Nomenklatura Lite? The Cadres Reserve in Russian Public Administration

Problems of Post-Communism

Volumn 51, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 30-39

  Huskey, Eugene ^a  

^a STETSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 1842865692     PISSN: 10758216     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10758216.2004.11052158     Document Type: Review

References (57)

1. Here the terra nomenklatura refers to the system of recruiting personnel rather than to the ruling class itself. One feature of the Soviet nomenklatura class has already been revived by Putin: the refusal to exile those who leave office into the political wilderness. Witness the treatment of two of his political enemies, the former mayor of St. Petersburg and the governor of Primorskii Krai. See Viktor Loshak, "Obratnaia sviaz. Vechnaia oboima" (The Return of Ties: The Eternal Circuit), Moskovskie novosti (June 17, 2003): 4.
2. Olga Kryshtanovskaia, "Vremia issledovanii. Molodezh idet v oligarkhi" (Research Time: Youth Go to the Oligarchs), Vremia MN (January 18, 2002): 6.
3. For details on the competition in Kirienko's federal district, see Marina Volkova, "Chinovnika staviat v ramki" (Bureaucrats Placed on Lists), Rossiiskaia gazeta (May 6, 2003): 4; Mikhail Aleksandrov, "Privolzhe, U Kirienko tri vakansii" (Privolzhskii: Kirienko Has Three Vacancies), Rossiiskaia gazeta (June 1, 2002): 7. Information on the open competition for a cadres reserve in the Ulianovsk oblast, which sought to exclude the influence of blat on the outcome, may be found in "V Ulianovskoi oblasti sozdaetsia rezerv kadrov oblastnoi administratsii. Chinovniki nabiraiut po konkursu" (In Ulianovsk Oblast the Oblast Administration Creates Cadres Reserves: Bureaucrats Gain Experience), available at www.pravda.ru (July 18, 2001).
4. For details on the competition in Kirienko's federal district, see Marina Volkova, "Chinovnika staviat v ramki" (Bureaucrats Placed on Lists), Rossiiskaia gazeta (May 6, 2003): 4; Mikhail Aleksandrov, "Privolzhe, U Kirienko tri vakansii" (Privolzhskii: Kirienko Has Three Vacancies), Rossiiskaia gazeta (June 1, 2002): 7. Information on the open competition for a cadres reserve in the Ulianovsk oblast, which sought to exclude the influence of blat on the outcome, may be found in "V Ulianovskoi oblasti sozdaetsia rezerv kadrov oblastnoi administratsii. Chinovniki nabiraiut po konkursu" (In Ulianovsk Oblast the Oblast Administration Creates Cadres Reserves: Bureaucrats Gain Experience), available at www.pravda.ru (July 18, 2001).
5. For details on the competition in Kirienko's federal district, see Marina Volkova, "Chinovnika staviat v ramki" (Bureaucrats Placed on Lists), Rossiiskaia gazeta (May 6, 2003): 4; Mikhail Aleksandrov, "Privolzhe, U Kirienko tri vakansii" (Privolzhskii: Kirienko Has Three Vacancies), Rossiiskaia gazeta (June 1, 2002): 7. Information on the open competition for a cadres reserve in the Ulianovsk oblast, which sought to exclude the influence of blat on the outcome, may be found in "V Ulianovskoi oblasti sozdaetsia rezerv kadrov oblastnoi administratsii. Chinovniki nabiraiut po konkursu" (In Ulianovsk Oblast the Oblast Administration Creates Cadres Reserves: Bureaucrats Gain Experience), available at www.pravda.ru (July 18, 2001).
6. "O rezerve kadrov dlia zameshcheniia vakantnykh dolzhnostei gosudarstvennykh sluzhb goroda Moskvy" (On the Cadres Reserve for Filling Vacant Positions in the Moscow Civil Service), Rasporiazhenie mera Moskvy (February 26, 1998).
7. I b i d.
8. See, for example, the legislation on this from Sakhalin, "O poriadke zachisleniia v rezerv i nakhozhdeniia v rezerve gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Sakhalinskoi oblasti" (On the Procedures for Entering the Reserves of the Sakhalin Oblast Civil Service), (January 24, 2002), available at http://vff-s.narod.ru/sb/b7/314_1.html. Besides the detailed files maintained on individual civil servants, including those in reserve, new legislation calls for the establishment of a combined registry (svodnyi reestr) of all federal and provincial civil servants, regulated by presidential decree. See Article 15, "O sisteme gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi federatsii" (On the Civil Service System of the Russian Federation), Rossiiskaia gazeta (May 30, 2003): 10.
