Why non-monotonie logic is inadequate to represent balancing arguments

Artificial Intelligence and Law

Volumn 11, Issue 2-3, 2003, Pages 211-219

  Sieckmann, Jan R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BAMBERG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Argumentation; Defeasible reasoning; Internal point of view; Legal reasoning; Normative arguments; Weighing and balancing

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; DECISION MAKING; FORMAL LOGIC; LAWS AND LEGISLATION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; SPEECH COMMUNICATION;

ARGUMENTATION; DEFEASIBLE REASONING; INTERNAL POINT OF VIEW; LEGAL REASONING; NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS; WEIGHING AND BALANCING;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE;

EID: 18744394096     PISSN: 09248463     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:ARTI.0000046010.14101.04     Document Type: Article

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