A grand strategy for Central Asia

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 45-54

  Hansen, Flemming Splidsboel ^a  

^a CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 18544372122     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2005.11052196     Document Type: Article

References (76)

1. This article focuses on the formerly Soviet Central Asia, defined here as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Although the discussion necessarily employs the term "Central Asia," one must note that its widespread use to designate this area is both unfortunate and misleading, because it overlooks important security dynamics involving neighboring states. A more dynamic approach would see "Central Asia" in a wider context as a region comprising the formerly Soviet Central Asia plus Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran and possibly even China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region.
2. As one commentator recently noted, "Experience suggests that public interest soon fades and policy makers quickly shift their attention to the next crisis" (William Hay, "Reading the Past into American Foreign Policy," Orbis 48, no. 2 [Spring 2004]: 374).
3. See, for example, Cheryl Benard, "Central Asia: 'Apocalypse Soon' or Eccentric Survival?" in The Muslim World After 9/11, ed. Angel Rabasa et al. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), p. 365.
4. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002), p. 6; available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
5. John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy," Foreign Policy 81, no. 6 (November/December 2002): 56.
6. The 2005 Freedom House evaluation of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, respectively, is as follows (0 is most free, 7 is least free): Kazakhstan 6/5, Kyrgyzstan 6/5, Tajikistan 6/5, Uzbekistan 7/6, and Turkmenistan 7/7. In 1988, the Soviet Union was set at 6/5, and in 1991, at 4/4. For more information, see www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld /2005/table2005.pdf.
7. For a discussion of this, see Bernard Lewis, "Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy," Middle East Quarterly 1, no. 1 (March 1994), available at www.meforum.org/article/216/.
8. Steven Hofmann, "Islam and Democracy - Micro-Level Indications of Compatibility," Comparative Political Studies 37, no. 6 (2004): 652-76. In his conclusion, Hofmann notes, "It may be argued that countries included in this study [Turkey, Bosnia, Bangladesh, and Azerbaijan] have secular governments, as well as fewer practicing adherents of Islam than many other Muslim countries, which may raise doubts about the applicability of these empirical findings to other countries," The Central Asian states, however, all share these characteristics with the countries surveyed, indicating that similar results would be found here.
9. Richard Rose, "How Muslims View Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia," Journal of Democracy 13, no. (2002): 107. This majority stands at 61 percent in both states (in Kazakhstan, the share of undecided respondents was 18 percent, in Kyrgyzstan, 14 percent). The World Values Survey found that as many as 78 percent of Kyrgyz polled prefer democracy over the alternatives;
10. see Ronald Inglehart, "The Worldviews of Islamic Publics in Global Perspective" (2004), p. 26; available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.
11. Rose, "How Muslims View Democracy," p. 107.
12. Commenting on the situation in Uzbekistan, which is matched for repressive rule only by Turkmenistan, Martha Brill Olcott "cautioned that [while] human rights should not be forgotten ⋯ concerns about them may have to take a back seat to economic development" (Report on Carnegie Endowment for International Peace meeting, "The Situation on the Ground: Security Risks and Opportunities in Central Asia" [November 19, 2001], available at www.ceip.org/files/events/OlcottSitonGround.asp).
13. On the dangers of democratization, see Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence (New York: Norton, 2000).
14. For representatives of this perspective, see José María Maravall, "The Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage" in Economic Reform and Democracy (1995);
15. Barbara Geddes, "Challenging the Conventional Wisdom" in Economic Reform and Democracy (1995);
16. Anders Åslund, "The Case for Radical Reform" in Economic Reform and Democracy (1995);
17. and Minxin Pei, "The Puzzle of East Asian Exceptionalism"; all in Economic Reform and Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
18. See also Joseph Siegle, Michael Weinstein, and Morton Halperin, "Why Democracies Excel," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (September/October 2004): 57-71.
19. I b i d.
20. The Heritage Foundation evaluation is as follows (1 is most open, 5 is most repressed): Kyrgyzstan 3.29, Kazakhstan 3.66, Tajikistan 4.00, Uzbekistan 4.10, Turkmenistan 4.36; see www.heritage.org/researcn/features/index/countries.cfm.
21. This list also includes Cuba, Libya, and North Korea.
22. Daniel Linotte, "Poverty in Central Asia," Helsinki Monitor 13, no. 2 (2002): 167-76.
23. Anders Åslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 149-51.
24. Kazakhstan: Country Profile 2003 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003), p. 31.