9. See, for example, the legislation on this from Sakhalin, "O poriadke zachisleniia v rezerv i nakhozhdeniia v rezerve gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Sakhalinskoi oblasti" (On the Procedures for Entering the Reserves of the Sakhalin Oblast Civil Service), (January 24, 2002), available at http://vff-s.narod.ru/sb/b7/314_1.html. Besides the detailed files maintained on individual civil servants, including those in reserve, new legislation calls for the establishment of a combined registry (svodnyi reestr) of all federal and provincial civil servants, regulated by presidential decree. See Article 15, "O sisteme gosudarstvennoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi federatsii" (On the Civil Service System of the Russian Federation), Rossiiskaia gazeta (May 30, 2003): 10.
10. Typically, reserve lists are culled once a year to remove individuals who are no longer eligible for promotion to the designated posts or who no longer enjoy the confidence of the leadership.
11. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation represents an exception to this pattern. It announced competitions for three supervisory posts that were to be filled through an open competition that it hoped would draw applicants from private as well as public institutions, It remains to be seen, however, whether employees in the private sector will be willing to make a career move to a ministry if they can be terminated during a three-month probationary period, presumably without the severance pay that would be negotiated for such positions in the West. This ministry, which helped to write pending legislation encouraging the use of open competitions for the hiring of civil servants, viewed the three competitions within its own bureaucracy as an experiment that it hoped would encourage other ministries to follow suit. Mikhail Vorobev, "Konkursy na gosudarstvennye dolzhnosti voidut v modu" (Competition to Enter Civil Service Posts Will Become Fashionable), Vremia novostei (May 15, 2003): 4.
12. See, for example, Article 3.3, "Polozhenie o rezerve kadrov dlia zameshcheniia vakantnykh dolzhnostei gosudarstvennykh sluzhb goroda Moskvy" (The Situation of Cadres Reserves for Replacing Vacant Positions in the Civil Service of Moscow City), Rasporiazhenie mera Moskvy (February 26, 1998), and Article 2.1 of Postanovlenie no. 46, "O poriadke zachisleniia v rezerv munitsipalnoi sluzhby, Tazovskii raion, Iamal-Nenets Avtonomnyi Okrug" (On the Procedures for Entering the Municipal Service Reserves, Tazov Raion, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug), available at www.fakttv.ru/official/2002/04/22/ 01.html.
13. See, for example, Article 3.3, "Polozhenie o rezerve kadrov dlia zameshcheniia vakantnykh dolzhnostei gosudarstvennykh sluzhb goroda Moskvy" (The Situation of Cadres Reserves for Replacing Vacant Positions in the Civil Service of Moscow City), Rasporiazhenie mera Moskvy (February 26, 1998), and Article 2.1 of Postanovlenie no. 46, "O poriadke zachisleniia v rezerv munitsipalnoi sluzhby, Tazovskii raion, Iamal-Nenets Avtonomnyi Okrug" (On the Procedures for Entering the Municipal Service Reserves, Tazov Raion, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug), available at www.fakttv.ru/official/2002/04/22/ 01.html.
14. For other examples of cross-training between the public and private sectors, see Gambhir Bhatta, "Senior Management Development in the New Zealand Public Service," Asian Journal of Political Science, no. 2 (2001): 122.
15. Artem Galin, "Korporatsiia munitsipalnykh sluzhashchikh" (Municipal Civil Service Corps), Kommercheskie vesti (July 2, 2003).
16. Svetlana Grigoreva, "Kollektivnyi razum vospityvaetsia trudom" (Collective Reasons Labor Cultivates), Nizhegorodskie novosti (July 5, 2001).
17. O privlechenii predstavitelei molodezhnykh obshchestvennykh obedinenii k uchastiiu v deiatelnosti ispolnitelnykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti Sankt-Peterburga (On Attracting Representatives of the Youth Population with More Frequency to Perform the Activities of the Organs of State Power in St. Petersburg), Regulation enacted December 21, 2001, No. 1406, available at http://gov.spb.ru/gov/admin/otral/kpmp/dokument/rasporyagheniya/2 (sic).
18. "Uspekhov!" (Success!), Iunost (October 23, 2002). This article describes the youth government in Yaroslavl.
