Clash of interest over northern Iraq drives Turkish-Israeli alliance to a crossroads

Middle East Journal

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 246-264

  Kibaroglu, Mustafa ^a  

^a BILKENT UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GEOPOLITICS; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; REGIONAL SECURITY; WAR;

ASIA; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; IRAQ; ISRAEL; MIDDLE EAST; TURKEY; WORLD;

EID: 19344365447     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3751/59.2.14     Document Type: Article

References (105)

1. See Douglas Jehl, "US Intelligence Shows Pessimism On Iraq's Future," The New York Times, September 16, 2004, pp. A1 & A6.
2. See for instance George Gruen, "Dynamic Prospects in Turkish-Israeli Relations," Israel Affairs (Summer 1995), Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 44.
3. Also see Daniel Pipes, "A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish-Israeli Entente," The National Interest (Winter 1997/98), p. 35.
4. After long speculation about whether the elections could be carried out at all, Iraqi citizens from all segments of society went to the ballot boxes on January 30, 2005. As of the date of publication the new National Assembly was still in the process of forming a government; although turnout had been high in Shi'i and Kurdish areas, the Sunni Arab population had largely avoided voting.
5. See, for instance, Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey and Israel Strategize" Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2002), Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 61-65; Also available at www.meforum.org/article/128.
6. The argument here is not to suggest that Israel is definitely drawing plans to create a Kurdish political entity all by itself.
7. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 called for the partition of the British-ruled Palestine Mandate into a Jewish state and an Arab state. It was approved on November 29, 1947 with 33 votes in favor, 13 against, 10 abstentions and one absent. See the Resolution Adopted on the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question (www.un.org). The Resolution was accepted by the Jews in Palestine, yet rejected by the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab states. Israel proclaimed independence on 14 May 1948.
8. On this account, see Joseph Heller, The Birth of Israel 1945 - 1949: Ben Gurion and his Critics, University Press of Florida, Tampa, 2000.
9. Also see John Bright, A History of Israel, Third Edition (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981).
10. For a different perspective see Gerald Butt, The Arabs: Myth and Reality, (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 85-149.
11. Interview with Hagit Ben Yaakov, Israeli Embassy in Ankara, October 2002.
12. Turkey, whose population is predominantly Muslim, was one of the first countries to recognize the state of Israel in 1949 and to establish diplomatic relations since then. See Faruk Sonmezoglu Turk Dis Politikasinin Analizi [Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy], (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 1998).
13. Strangely enough, Turkey and Israel used to amaze the political and security elite on both sides until very recently with the degree of their strategic cooperation, especially in the security field. For a view from Turkey, see Cevik Bir and Martin Sherman, "Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel," Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2002), Vol. 9, No. 4. pp. 23-32.
14. For an Israeli perspective, see Ilan Berman, "Israel, India and Turkey: Triple Entente?," Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2002), Vol. 9, No. 4. pp. 33-40.
15. A look at the Turkish media in the wake of the vote in the Turkish Parliament on March 1, 2003, and especially after the fall of Saddam Husayn and the reported atrocities of Kurdish militia that followed in northern Iraqi cities inhabited by Turkomans, will provide a host of articles and commentaries harshly criticizing the policy pursued by the Turkish government.
16. See for example Hikmet Erdogdu, Buyuk Israil Stratejisi, [Grand Israeli Strategy] (Istanbul: IQ Kultur Sanat Yayinlari, 2005).
17. Also see, Prof. Dr. Cemal Anadol, Israil ve Siyonism Kiskacinda Turkiye [Israel and Turkey Knotted with Zionism] (Second Edition), (Istanbul: Bilen Karinca, 2004).
18. A number of articles published on this matter and the interviews conducted over the last few years with various people at key positions in diplomatic, political and military spheres in Israel and in the United States, some of whom wish to remain anonymous, assisted in understanding how Israel's security could be enhanced if cooperative relations with a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq could be established over time. Those who expressed views on how important such a cooperative scheme would be from the Israeli standpoint did not necessarily want to undermine the importance of the relations with Turkey. However, it was emphasized that compatibility of these two relationships would be difficult to achieve.
