Tumult in Syria's Hama in 1925: The failure of a revolt

Journal of Contemporary History

Volumn 33, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 273-290

  Bou Nacklie, N E ^a  

^a LYNDON STATE COLLEGE   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 18944397612     PISSN: 00220094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/002200949803300206     Document Type: Article

References (32)

1. Robert Brenton Betts, The Druze (New Haven 1988), 13-14. The Druze are a sect descended from the Shi'a that settled in central Lebanon and southern Syria. They have an esoteric religion and have long been known as warriors. Their religion was begun by a Fatimid Sultan who went into occultation in the Egyptian desert, and his disciple, Darazi, essentially made the Druze what they are today. They believe in reincarnation, have a strong moral system, and their society is close-knit and still traditional in outlook. They have their own scripture over and above the Quran, and believe that their Imam will return soon from occultation. They believe in one God in whose light and comfort they shall bask at the end of time
2. See Dick Dowes and Norman Lewis, 'The Trials of Syrian Isma'ilis in the First Decade of the Twentieth Century', International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 21 (Spring 1989), 214-15
3. See also Bernard Lewis, The Origin of Isma'ilism: A Study of the Historical Background of the Fatimid Caliphate (Cambridge 1975), 157. The Isma'ilis are the Sevener Shi'a after Imam Isma'il. They believe in a living Imam and are some of the most prosperous Shi'a around. Their religion is, like that of the Druze, esoteric
4. See also a report by Gamelin, unnumbered document, of September 1925, file 2e, carton 4H-253, AV
5. Gamelin to Minister of War, document 393/IG of 10 February 1926, file 1, carton 7N-4181, AV. He stated that he needed 27 battalions to hold the country, and that was the minimum that he would settle for
6. Bulletin de renseignements, document 57/SP of 14 April 1924, file 3, carton 4H-72, AV
7. Bulletin de renseignements, document 61/SP of 28 April 1924, file 3, carton 4H-72, AV. Hama is more humid than Homs. Therefore a drought in Hama meant a worse problem for Syria as a whole. Indeed, the drought helped trigger the Damascus-Druze revolts of 1925. One of the problems associated with this particular drought was its erratic nature: hail fell at odd moments, and severe but short rainstorms created problems
8. Elizabeth McCallum, The Nationalist Crusade in Syria (New York 1928), 146. Since about half of the land was owned by small landholders, a 25 per cent reduction in the harvest would have been catastrophic with regard to their income
9. Bulletin économique d'état alaouite, section 2, part 2, 1927, 5, carton 4H-134. In the period under discussion there were about 30,000 'Alawis in the Homs-Hama region at harvest time. See Statistique générate 1938, SGA 92:1, file 1, carton 4H-134, AV
10. Al-Mirsaad, 90, 6 November 1928, 2. Mudiriyat al-watha'eq al-wataniya (National archives, henceforth MWW), Damascus, Syria
11. Al-Ahwaal, 9115, 2 June 1927, 1, MWW. The problem repeated itself over the years. Under interrogation a number of labourers who were involved in field-burning in 1926-7 admitted that they had been involved in, and had heard many others bragging of, burning fields owned by families that they hated, or on a mercenary basis
12. Bulletin de reseignements, document 218 of 12 November 1925, file 1, carton 4H-73, AV. The French had already undermined the authority of the gendarmerie by the way that they had treated it. From being an elite unit under the Turks it was purged repeatedly in the early 1920s under the French. Improperly armed, improperly trained, poorly paid and officered, the gendarmerie was a mirror image of French institutions in Syria. See 'Rapport sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, juillet 1922 à juillet 1923', file 1, canon 7N-4174, AV
13. Rapport au Société des Nations, annexe 5. Indiquant la composition par religion des gendarmeries des états sous mandat à la fin de l'année 1926, 221, AV. Its men were composed mostly of Sunni Arabs, Sunni Tcherkess and Shi'a Isma'ilis
14. Bulletin de renseignements, document 219, of 13 November 1925, file 1, carton 4H-73, AV. The word ridicule would be more apt here. He was of Hamawi working-class origin and was something of a whiner. He did not have either the political or the diplomatic skills to build a coalition of important groups both to protect himself and his organization, and to keep peace in that vital city
15. Bulletin de reseignements, document 225 of 19 November 1925, file 1, carton 4H-73, AV
16. Philip Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945 (Princeton, NJ 1987), 173. These were short clashes, but the damage to French prestige was great. They were supposed to impose peace on the area, but could not. Respecting a strong ruler who could impose peace is important in Sunni lore - something the French proved that they could not do
17. Henri Lammens (SJ), Islam: Beliefs and Institutions (New York n.d.), 169-76. The 'Alawi religion is esoteric. It believes in a trinity of gods in one Godhead: the essence of God, the eternal manifestation of God and the manifestation in person who will teach the doctrines. They believe that this trinity has reincarnated itself seven times, with the last reincarnation being at the time of Muhammad. 'Ali was the essence of God, Muhammad the manifestation of God, and Salman al- Farisi taught the word. There are four main 'Alawi sects: Haidari, Chamali, Kalazi and Shaibi. These sects run across tribes and are riven with disputes