19. "Zdorovyi patriotizm, demokraticheskie tsennosti, uvazhenie mneniia drugikh" (Healthy Patriotism, Democratic Values, Respect Opinions of One Another), Kommuna (Voronezh) (April 15, 2003).
20. "Aleksandr Samsonov: 'My poluchili realnuiu kartinu o kadrovom potentsiale respubliki" (Aleksandr Samsonov: I Have Received a Realistic Picture of Potential Republic Cadres), Iakutiia (June 6, 2002).
21. V. Kizilov, "Vypusknikov mnogo - spetsialistov net" (Many Graduates - Few Specialists), Belgorodskaia pravda (November 19, 2002). In Krasnoiarsk, the city government has created a single cadres reserve, noting that the "municipality serves as a coordinating and organizing center for the development of personnel resources of the city, nurturing its intellectual potential and assuring the professional socialization of its management cadres." "Kontury programmy 'Munitsipalnyi kadrovyi rezerv'" (Outline of a Program for a Municipal Cadres Reserve), available at www.povestka.ru/shkr/kras/an/stal.htm. In Karelia, the republican government has adopted what it calls an "integrated cadres policy" to embrace the forming of reserves and training of personnel for municipal government and enterprises." "Kak utopit kadrovyi golod?" (How to Fill the Personnel Shortage?), Kareliia, no. 118 (November 7, 2002), available at www.gov.karelia.ru/gov/Karelia/965/18.html.
22. V. Kizilov, "Vypusknikov mnogo - spetsialistov net" (Many Graduates - Few Specialists), Belgorodskaia pravda (November 19, 2002). In Krasnoiarsk, the city government has created a single cadres reserve, noting that the "municipality serves as a coordinating and organizing center for the development of personnel resources of the city, nurturing its intellectual potential and assuring the professional socialization of its management cadres." "Kontury programmy 'Munitsipalnyi kadrovyi rezerv'" (Outline of a Program for a Municipal Cadres Reserve), available at www.povestka.ru/shkr/kras/an/stal.htm. In Karelia, the republican government has adopted what it calls an "integrated cadres policy" to embrace the forming of reserves and training of personnel for municipal government and enterprises." "Kak utopit kadrovyi golod?" (How to Fill the Personnel Shortage?), Kareliia, no. 118 (November 7, 2002), available at www.gov.karelia.ru/gov/Karelia/965/18.html.
23. V. Kizilov, "Vypusknikov mnogo - spetsialistov net" (Many Graduates - Few Specialists), Belgorodskaia pravda (November 19, 2002). In Krasnoiarsk, the city government has created a single cadres reserve, noting that the "municipality serves as a coordinating and organizing center for the development of personnel resources of the city, nurturing its intellectual potential and assuring the professional socialization of its management cadres." "Kontury programmy 'Munitsipalnyi kadrovyi rezerv'" (Outline of a Program for a Municipal Cadres Reserve), available at www.povestka.ru/shkr/kras/an/stal.htm. In Karelia, the republican government has adopted what it calls an "integrated cadres policy" to embrace the forming of reserves and training of personnel for municipal government and enterprises." "Kak utopit kadrovyi golod?" (How to Fill the Personnel Shortage?), Kareliia, no. 118 (November 7, 2002), available at www.gov.karelia.ru/gov/Karelia/965/18.html.
24. "Kadry reshaiut vse!" (Cadres Solve Everything!), Krasnyi sever (Vologda) (March 2, 2002).
25. The presidential apparatus has an Administration for Cadres Policy, but it plays only a negligible role in personnel policy and practice. There is also a Departament gosudarstvennoi sluzhby i kadrov (Department of Civil Service and Cadres) in the apparatus of the government.
26. On the operation of personnel policy at the regional level, see the informative interview with the head of the administrator of affairs of the Vologda region. "Kadry reshaiut vse!" Krasnyi sever (Vologda), (March 2, 2002).
27. For an example of rotation used for leading posts in a republic, where 42 percent of the people appointed to "leading posts" are drawn from other state institutions or from economic enterprises, see "Aleksandr Samsonov: 'My poluchili realnuiu kartinu." See also Aleksandr Strakhov, "Otstupat nekuda. Nastupat - tozhe. V regionakh u tsentra kadrovogo rezerva net" (Never Retreat. Forward - Always. No Cadres Reserve in the Regions and the Center), Izvestia (March 6, 2002): 4.