19. Turkey's importance in the US war plans were underscored during a meeting of a Turkish delegation headed by the then Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Ugur Ziyal, with their American counterparts. For details of this meeting see Fikret Bila, Sivil Darbe Girisimi ve Ankara'da Irak Savaslari [Civilian Coup Attempt and the Iraq Wars in Ankara], (Ankara: Umit Yayincilik, 2003), p.171.
20. The three-party coalition consisted of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) chaired by the then Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) chaired by Devlet Bahceli, then Deputy Prime Minister, and the Motherland Party (ANAP) chaired by Mesut Yilmaz, who did not take part in the government. As a result of the worsening of the economic situation in Turkey following two severe financial crises, the coalition partner MHP called for early elections to be held in November 2002. Many political analysts considered this to be a suicidal decision for the coalition, which ultimately led to its replacement by the newly established AKP chaired by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who was sworn in as a deputy first, and then Prime Minister a few months later due to some legal technicalities that had to be overcome through by-elections in February 2003.
21. The difficulties that were encountered during the negotiations were sometimes reflected to media. See David A. Sanger and Dexter Filkins, "US is Pessimistic Turks Will Accept the Deal on Iraq," The New York Times, February 20, 2003, pp. A1 & A13.
22. The resolution was not approved with 264 votes in favor to 251 votes against and with 19 abstentions. See Dexter Filkins, "Turkish Deputies Refuse to Accept American Troops," The New York Times, March 2, 2003, pp. A1 & A13.
23. Deterioration of the relations was reflected in public statements made by high-ranking officials on both sides. For the words of Robert Pearson, then US Ambassador to Ankara see agency news compiled by TDN staff "Defeat Presented with Sugar Coating," Turkish Daily News, March 3, 2003, pp. A1 & A14.
24. See Frank Buruni, "US Ties to Turkey May Face Enduring Strain, Officials Say," The New York Times, March 24, 2003, p. B13.
25. The US Administration kept its hopes alive for a while but then set out to put an alternative plan into operation. See agency news compiled by TDN staff "US Still Hopeful Turkey Will Allow Troop Deployment," Turkish Daily News, March 4, 2003 pp. A1 & A14.
26. Also see Steven Weisman, "Powell Says US Can Wage War On Iraq Without Turks," The New York Times, March 5, 2003, p. A11.
27. See David Rohde, "If War Hits, Kurds See Way To Grab Old Lands," The New York Times, March 14, 2003, p. A13.
28. The term "staunch ally" was used by the US President George Bush, the father, with regard to Turkey for the first time back in 1990. See George Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing the Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, August 8, 1990", Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1990, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991, pp. 1107-1109.
29. See William Safire, "The Kurdish Ghost," The New York Times, March 3, 2003, p. A23.
30. See Dexter Filkins, "Turkey needs week or more to reconsider US request," The New York Times, March 4, 2003, p. A10.
31. See Eric Schmitt and Dexter Filkins, "Turkey Demands $32 Billion US Aid Package If It Is To Take Part in a War On Iraq," The New York Times , February 19, 2003, p. A15.
32. See Mete Belovacikli, "Clash of Intentions," Turkish Daily News, February 28, 2003, p. 14.
33. See Dexter Filkins and C. J. Chivers, "US In Talks On Allowing Turkey To Occupy A Kurdish Area In Iraq," The New York Times, March 7, 2003, pp. A1 & A12.
34. Interview with Ambassador Yasar Yakis, then Turkish Foreign Minister, March 2003, Bilkent University, Ankara. Foreign Minister Yakis presided over the Turkish delegation during the early phase of the negotiations with their American counterparts in January and February 2003.
35. See Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918 1923, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 2001).
36. For a comprehensive study on the making of modern Turkey see Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Limited, 2001) (New Revised Edition).
