Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 115, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 309-321

  Fibich, Gadi ^a   Gavious, Arieh ^b   Sela, Aner ^b  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV   (Israel)

Author keywords

Asymmetric auctions; Perturbation analysis; Revenue equivalence

Indexed keywords

EID: 1942510362     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00251-5     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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