28. For an example of rotation used for leading posts in a republic, where 42 percent of the people appointed to "leading posts" are drawn from other state institutions or from economic enterprises, see "Aleksandr Samsonov: 'My poluchili realnuiu kartinu." See also Aleksandr Strakhov, "Otstupat nekuda. Nastupat - tozhe. V regionakh u tsentra kadrovogo rezerva net" (Never Retreat. Forward - Always. No Cadres Reserve in the Regions and the Center), Izvestia (March 6, 2002): 4.
29. See Svetlana Ofitova, "Polpredam razreshili 'vziat' kassu. Odnako prioritetnye zadachi namestnikov - eto zemelnaia i sudebnaia reformy" (Plenipotentiary Resolves "Bribery" Case. However, the Priority Tasks of Governors - General Are-They Are Land and Legal Reform), Nezavisimaia gazeta (April 24, 2003): 2.
30. Svetlana Ofitova, "Petr Latyshev: nasha tsel - edinoe prostranstvo" (Pete Latyshev: Our Goal-Unified Space), Nezavisimaia gazeta (April 22, 2003): 10; Larisa Aidinova, "6.5 milliona chinovnika dlia Rossii - eto zapredelno" (6.5 Million Bureaucrats for Russia - That Is the Limit), Vek (March 16, 2001): 9.
31. Svetlana Ofitova, "Petr Latyshev: nasha tsel - edinoe prostranstvo" (Pete Latyshev: Our Goal-Unified Space), Nezavisimaia gazeta (April 22, 2003): 10; Larisa Aidinova, "6.5 milliona chinovnika dlia Rossii - eto zapredelno" (6.5 Million Bureaucrats for Russia - That Is the Limit), Vek (March 16, 2001): 9.
32. For a stimulating article on the influence of the president of Tatarstan on the selection of the republic's procurator, see "Kafil Amirov: zakonnost dolzhna byt odna - vserossiiskaia, a ne kaluzhskaia ili kazanskaia" (Kafil Amirov; Law and Order Must Be Unified - All-Russian, Not Kaluzhska's or Kazan's), Rossiiskala gazeta (July 15, 2000): 4.
33. "Prezidium Vladimirskogo gorodskogo Soveta narodnykh deputatov" (Presidium of the Vladimir City Congress of People's Deputies), Molva (Vladimir) (February 26, 2002).
34. On the significance of the politics-administration nexus, see Peter Hall, "Policy Innovation and the Structure of the State: The Politics-Administration Nexus in France and Britain," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (March 1983): 43-59.
35. Although the white paper on "Reform of the State Service of the Russian Federation, 2003-2005" calls for the cadres reserves to be formed on a competitive basis, there is no indication that this method of selection is being used for most reserve lists. "Ofitsialnye materialy" (Official Materials), Rossiiskaia gazeta (November 23, 2002): 5. The first deputy leader of the presidential administration, Dmitrii Medvedev, responding to criticism that the new draft law on the civilian state service had drastically reduced the use of open competitions in civil service hiring, stated that it will remain an important element of civil service hiring, but he admitted that when people are hired on fixed-term contracts as well as from the reserve, open competitions would not be used; Volkova, "Chinovnika staviat v ramki." Speaking in late 2001, a prominent Duma deputy, Vladimir Yuzhakov, estimated that 30 percent of all civil service vacancies would be filled through open competition, although that figure is almost certainly high; Tatiana Khudiakova, "Chinovnik i ego komanda" (Bureaucrat and His Team), Vremia MN (October 12, 2001); 8.
36. Although the white paper on "Reform of the State Service of the Russian Federation, 2003-2005" calls for the cadres reserves to be formed on a competitive basis, there is no indication that this method of selection is being used for most reserve lists. "Ofitsialnye materialy" (Official Materials), Rossiiskaia gazeta (November 23, 2002): 5. The first deputy leader of the presidential administration, Dmitrii Medvedev, responding to criticism that the new draft law on the civilian state service had drastically reduced the use of open competitions in civil service hiring, stated that it will remain an important element of civil service hiring, but he admitted that when people are hired on fixed-term contracts as well as from the reserve, open competitions would not be used; Volkova, "Chinovnika staviat v ramki." Speaking in late 2001, a prominent Duma deputy, Vladimir Yuzhakov, estimated that 30 percent of all civil service vacancies would be filled through open competition, although that figure is almost certainly high; Tatiana Khudiakova, "Chinovnik i ego komanda" (Bureaucrat and His Team), Vremia MN (October 12, 2001); 8.