37. Daniel Silverfarb, Britain's Informal Empire in the Middle East, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.)
38. The Mosul problem was one of the unresolved issues at the Lausanne negotiations which resulted in a Treaty on July 24, 1923 that paved the way to the foundation of the modern Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923. During the negotiations, it was agreed to form a commission under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1924 with a view to finding a compromising solution between the British and the Turks who had divergent views on the status of the Mosul province. Turks claimed that Mosul was inherently a Turkish city while the British maintained, on the contrary, that the demographic structure of the region did not substantiate Turkey's claims. Finally, after long deliberations, the Council of the League of Nations decided in 1926 to rely on the commission's report that literally was completely in line with the position of the British in this debate. See David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of Modern Middle East, (New York: Avon Books, 1989).
39. See Frank Buruni, "Turkey Denies Reports That Its Troops Defied US And Entered Iraq," The New York Times, March 23, 2003, p. B7.
40. Mustafa Kernal Atatürk ("father of all Turks"), the founder and the first President of the Republic of Turkey, abolished the Sultanate in 1922 just prior to the commencement of the Lausanne peace negotiations in Switzerland after the War of Liberation was fought and won against the occupying powers. The reason for the abolishment was to have only one Turkish delegation representing the interests of the Turkish people. However, the organizers of the Lausanne negotiations, the British in particular, had invited both the Ottoman Sultan as well as the representatives of victorious warriors led by Mustafa Kemal. The Caliphate was also abolished soon after the declaration of the Republic of Turkey, which was created as a secular state by its Constitution.
41. A comprehensive assessment of the threats perceived by the Turkish military and the government can be found in the white papers that are occasionally published. See for instance, Beyaz Kitap [White Paper] (Ankara: Ministry of Defense, 2000).
42. See Hasan Altinisik, "First Islamist Protest Against AK Party," Turkish Daily News, March 1, 2003, pp. A1 & A14;
43. Also see agency news compiled by TDN staff "Turkish people say no to war," Turkish Daily News, January 22, 2003, pp. A1 & A14.
44. George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," September 20, 2001. For the original script of President Bush's address see www.whitehouse.gov.
45. The AKP is widely viewed a continuation of the former Islamic parties, with slight variations and cosmetic changes, namely the Welfare (Refah) Party and the Virtue (Fazilet) Party. The Refah Party was banned with a decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court on February 15, 1998. Its successor, the Fazilet Party faced the same problem and it was banned with a decision of the Court taken on June 22, 2001.
46. Turkish deputies wore white ribbons at a Parliamentary session to signal their opposition to a US -led war on Iraq. See Dexter Filkins, "Turkish Parliament Asked to Approve US Troops," The New York Times, February 26, 2003, p. A10.
47. The Turkish Armed Forces followed the developments rather closely since the beginning, and delegated their frustration with some of the issues to their American counterparts. See "ABD'ye Irak icin bes uyari verdik" ["We Gave Five Notes to the US for Iraq"] Hürriyet, October 29, 2002.
48. For a statement of General Hilmi Ozkok, the Chief of Turkish General Staff, see the agency news compiled by TDN staff "Ozkok: US Troops And Equipment Are Part Of First Bill," Turkish Daily News, February 22, 2003, pp. A1 & A14.
49. Ad hoc conversations with military officials in the Turkish General Staff and elsewhere who wished to remain anonymous.
50. Turkey was concerned with the possibility of proclamation of independence by the Kurds in Iraq with the close support of the US. See Dexter Filkins, "Turkey Assesses Question of Kurds," The New York Times, February 21, 2003, p. A14.
51. Also see Mensur Akgun, "Kuzey Irak'ta hassas dengeler," ["Sensitive Balance in Northern Iraq"], Hürriyet, March 8, 2003.
52. See Dexter Filkins, "Turkish Military Back Role In US Drive On Iraq," The New York Times, March 6, 2003, p. A11.
53. Also see the agency news compiled by TDN staff "Army Supports Government on US Troops, Warns Kurds," Turkish Daily News, March 6, 2003, pp. A1 & A14.