25. See Maravall, "Myth of the Authoritarian Advantage," pp. 15-17. It could be added that in the absence of political accountability, the economy is also vulnerable to the whims of autocratic rulers. The 1997 decision of President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan to introduce a damaging system of multiple exchange rates was one of the more irresponsible instances.
26. It is important to add that democratization may actually have the opposite effect, by serving to release anti-U.S. sentiments now controlled by an authoritarian government. However, as shown below, in Central Asia anti-U.S. feelings do not run anywhere near as high as in many other parts of the Muslim world, suggesting that for the United States the risk of democratization in the region is relatively small. See Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, "A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger Persists" (Pew Research Center, 2004), available at http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=206/.
27. In a 2003 survey the International Crisis Group found that the proportion of people who look favorably on the United States is 47.8 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 60.8 percent in Uzbekistan, and 76.3 percent in Tajikistan, and the proportion who look unfavorably on the United States is 30.6 percent, 10.9 percent, and 20.0 percent respectively; in ICG Asia, "Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for Engagement" (International Crisis Group Asia Group Report No. 72, December 2003), p. 23; available at www.crisisweb.org.
28. In early July 2003, Heidar Aliyev was taken to Ankara for treatment, only to be transferred to the Cleveland Clinic in Ohio a month later. His death was announced on December 12, 2003, that is, two months after the presidential election.
29. Human Rights Reports (2004), available at www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c1470.htm.
30. Some of the more prominent opposition figures include Galymzhan Zhakianov (Kazakhstan) and Feliks Kulov (Kyrgyzstan).
31. On securitization, see Barry Buzan, Ole Wver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998).
32. Alexei Malashenko, "Landmarks on the Road of Jihad," Russia in Global Affairs 1, no. 1 (2003): 132-33.
33. For a discussion of this, see Yaacov Ro'i, "Islam, State, and Society in Central Asia," Helsinki Monitor 14, no. 3 (2003): 242-53;
34. Igor Rotar, "Under the Green Banner: Islamic Radicals in Russia and the Former Soviet Union," Religion, State, and Society 30, no. 2 (2002): 89-153;
35. and Shirin Akiner, "The Politicisation of Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia," Religion, State, and Society 31, no. 2 (2003): 97-122.
36. Ghoncheh Tazmini, "The Islamic Revival in Central Asia: A Potent Force or a Misconception?" Central Asian Survey 20, no. 1 (2001): 67.
37. Ibid., p. 68. All of Central Asia's leaders have, to varying degrees, used their Muslim background to distance themselves from the Soviet apparatus (in which most of them served loyally) and to show that they are firmly committed to the non-Russian cultural identity of the region.
38. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 106.
39. Amin Tarzi, "Hurdles in Implementing the New Afghan Constitution," RFE/RL Afghanistan Report (February 5, 2004), available at www.rferl.org.
40. For an excellent treatment of the Soviet policy toward Islam, see Yaacov Ro'i, Islam in the Soviet Union: From the Second World War to Gorbachev (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). On the impact of communist rule on different value systems
41. see Inglehart, "Worldviews of Islamic Publics in Global Perspective," p. 11 and figure 3.
42. See, for example, "Contrasts Between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan," Economist (May 17, 2003): 39.
43. Afghanistan is still in a category of its own, but as a case it suddenly seems less extreme.
44. See Kalevi Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
45. A well-written, though slightly alarmist, account of the situation in Russia before the introduction of reforms by President Vladimir Putin is Sam Nunn and Adam Stulberg, "The Many Faces of Modern Russia," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 2 (March/April 2000): 45-62. The Putin reforms were designed to increase, first, the coercive and administrative capacity of the state and then, second, its legitimacy among the population.
46. Vladimir Putin, "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium," in First Person, ed. Nataliya Gevorkyan, Nataliya Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov (New York: Public Affairs, 2000), appendix.
47. Controversially, the 2002 census put the number of Russian Muslims at only 14.5 million (i.e., 10 percent of the population), but Putin subsequently referred to the pre-census standard figure of 20 million (i.e., one in seven) as the correct one. See RFE/RL Newsline (October 16, 2003). The gap produced by the census results indicates just how sensitive questions of ethnicity and religion are in today's Russia.
48. In an interview, U.S. observer Alex Alexiev warned readers that an Islamic radicalization is taking place "also in Russia - not just in Chechnya and Dagestan, but also in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, everywhere where Muslims are living," adding that "this could very well be a greater threat for Russia than for the USA" (Izvestia, July 9, 2003).