37. The idea of cadres rotation is so important, one official tied to Kirienko observed, because "a boss never includes in the reserve for his post a subordinate who is more talented (perspektivnee) than he is. He prefers someone who's not able to replace (podsidet) him"; V. Kochetkov, "Dmitrii Zharkov. Iaponskii opyt preobrazhaet kadrovuiu politiku PFO" (Dmitrii Zharkov: The Japanese Experience in Transforming Political Personnel), Izvestiia Mordovii (March 5, 2002).
38. Mikhail Lukin, "O tekh, kto 'vse reshaet,' i morskikh prostorakh" (On Those Who "Decide Everything," and on the Sea's Expanse), Stavropolskaia pravda (July 26, 2003).
39. Author interview with Tamara Nikolaevna Shamaeva, deputy head, Department of Education, Sovetskii raion, Kazan, May 24, 2003.
40. Some deputy ministerial posts reputedly sell for large sums of money, which suggests that they are often used for personal enrichment. The sale of such sinecures, of course, would make a mockery of the cadres-reserve lists, but it would not negate the point that deputy ministers have an interest in preserving the status quo, which is usually guaranteed by re-electing the current power holders.
41. Ofitova, "Petr Latyshev."
42. Kushtapin, "Polpred Kirienko v kruge pervom."
43. Although he believes that the state, rather than a party, should form a reserve for republic presidents and regional governors, the president of Chuvashia, Nikolai Fedorov, favors the preparation of provincial leaders for office by ensuring that they first have experience in federal ministries and agencies. Marina Kalashnikova, "Rossiiu nado uderzhat ot samoizoliatsii" (It is Necessary for Russia to Restrain Itself from Self-Isolation), Nezavisimaia gazeta (February 27, 2002); 1. It is striking that politicians like Fedorov do not seem to understand that in democratic regimes career movements of this sort are matters for parties and not the state, and that state control of the process removes the element of choice and uncertainty essential to a democracy.
44. Olga Kryshtanovskaia, "Vremia sotsiologii. Elita v pogonakh" (Sociology Times; Elites in Pursuit), Vremia MN (September 18, 2002); 9. This article merits careful reading by anyone interested in cadres policy in Russia.
45. Mikhail Kushtapin, "Polpred Kirienko v kruge pervom" (Plenipotentiary Kiriyenko in the First Circle), Rossiiskaia gazeta (February 28, 2001): 4.
46. Andrei Makarychev, "Lebedev protiv Putina?" (Lebedev against Putin?), Birzha (May 20, 2002). Putin's desire to influence local elections is part of a larger campaign to lessen the power of regional elites who themselves seek to have allies elected to city and district offices.
47. Svetlana Ofitova, "Polpredy zhdut ot Kremlia deneg i vlasti" (Plenipotentiaries Wait for Money and Power from Kremlin), Nezavisimaia gazeta (April 22, 2003): 2.
48. Ibid. One the electoral tasks of Latyshev's office is the organizing of "hot lines" the media could use to "receive explanations and recommendations (from the authorities) on questions relating to their activities during the electoral campaign. We are obligated to monitor the carrying out of the law, which guarantees that parties and the media explain issues properly." He was unable to explain to a journalist what he meant by "properly" (ibid.), Dmitrii Medvedev admits that Russia could see the development of cadres reserves with a strict party orientation, but he believes this is a "matter for the future"; Volkova, "Chinovnika staviat v ramki." There is extraordinary variety in the ways democratic states structure the politics-administration nexus. Whereas Britain allows only about 100 key posts to be filled with new appointees when a new administration comes to office, the number is approximately 3,000 in the United States. Whatever the ratio of political appointees to permanent civil servants, there is general agreement that there should be a clear delineation between political and administrative posts in a democratic state. However, in practice, in countries traditionally labeled as democratic, permanent civil servants sometimes find themselves under severe political or partisan pressure. One such case is Israel, which has allowed some parties to gain a foothold in the administrative life of certain ministries. Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Administrative Power in Israel," Israel Affairs, no. 4 (2002): 30-42.