54. Turkish and American diplomats had intense negotiations for several weeks. Major issues of contention were the number, as well as the sites, of American troops to be deployed in Turkey and the Turkish troops in northern Iraq. US did not want to jeopardize a potential strategic alliance with the Kurdish groups by allowing Turkish troops into their sectors, while Turkey made the US troop basing resolution conditional upon a similar permit for Turkish troops to cross the Iraqi border. For some details about the document entitled Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Turkey and the Government of the United States of America on the Establishment and Implementation of Basic Policy, Principles, Procedures and to Determine the Status of Forces to be Provisionally Deployed in Turkey for the Purposes of Possible Operations Toward Iraq, see Fikret Bila, Sivil Darbe Girisimi ve Ankara'da Irak Savaslari, [Civilian Coup Attempt and the Iraq Wars in Ankara], (Ankara: Umit Yayincilik, 2003), p.225.
55. See Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey Says No," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2003, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 22-25.
56. Dexter Filkins, "Turkey says US has detained some of its soldiers in northern Iraq," The New York Times, July 6, 2003, p. A6.
57. Also see Sedat Ergin "Derhal Ozür Dileyin," ["Make an Apology Right Away"], Hürriyet, July 6, 2003, p. 20.
58. See Kemal Kirisci, "Turkey and the Kurdish Safe Haven in Northern Iraq," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XI, No. 3, pp. 21-39.
59. The general mood among the political and academic circles was that, had the resolution not been disapproved, such unwanted developments would not have taken place. See, Fikret Bila, "Ozel Amaci Asan Faaliyetler Yasak!" ["Activities that Go Beyond a Specific Purpose are Forbidden"], Milliyet, September 24, 2003, p. 14.
60. See Douglas Jehl and Dexter Filkins, "Turkey Says US Has Agreed To Free 11 Soldiers Suspected In Plot To Kill Kurdish Aide," The New York Times, July 7, 2003, p. A6.
61. Various sources indicate that 97% of the population of Iraq consists of Muslims, of whom some 65% are Shi'i and about 30% Sunnis. Christians constitute 3% of total population. When it comes to ethnic distribution of the population, Arabs constitute 70% of the total population while the Kurds constitute 15-20%. Turkomans and other groups constitute 10% of the population.
62. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Superonline, a Turkish Internet broadcasting company, between August 26, 2003 and September 26, 2003 some 81% of Turks who answered the polls were against sending Turkish soldiers to Iraq while some 18% of them were supportive of the idea. However, according to a subsequent poll by the same company conducted a month later between September 25 and October 25, 2003 the ratio of those who supported the idea to send troops to Iraq doubled and hit 36%. For the results of the polls refer to the website http:// anket.superonline.com.
63. First, and foremost, the Turkish Parliament had passed a bill in August 2003 that gave amnesty to PKK members if they gave up their arms and surrendered, provided that they were not involved in killings in the past. The "amnesty law" expired on February 6, 2004. Still a combined military operation against the PKK could potentially create a lot more troubles for the US in the political domain both at home and abroad. Secondly, a military operation against the group in the mountains is estimated to necessitate some 30,000 US troops that would have to be allocated to conduct combat operations for more than a month, which are also likely to suffer hundreds of casualties. The US, however, does not have troops to spare for a prolonged military operation whose political objective and military benefits are not very clear to most Americans.
64. Pakistan made it clear that no troops would be sent to Iraq. See the news compiled by the staff "Pakistan Asker Gondermiyor," ["Pakistan Does not Send Troops"] Milliyet, September 24, 2003, p. 16.
65. When it became clear for the US that a new UN Security Council resolution could be approved and that it would satisfy the condition of legitimacy for a number of countries, especially in the Muslim world, a series of statements started to emanate from the high levels of the US Administration that sending Turkish troops in Iraq could be risky. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1511 on October 16, 2003 that provided necessary legal ground to send troops to Iraq for restoring security and stability in the country. See Felicity Barringer, "Unanimous Vote By UN's Council Adopts Iraq Plan," The New York Times, October 17, 2003, pp. A1 & A12.
