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Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 403-429

The structure of payments in technology transfer contracts: Evidence from Spain

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EID: 18844389032     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2005.00046.x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (29)

References (12)
  • 1
    • 0034405660 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The structure of licensing contracts
    • Anand, B. and T. Khanna, 2000, "The Structure of Licensing Contracts," Journal of Industrial Economics, 48(1), 103-135.
    • (2000) Journal of Industrial Economics , vol.48 , Issue.1 , pp. 103-135
    • Anand, B.1    Khanna, T.2
  • 2
    • 0030408324 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Contracting for tacit knowledge: The provision of technical services in technology licensing contracts
    • Arora, A., 1996, "Contracting for Tacit Knowledge: The Provision of Technical Services in Technology Licensing Contracts," Journal of Development Economics, 50, 233-257.
    • (1996) Journal of Development Economics , vol.50 , pp. 233-257
    • Arora, A.1
  • 3
    • 0000323328 scopus 로고
    • Classificatory notes on the production and transmission of technological knowledge
    • Arrow, K.J., 1969, "Classificatory Notes on the Production and Transmission of Technological Knowledge," American Economic Review, 59(2), 29-35.
    • (1969) American Economic Review , vol.59 , Issue.2 , pp. 29-35
    • Arrow, K.J.1
  • 4
    • 85077563618 scopus 로고
    • Double-sided moral hazard and the nature of share contracts
    • Bhattacharyya, S. and F. Lafontaine, 1995, "Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, 26(4), 761-781.
    • (1995) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.26 , Issue.4 , pp. 761-781
    • Bhattacharyya, S.1    Lafontaine, F.2
  • 6
    • 0036392543 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Royalty rates and upfront fees in share contracts: Evidence from franchising
    • Brickley, J., 2002, "Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence from Franchising," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18(2), 511-535.
    • (2002) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization , vol.18 , Issue.2 , pp. 511-535
    • Brickley, J.1
  • 9
    • 0000909737 scopus 로고
    • Technology transfer under asymmetric information
    • Gallini, N. and B.D. Wright, 1990, "Technology Transfer Under Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, 21, 147-160.
    • (1990) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.21 , pp. 147-160
    • Gallini, N.1    Wright, B.D.2
  • 10
    • 0030551184 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Why hold-ups occur: The self-enforcing range of contractual relationships
    • Klein, B., 1996, "Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships," Economic Inquiry, 34(3), 444-463.
    • (1996) Economic Inquiry , vol.34 , Issue.3 , pp. 444-463
    • Klein, B.1
  • 11
    • 85076770617 scopus 로고
    • Agency theory and franchising: Some empirical results
    • Lafontaine, F., 1992, "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results," RAND Journal of Economics, 23(2), 263-283.
    • (1992) RAND Journal of Economics , vol.23 , Issue.2 , pp. 263-283
    • Lafontaine, F.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.