Restorative Justice and Civic Accountability for Punishment

Polity

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 3-22

  Dzur, Albert W ^a  

^a BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842766305     PISSN: 00323497     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/POLv36n1ms3235421     Document Type: Review

References (72)

1. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Daniel Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong, Restoring Justice (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1997).
2. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Daniel Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong, Restoring Justice (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1997).
3. Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1990).
4. Susan M. Olson and Albert W. Dzur, "Reconstructing Professional Roles in Restorative Justice Programs," Utah Law Review (2003).
5. Gordon Bazemore and Mark Umbreit, "A Comparison of Four Restorative Conferencing Models," Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Bulletin (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, February 2001); Leena Kurki, "Restorative and Community Justice in the United States," in Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 27, ed. Michael Tonry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 235-303.
6. Gordon Bazemore and Mark Umbreit, "A Comparison of Four Restorative Conferencing Models," Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Bulletin (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, February 2001); Leena Kurki, "Restorative and Community Justice in the United States," in Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 27, ed. Michael Tonry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 235-303.
7. Albert W. Dzur and Alan Wertheimer, "Forgiveness and Public Deliberation: The Practice of Restorative Justice," Criminal Justice Ethics 21 (2002): 3-20.
8. Kathleen Daly, "Revisiting the Relationship between Retributive and Restorative Justice," in Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice, ed. Heather Strang and John Braithwaite (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 33-54.
9. Daly, "Revisiting the Relationship," 36.
10. See John Braithwaite, "Survey Article: Repentance Rituals and Restorative Justice," The Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (2000): 11.
11. Nils Christie, Limits to Pain (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981).
12. John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
13. C. L. Ten offers a standard definition: punishment is "administered by the legal authority," "involves the infliction of some unpleasantness on the offender, or it deprives the offender of something valued," and "the imposition is made to express disapproval or condemnation of the offender's conduct which is a breach of what is regarded as a desirable and obligatory standard of conduct." Crime, Guilt, and Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 2.
14. Kathleen Daly, "Does Punishment Have a Place in Restorative Justice," unpublished paper presented to the Australia and New Zealand Society of Criminology annual conference (1999); http://www.gu.edu.au/school/ ccj/kdaly.html.
15. Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Forgiveness, Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions," Criminal Justice Ethics 7 (1988): 3-15; Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
16. Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Forgiveness, Mercy, and the Retributive Emotions," Criminal Justice Ethics 7 (1988): 3-15; Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
17. Zehr, Changing Lenses, 93.
18. Zehr, Changing Lenses, 27.
19. Zehr, Changing Lenses, 31.
20. Zehr, Changing Lenses, 41.
21. Zehr, Changing Lenses, 161.
22. Zehr, Changing Lenses, 161.
23. Zehr, Changing Lenses, 161.
24. Braithwaite and Pettit, Not Just Deserts, 57.
25. Philip Pettit, "Republican Theory and Criminal Punishment," Utilitas 9 (1997): 68-70.
26. Pettit, "Republican Theory," 71-72.
27. Braithwaite and Pettit, Not Just Deserts, 79.
28. Braithwaite and Pettit, Not Just Deserts, 82.
29. Braithwaite and Pettit, Not Just Deserts, 89.
30. Pettit, "Republican Theory," 75.
31. John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, "Republican Criminology and Victim Advocacy," Law and Society Review 28 (1994): 770.
32. Braithwaite and Pettit, "Republican Criminology," 770.
33. Braithwaite and Pettit, "Republican Criminology," 771.
34. Christie, Limits to Pain, 10-11.
35. Christie, Limits to Pain, 45.
36. "Conventionalist" is my term for theories such as retributivism and expressivism, which maintain that the wrong done by an offender must be somehow reciprocated, if only symbolically, in order to even things out for the victim. Useful discussions of retributivism and expressivism are found in Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981) and Joel Feinberg, "The Expressive Function of Punishment," in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), respectively.
37. "Conventionalist" is my term for theories such as retributivism and expressivism, which maintain that the wrong done by an offender must be somehow reciprocated, if only symbolically, in order to even things out for the victim. Useful discussions of retributivism and expressivism are found in Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981) and Joel Feinberg, "The Expressive Function of Punishment," in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), respectively.
38. Christie, Limits to Pain, 11.
39. Christie, Limits to Pain, 74.
40. Christie, Limits to Pain, 74.
41. Christie, Limits to Pain, 81.
