Move to markets? An empirical analysis of privatization in developing countries

Journal of International Development

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 213-240

  Banerjee, Sudeshna Ghosh ^a   Munger, Michael C ^b  

^a WORLD BANK   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEVELOPING WORLD; ECONOMIC POLICY; FIRM OWNERSHIP; PRIVATIZATION; STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE;

EID: 1842853891     PISSN: 09541748     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/jid.1072     Document Type: Article

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