49. Ibid. One the electoral tasks of Latyshev's office is the organizing of "hot lines" the media could use to "receive explanations and recommendations (from the authorities) on questions relating to their activities during the electoral campaign. We are obligated to monitor the carrying out of the law, which guarantees that parties and the media explain issues properly." He was unable to explain to a journalist what he meant by "properly" (ibid.), Dmitrii Medvedev admits that Russia could see the development of cadres reserves with a strict party orientation, but he believes this is a "matter for the future"; Volkova, "Chinovnika staviat v ramki." There is extraordinary variety in the ways democratic states structure the politics-administration nexus. Whereas Britain allows only about 100 key posts to be filled with new appointees when a new administration comes to office, the number is approximately 3,000 in the United States. Whatever the ratio of political appointees to permanent civil servants, there is general agreement that there should be a clear delineation between political and administrative posts in a democratic state. However, in practice, in countries traditionally labeled as democratic, permanent civil servants sometimes find themselves under severe political or partisan pressure. One such case is Israel, which has allowed some parties to gain a foothold in the administrative life of certain ministries. Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Administrative Power in Israel," Israel Affairs, no. 4 (2002): 30-42.
50. Ibid. One the electoral tasks of Latyshev's office is the organizing of "hot lines" the media could use to "receive explanations and recommendations (from the authorities) on questions relating to their activities during the electoral campaign. We are obligated to monitor the carrying out of the law, which guarantees that parties and the media explain issues properly." He was unable to explain to a journalist what he meant by "properly" (ibid.), Dmitrii Medvedev admits that Russia could see the development of cadres reserves with a strict party orientation, but he believes this is a "matter for the future"; Volkova, "Chinovnika staviat v ramki." There is extraordinary variety in the ways democratic states structure the politics-administration nexus. Whereas Britain allows only about 100 key posts to be filled with new appointees when a new administration comes to office, the number is approximately 3,000 in the United States. Whatever the ratio of political appointees to permanent civil servants, there is general agreement that there should be a clear delineation between political and administrative posts in a democratic state. However, in practice, in countries traditionally labeled as democratic, permanent civil servants sometimes find themselves under severe political or partisan pressure. One such case is Israel, which has allowed some parties to gain a foothold in the administrative life of certain ministries. Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Administrative Power in Israel," Israel Affairs, no. 4 (2002): 30-42.
51. Irina Granik, "Organy vlasti. Povestka. Pravitelstvo mozhet stat partiinym" (Organs of Power: Tendencies. Government May Become State Party), Kommersant-Daily (April 17, 2003): 2.
52. Olga Kopsheva, "Test na loialnost vlasti. V Saratove ne vse soglasny igrat po gubernatorskim pravilam" (Test of the Strength of Loyalty. In Saratov Not All Agree with the Governor's Rules), Nezavisimaia gazeta (December 18, 2002): 4.
53. "Diletantam vo vlasti delat nechego" (Dilettantes in Power Do Nothing), Spb Vedomosti (April 21, 2000). The rector's solution was to restrict office-holding to those with the requisite education and professional background.
54. Ibid. She notes that 34.9 percent of all federal deputy ministers appointed from 2000 to 2002 had military backgrounds. Kryshtanovskaia argues that another reason for drawing demobilized officers into the civilian bureaucracy is to prevent "insulted elites" from being recruited by the Communist Party and other opposition-oriented organizations. "Vremia elity. Sinekury dlia 'byvshikh'" (Elite Times: Sinecures for Influence), Vremia MN (April 18, 2003): 3; Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, "Putin's Militocracy," Post-Soviet Affairs, no. 4 (2003): 289-306.
55. Ibid. She notes that 34.9 percent of all federal deputy ministers appointed from 2000 to 2002 had military backgrounds. Kryshtanovskaia argues that another reason for drawing demobilized officers into the civilian bureaucracy is to prevent "insulted elites" from being recruited by the Communist Party and other opposition-oriented organizations. "Vremia elity. Sinekury dlia 'byvshikh'" (Elite Times: Sinecures for Influence), Vremia MN (April 18, 2003): 3; Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, "Putin's Militocracy," Post-Soviet Affairs, no. 4 (2003): 289-306.
56. Ibid. She notes that 34.9 percent of all federal deputy ministers appointed from 2000 to 2002 had military backgrounds. Kryshtanovskaia argues that another reason for drawing demobilized officers into the civilian bureaucracy is to prevent "insulted elites" from being recruited by the Communist Party and other opposition-oriented organizations. "Vremia elity. Sinekury dlia 'byvshikh'" (Elite Times: Sinecures for Influence), Vremia MN (April 18, 2003): 3; Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, "Putin's Militocracy," Post-Soviet Affairs, no. 4 (2003): 289-306.
57. Author interview with Natalia Fedorovna Lukianova, Head of Kafedra of State and Municipal Administration, Institute for Qualification Raising, Moscow, May 27, 2003.