42. Nils Christie, "Conflicts as Property," The British Journal of Criminology 17 (1977): 3.
43. Christie, "Conflicts as Property," 8.
44. Christie, Limits to Pain, 96.
45. Christie, "Conflicts as Property," 9.
46. Christie, "Conflicts as Property," 8.
47. Christie, "Conflicts as Property," 10.
48. Christie, "Conflicts as Property," 10.
49. Christie, "Conflicts as Property," 11.
50. Christie, Limits to Pain, 97.
51. R. A. Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
52. John Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, "Republicanism and Restorative Justice: An Explanatory and Normative Connection," in Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice, ed. Heather Strang and John Braithwaite (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 159.
53. Braithwaite and Pettit, "Republicanism and Restorative Justice," 159.
54. Christie, Limits to Pain, 11.
55. Michael Tonry, "Crime and Punishment in America," in The Handbook of Crime & Punishment, ed. Michael Tonry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 3.
56. Julian V. Roberts and Loretta J. Stalans, "Crime, Criminal Justice, and Public Opinion," in The Handbook of Crime & Punishment, ed. Michael Tonry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 31-57.
57. Franklin E. Zimring, Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin, Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in California (New York: Oxford, 2001); Philip Pettit, "Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?" Buffalo Criminal Law Review 5 (2002): 427-450.
58. Franklin E. Zimring, Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin, Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in California (New York: Oxford, 2001); Philip Pettit, "Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?" Buffalo Criminal Law Review 5 (2002): 427-450.
59. Braithwaite and Pettit, "Republican Criminology." Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin argue, in defense of sentencing commissions that are shielded from popular political pressure, that public attitudes flow from the role of citizen that, in comparison with the role of judge or prosecutor, demands only minimal information and indirect accountability. "Turn a complaining cab driver into a sentencing judge and his or her sensitivity to questions of desert and proportionality in individual cases might be just as strong as the judge sitting in the next courtroom." Punishment and Democracy, 202. In my view this is an argument for lay participation, not sentencing commissions.
60. Braithwaite and Pettit, "Republican Criminology." Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin argue, in defense of sentencing commissions that are shielded from popular political pressure, that public attitudes flow from the role of citizen that, in comparison with the role of judge or prosecutor, demands only minimal information and indirect accountability. "Turn a complaining cab driver into a sentencing judge and his or her sensitivity to questions of desert and proportionality in individual cases might be just as strong as the judge sitting in the next courtroom." Punishment and Democracy, 202. In my view this is an argument for lay participation, not sentencing commissions.
61. Roberts and Stalans write: "When asked directly whether they support such [anti-recidivist statutes such as three-strikes] legislation, three-quarters of Americans respond affirmatively. However, more refined research reveals important limits to the public support." "Crime, Criminal Justice, and Public Opinion," 48.
62. Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher, and Brandon K. Applegate, "Public Opinion about Punishment and Corrections," in Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 27, ed. Michael Tonry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 46-7.
63. Cullen, Fisher, and Applegate, "Public Opinion about Punishment and Corrections," 46-7.
64. By "unreasonable" I do not mean to imply that there are clear-cut standards of rationality that can solve all criminal justice policy dilemmas. But I do hold that information and analysis emerging through dialogue can show our current policy preferences to be mistaken: inaccurate, incoherent, or incomplete. "Unreasonable" choices result from gaps between our current policy preferences and our considered interests that can be bridged through deliberation.
65. Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin, Punishment and Democracy, 14.
66. Andrew von Hirsch and A. J. Ashworth, "Not Not Just Deserts: A Response to Braithwaite and Pettit," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 12 (1992): 83-98; Andrew von Hirsch, "Penal Theories," in The Handbook of Crime & Punishment, ed. Michael Tonry (New York: Oxford University Press), 659-682.
67. Andrew von Hirsch and A. J. Ashworth, "Not Not Just Deserts: A Response to Braithwaite and Pettit," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 12 (1992): 83-98; Andrew von Hirsch, "Penal Theories," in The Handbook of Crime & Punishment, ed. Michael Tonry (New York: Oxford University Press), 659-682.
68. Andrew Ashworth, "Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice," British Journal of Criminology 42 (2002): 591.
69. Allison Morris and Warren Young, "Reforming Criminal Justice: The Potential of Restorative Justice," in Restorative Justice: Philosophy to Practice, ed. Heather Strang and John Braithwaite (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2000), 21-22.
70. Ashworth, "Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice."
71. Pettit, "Is Criminal Justice Politically Feasible?"
72. Letter IV, in The Anti-Federalist: Writings by the Opponents of the Constitution, ed. Herbert J. Storing and Murray Dry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 58-9.