66. See William Safire, "Turkey Is Joining Up," The New York Times, October 8, 2003, p. A31.
67. For an account of Turkey's contribution to peace operations see "The Contribution of the Turkish Armed Forces to World Peace" on the website www.byegm.gov.tr.
68. See Asli Aydintasbas, "Why America Needs Turkey in Iraq," The New York Times, October 10, 2003, p. A31.
69. See Ian Fisher, "Possible Turkish Role Upsets The Iraqi Council," The New York Times, October 9, 2003, pp. A1 & A12.
70. See the editorial "Genelkurmay: Saldirirlarsa Vururuz," ["General Staff: We will Shoot if they Attack"], Hürriyet, October 14, 2003, pp. 1 & 20.
71. Also see Ilnur Cevik, "The Spheres Of Interest Of The Military," Turkish Daily News, October 14, 2003.
72. During the NATO's Heads of States Summit in Istanbul there was intense discussion on the possible role of the Alliance in restoring the situation in Iraq. However, the outcome is far from being explicit about what exactly NATO countries could do about stabilizing Iraq.
73. See Michael Gunter, "The Consequences of a Failed Iraqi State: An Independent Kurdish State in Northern Iraq?," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Spring 2004), Vol. XX, No.3, pp. 1-12.
74. For a comprehensive coverage of Israeli approach see Shai Feldman (ed.), After the War in Iraq: Defining the New Strategic Balance, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2003).
75. For an account of Israel's historic interest in Iraq and the Iraqis see Gawdat Bahgat, "Iraq and Israel," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Fall 2003), Vol. XIX, No. 1, pp. 49-78.
76. Also see Seymour M. Hersh, "Israeli Agents Operating In Iraq, Iran And Syria," posted on the website Democracy Now (www.democracynow.org), June 22, 2004;
77. On the same subject see Seymour M. Hersh, "As June 30th Approaches Israel Looks To The Kurds," The New Yorker, June 28, 2004.
78. For a detailed account on Israel's interest in northern Iraq and its intensifying relations with the Kurds of Iraq see Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command: the Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 2004, pp. 351-360.
79. Also see, Shelomoh Nakdimon, Irak ve Ortadogu'da Mossad (Ceviri Ahmet Ekinci), [Mossad in Iraq and the Middle East (translated by Ahmet Ekinci)], (Ankara: Elips Kitap, 2004).
80. Hersh, Chain of Command.
81. Hersh, Chain of Command.
82. Iran is believed to possess chemical weapons and ongoing research programs focusing on the production of biological agents. For further information see Sebnem Udum, "Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: Turkey and Missile Defense," Turkish Studies (Autumn 2003), Vol. 4, No.3, pp. 71-102.
83. Also see Mustafa Kibaroglu "An Assessment of Iran's Nuclear Program" The Review of International and Strategic Affairs (Spring 2002), Vol. 1. No. 3, pp. 33-48.
84. For a detailed study on Iran's military capabilities see Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996).
85. Also see Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats from Iran" in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (ed.), Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability , (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996).
86. According to an Israeli officer, "when the Iranians have enough fuel for enrichment and the technology for it, it's over." See Steven Erlanger, "Israeli Spy Satellite Ditches After Takeoff," International Herald Tribune, September 7, 2004, p. 5.
87. Also see David Menashri, Revolution at a Crossroads: Iran's Domestic Politics and Regional Ambitions, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997).
88. For detailed information on Pakistan's nuclear capabilities see Samina Ahmed and David Cortright (eds.), Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Option, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998).
89. Also see Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998).
90. See, Mohammed E. Ahrari, Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game, (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001).
91. Interview with Ze'ev Schiff, senior journalist and military affairs editor with Israeli newspaper Haaretz, July 2001, Istanbul.
