Quantum coin tossing and bit-string generation in the presence of noise

Physical Review A - Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics

Volumn 69, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 223221-223226

  Barrett, Jonathan ^a   Massar, Serge ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LIBRE DE BRUXELLES   (Belgium)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; CORRELATION METHODS; CRYPTOGRAPHY; ERROR CORRECTION; MATHEMATICAL OPERATORS; PARAMETER ESTIMATION; PROBABILITY; THEOREM PROVING;

BIT-STRING GENERATION; COIN TOSSING;

QUANTUM THEORY;

EID: 1942508096     PISSN: 10502947     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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22. It may be instructive to contrast this situation with that of noisy key distribution. In the case of noisy key distribution, if quantum error correction and entanglement distillation are not available, the raw key will only be partially secure. However, there is still the possibility of extracting an arbitrarily secure key via postprocessing of the raw key data. In the case of bit string generation, on the other hand, there is no possibility of "distilling" an arbitrarily secure single coin toss from the partially secure bit string.
23. In some ways, the assumption of uncorrelated cheating strategies may be likened to the assumption of incoherent attacks that is common in analysis of quantum key distribution.