Insurance contracts and securitization

Journal of Risk and Insurance

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 45-62

  Doherty, Neil A ^a   Schlesinger, Harris ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 20244369142     PISSN: 00224367     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1539-6975.00004     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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