49. Dmitri Glinski, "Russia and Its Muslims: The Politics of Identity at the International-Domestic Border," East European Constitutional Review 11, nos. 1-2 (2002): 82.
50. Putin's "national idea" seems to rest on three pillars: democracy, market relations, and patriotism; see Putin, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium.
51. Afghanistan illustrates how extreme state weakness may threaten Russian interests; see, for example, Anatol Lieven, "The Secret Policemen's Ball: The United States, Russia and the International Order After 11 September," International Affairs 78, no. 2 (2002): 245-59.
52. Until 1992, not only did these groups form a single minority within a common state, they also faced the same uncompromising regime opposition. Add to that a shared language (Russian) and a shared religious background (more than 90 percent are Sunnis of the Hanafi school), and a picture of mutual sympathy and understanding emerges.
53. See Putin, Russia at the Turn of the Millennium, p. 241.
54. Putin's decision to attend the October 2003 summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference - Russia's first-ever participation in the QIC - also illustrates this attempt to formulate a positive agenda. Speaking before his departure for Malaysia, Putin explained that members of the Muslim minority "have the right to be part of the global Islamic community," adding that "QIC participation is a way for Russian Muslims to communicate with other Muslims and for Russia to better appreciate what is going on in the Islamic world" (RFE/RL Newsline [October 16, 2003]).
55. No single state - or, indeed, combination of states - seems capable of challenging Russia and U.S. influence in the region or willing to accept the possible costs of doing so.
56. Nezavisimaia gazeta (March 15, 2004).
57. Sergei Kortunov, "Russian-American Partnership: A Chance to Open a New Page," International Affairs 48, no. 3 (2002): 32.
58. RFE/RL Newsline (June 22, 2004).
59. Izvestia (April 15, 2004).
60. Robert Coalson, "Putin Cast His Vote for Bush," in RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly (June 24, 2004).
61. See, e.g., Sophie Lambroschini, "Russia: Summit Focuses on Increasing Energy Exports, Especially to U.S.," RFE/RL Features (September 24, 2003).
62. According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2004, the share of total proven oil and gas resources in the world is 0.8 percent/1.1 percent for Kazakhstan; less than 0.05 percent/1.6 percent for Turkmenistan, and 0.1 percent/1.1 percent for Uzbekistan (www.bp.com).
63. Kazakhstan, in this respect the most important state, implements a very cautious policy as it finds itself caught between U.S. and Russian interests (RFE/RL Newsline [March 2, 2004]).
64. According to a World Bank estimate; see http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf.
65. I b i d.
66. See Kai Wegerich, "Water: The Difficult Path to a Sustainable Future for Central Asia," in Central Asia: Aspects of Transition, ed. Tom Everett-Heath (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 256-59.
67. While annual per capita water resources in the region only constitute about two-thirds of the world average, at more than 4,300 cubic meters they easily exceed the oft-cited "water scarcity" definition of 2,000 cubic meters per capita per year. Figures have been calculated from World Bank, Water Resources in Europe and Central Asia, vol. 2 (2003), available at www.worldbank.org.
68. Illustrating a classic "prisoners' dilemma" situation, a recent report explained, "There is little prospect that the Central Asian states will succeed in reducing drastically their use of water and renovating their hydrosystems. None is willing to do so if it feels that it is losing out to the others" (Uzbekistan: Country Profile 2003 [London: Economist Intelligence Unit 2003], p. 17).
69. For the levels of aid, greatly increased since 2001, see www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/sectors.html, www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/index.htm, and www.ebrd.org/about/strategy/index.htm.
70. "EBRD Updates Strategy for Uzbekistan," EBRD Press Release (April 6, 2004), available at www.ebrd.org/new/pressrel/2004/index.htm.
71. Human Rights Watch, "Uzbekistan: EBRD Leading by Example" (April 7, 2004), available at http://www.org/english/docs/2004/04/06/uzbeki8405_txt.htm.
72. The combined gross domestic product of all fives states in 2003 reached $48.7 billion, that is, approximately twice that of Luxembourg; see World Bank, Quick Reference Tables, available at www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/GDP.pdf.
73. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) recommends that aid be allocated "across and within countries more selectively," and that more emphasis should be placed on "host country participation, ownership, and internal participation." In Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century (2004), p. 6, available at www.usaid.gov/policy/pdabz3221.pdf.
74. USAID/State Department Strategic Plan, 2004-2009 (2003), available at www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/state_usaid_strat_plan.pdf.
75. For these two extremes, see Frank Schimmelfenning, "Introduction: The Impact of International Organizations on the Central and Eastern European States - Conceptual and Theoretical Issues," in Norms and Nannies, ed. Ronald Linden (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 11-13.
76. RFE/RL Central Asia Report (January 11, 2004).