in-itself; alternatively, if the master affirms himself through comparison with the slave, it will be impossible to distinguish difference and opposition. The choices, then, are between simple positivity and negative difference. See Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J.M. Harding (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1980) 156-67. It is significant, however, that Descombes fails to distinguish power relations from the will to power. The movement of forces is one thing, the capacity of a will to distinguish between groundless, non-negative difference and opposition is quite another. That master and slave types are not the exhaustive forms of will for either Nietzsche or Deleuze should be apparent - the overman, for example, fits neither category neatly. Once these two factors are acknowledged, it becomes rather more difficult to assert that Deleuze's attempt to think a non-negative difference is just a pipe dream. Bogue disagrees with aspects of Descombes's reading, but nevertheless accepts that the relations between forces must be characterized by "concepts ... that are essentially oppositional and agonistic. The problem arises because Nietzsche's conception of mastery is much more conflictual than Deleuze allows" (Ronald Bogue, Deleuze and Guattari (London and New York: Routledge, 1989) 33). But again it is a question of whether agonism, conflict and opposition are all the same. Nietzsche's distinctions between fights of annihilation and fights that are contests in "Homer's Contest," The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1954) 32-39, the spiritualization of enmity outlined in Twilight of the Idols, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (London and New York: Penguin, 1968) 53-54, and Zarathustra's numerous exhortations to hate one's enemy but not despise him (see Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1954, 1966), passim) all suggest that they are not
23. "That a state of equilibrium is never reached proves that it is not possible. But in an indefinite space it would have to have been reached. Likewise in a spherical space. The shape of space must be the cause of eternal movement, and ultimately of all 'imperfection'" (Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967) n. 1064, 547). See also notes 515 and 520 for discussion of empty space as "an erroneous conception."
24. Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Seán Hand (London: Athlone, 1988) 86
25. Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993) 6
26. The term is Heidegger's, introduced in an examination of Parmenides's statement, "For the same perceiving (thinking) as well as being." Heidegger maintains that this sameness between thought and Being cannot be that of the metaphysical understanding of identity subsumed within Being. It rather points to a non-metaphysical synthesis of belonging together: If we think of belonging together in the customary way, the meaning of belonging is determined by the word together, that is, by its unity. In that case, "to belong" means as much as: to be assigned and placed into the order of a "together," established in the unity of a manifold, combined into the unity of a system, mediated by the unifying center of an authoritative synthesis ... However, belonging together can also be thought of as belonging together. This means: the "together" is now determined by the belonging. Of course, we must still ask here what the "belong" means in that case, and how its peculiar "together" is determined only in its terms ... Enough for now that this reference makes us note the possibility of no longer representing belonging in terms of the unity of the together, but rather of experiencing this together in terms of belonging. (Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) 29)
27. Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986) 12
28. Difference and Repetition 50-51
29. See Difference and Repetition esp. ch. 4, passim; Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, ed. Constantin V. Boundas, trans. Mark Lester with C.J. Stivale (New York: Columbia UP, 1990) 52-57; and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia UP, 1994) passim
30. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978, 1990) 93
31. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979)
32. See Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse" in Language and Politics, ed. Michael Shapiro (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) 108-38
33. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987) "Introduction: Rhizome" 3-25
34. Foucault poignantly sums up the danger: "Because by virtue of saying or thinking 'I'm fighting against the enemy,' if one day you found yourself in a position of strength, and in a situation of real war, in front of this blasted 'enemy,' wouldn't you actually treat him as one? Taking that route leads directly to oppression, no matter who takes it: that's the real danger" (Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito (New York: Semiotext(e), 1991) 181)
35. See Foucault's Preface to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1983) xi-xiv
36. See Michel Foucault, "Politics and Ethics: An Interview" in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984) 373-80