Formal markets and informal insurance

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 75-88

  Ligon, Ethan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Interlinked contracts; Private information; Risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 20444431928     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2004.06.005     Document Type: Article

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