18. Bulletin de reseignements, 609 of June 1925, file 2, carton 4H-64, AV. Converts had the nasty habit of killing and then mutilating those who had refused to convert. Hardened French officers, who had seen the carnage of the first world war, were disgusted
19. Gabriel Puaux, Deux années an Levant: Souvenirs de Syrie et du Liban, 1939-1940 (Paris 1952), 149. The High Commissioner bluntly accused French intelligence of all manner of trickery that ensured the 'loyalty' of al-Murshed
20. Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Jacquot, L'Etat des Alaouites (Beyrouth 1929), 266, MWW
21. Unsigned report, document number 72/SP of 3 June 1924, file 3, carton 4H-72, AV. The intelligence services reported in 1924 that 'although the situation is calm, it would be wrong to refer to it as stable. There are numerous indications that something is being planned.'
22. Hanna al-Khabbaz, Silsilat al-Khabbaz: Limaza harabat suriyya faransa (al-Qahira 1928), 209-16. Corruption, abuse of his power on the slightest pretext, flaunting his homosexuality, threatening to unleash his soldiers on raping rampages, etc., were just a few of the reasons for the Druzes' irritation. Theoretically, he should have been the perfect governor for the Druze region since he had been a star pupil of Marshal Lyauty in Morocco, but while Lyauty kept an ever-vigilant eye on his subordinates, Saraille did not and the consequential neglect led to trouble
23. Muhyi al-Din al-Sfarjilani, Tarikh al-thawrat al-Suriyya. Safahat khalida min rawai' kifah al'Arab fi sabil il-huriyya wal-istiqlal wal-wihda (Dimashq 1961), 196. The choice for the French was obvious: either the economically poor Druze region or rich Hama; either the geographicallyisolated Druze region or the communicationally-vital Hama
24. For events in Normand's column, see Tommy Martin, 'Bataille de Kafer', document 78/AM of July 1925, file 1A, carton 4H-253, AV. The column was about 250 strong. For information on Druout, see 'Journal des évé nements, du 20 juillet au 30 juillet, 1925'. Undated and unnumbered and unsigned document, file 9, carton 7N-4186, AV. In both cases, few were left alive
25. Bulletin de renseignements 209 of 3 November 1925, file 1, carton 4H-73, AV. Once the French withdrew, it was publicly stated on the Jabal al-Druze that the French did not have enough men and airplanes in the mandates and that they could do nothing against anyone before spring. In the vacuum thus created, Sultan al-Atrash was able to attack Damascus with 2000 men, where he connected with Damascene rebels. It was an opportunity not to be missed
26. Khairiyeh Qasimiyeh, Muzakarat Fawzi al-Qawukji: 1914-1932, vol. I (Beirut 1975), 11-15. His loyalty changed with the times. At first, it was to Turkey, then to France, then to the Syrian nationalists, then to the Germans during the second world war, and finally to the British
27. Minister of War to High Commissioner in Levant, document 3740 of 14 May 1925, file 1, carton 7N-4181, AV
28. See also Syrian government publication Kifah al sha'ab al-suri (Damascus 1962), 121. Thirty new battalions recently recruited and trained in France were sent to fight the rebellion raging in Morocco in 1925, and the number of men that the French marched against the Druze was impressive: 9000 men as against a few hundred rebels. The best French troops in Syria were three metropolitan battalions that were the Damascus garrison and which the French did not think wise to send to the Druze region. See Adham al-Jundi, Tarikh al-thawraat al-suriyya fi'ahd al-intidab al-faransi (Damascus 1960), 31-48
29. Gamelin to Minister of War, document 1000/3 of 27 April 1927, file 5, carton 4H-134, AV. It was not that the French had overwhelming forces in the Levant; rather, it was France's potential and determination, as well as the divisions among the rebels, that finally gave victory
30. Munir al-Rayyes, Al-Kitab al zahabi lil thawrat al-wataniya fil mashreq al-'arabi; al-thawra al-suriya al-kubra (Beirut 1969), 404. A number of these villages were mixed religiously and there Sunni villagers suffered as much as Christian ones
31. See also Zoukan Karkout, Tatawwur al-harakat al-wataniya fi suriya, 1920-1939 (Beirut 1975), 272. Druze rebels took the mostly Druze quarter of Jaramana, and the Sunni rebels did the same to the mostly Sunni al-Hamidiyye
32. Gamelin to all commanders in the Levant, document 36/2, of 30 October 1925, file 2f, carton 4H-253, AV. Included in this was a three-day barrage on a section of the city and the use of armour against which the rebels could offer no resistance. This barrage did not, in fact, break the rebellion's back. What did break it was the question: now what? A fractionalized society, an improperly verbalized ideology, a hasty coming-together of notables, continuous victories by the French, lack of external support (neither Lebanese Druze nor Sunnis rebelled in sympathy) and the seeming indifference of other Arab leaders, etc., disenchanted the men on the street and drained the panache out of them. See Nazih al-Mu'ayad al'Azm, 'Answers of al-Mu'ayad to researchers in Syria's history', document 150, undated, file 49, al-Wath'eq 66-158, vol. 2, MWW