92. Israel relies on its spy satellite Ofek-6 to increase surveillance over Iran to be able to have more early warning in case of a surprise attack. See Steven Erlanger, "Israeli Spy Satellite Ditches After Takeoff," International Herald Tribune, September 7, 2004, p. 5.
93. Interviews with Gen. Cevik Bir (Ret.), May 2001 in Ankara and January 2005 in Istanbul. General Cevik Bir is known for being the "mastermind" of the 1996 military agreement between Turkey and Israel during his post as the Second Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces in the mid 1990s.
94. For more about the Military Education and Cooperation Agreement signed on February 23, 1996 between Turkey and Israel see Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydin, Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.,2003), p 111.
95. Also see Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Turkey and Israel Strategize" Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2002), Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 61-65.
96. See Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3. (Summer 1993), pp. 22-28.
97. For a number of such statements made by the Turkish Premier see for instance Zübeyde Yalcin and Evren Mesci "Ve Israil'e sari kart!" , ["And Yellow Card to Israel!"], May 26, 2004, Sabah, (www.sabah.com.tr).
98. During the course of mounting tension between Turkey and Israel after the war in Iraq because of Israel's alleged role in the developments in the country favoring the Kurdish groups in the north, Ariel Sharon's desire to meet with Tayyip Erdogan, during a stopover in Istanbul on his way back to Israel from an official trip, was refused by his Turkish counterpart due to "scarcity of time" and the "short-notice of the request." Later on, following the events in the Gaza Strip in Palestine, Tayyip Erdogan cancelled his planned trip to Israel claiming, "the political atmosphere in the region was not suitable for such a visit."
99. For details of this interview translated from Israeli daily Haaretz see "Israil devlet terroru yapiyor" ["Israel Commits State Terror"], Hurriyet, June 5, 2004 (www.hurriyetim.com.tr). On a similar account
100. see Abdullah Karakus, "Israil'in yaptigi terror," ["What Israael Makes is Terror"], April 14, 2004, Milliyet, (www.milliyet.com.tr).
101. Interview with Sharon Bar-Li Sa'ar, Israeli Embassy in Ankara. October 2003.
102. See Ilnur Cevik "Ugly Debate Over Erkaya's Demise," Turkish Daily News, July 2, 2000.
103. Interview with Sharon Bar-li Sa'ar, Israeli Embassy in Ankara. October 2003.
104. See Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command, pp. 351-360.
105. Prior to the first democratic elections in Iraq in over half a century, on January 30, 2005, the top officials in Turkey, both civilian and military, including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Chief of Turkish General Staff issued serious warnings to the effect that the legitimacy and legality of the elections should not be overshadowed by the initiatives of the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq aiming at changing the demographic structure of Kirkuk and Mosul (both of which are heavily populated by the Turkomans) by moving in Kurds from rural areas to cast their votes in these cities with a view to having more Kurds elected to the national and provincial parliaments. Among these statements, the ones made by the Second Chief of Staff Gen. Ilker Basbug during a press meeting on January 25, 2005 were, as expected and as usual, the most straightforward pointing at the possibility of resorting to force, if need be, should the Kurds goso far as to declare Kirkuk to be the capital city of a would-be independent Kurdish state. Iraqi Kurdish leaders Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani were, as expected and as usual, quick to reply with even more bitter statements touching the nerves of most Turks, asserting that the proclamation of an independent Kurdish state, with Kirkuk as its capital, was only a matter of time, and that Turkey and the Turks had no right to say a word about these "internal matters of the Kurds of Iraq." For details see, for instance, the Internet news portal www.ntvmsnbc.com. Amid such crossfire, which unnecessarily raised the tension in an already heated political environment, positive signals are also coming from higher-ranking officials in American diplomatic circles suggesting that the US Administration will be "sensitive to the legitimate rights of the Turkomans in Kirkuk and will work to make that city a model of intraethnic harmony for the country and the region." Interview with a high-ranking diplomat from the US Department of State, January 2005, Boston, MA.