Joint Force Training: Key to ROK Military Transformation

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2004, Pages

  Mangum, Ronald S ^a  

^a U States Spec Oper Command Korea   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842662626     PISSN: 10163271     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10163270409464058     Document Type: Review

References (19)

1. Dong-A Ilbo (Internet version in Korea), May 8, 2003.
2. The original Roman quotation "Igitur qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum" [Therefore he who desires peace, let him prepare for war], Flavus Vegetus Renatus, De Rei Militari, Liber III, commonly shortened to "si vis pacem, para bellum" [If you seek peace, prepare for war], which was the motto of the Roman Legion, available at http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/ bl/bl_preparewar.htm.
3. Lee Chul-hee and Ser Myo-ja, "Military plan balances U.S. ties, self-defense," JoongAng Daily, May 7, 2003, p. 1.
4. Han Yong-sup, South Korea's Strategy of Conflict: The Past, Present and Future (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1997), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books-1997/Strength Through Cooperation 1997/stcch9.html.
5. Article by Yonhap News Service, May 2, 2003, noted that while South Korea's armed forces are superior to North Korea's in quality, the North Korean preponderance of forces and proximity to South Korea's capital give North Korea a military advantage of approximately 1:1.3 over South Korea. With added U.S. forces in place and available to reinforce the South Korean forces, the estimate is that the combined ROK/U.S. forces have a 1:1.2 military advantage over North Korea. See also, Bennett, Bruce, "N. Korea's threat to S. Korea," UPI wire, March 7, 2003.
6. Lee San-ho, "3-4 Korean Divisions Equal One U.S. Division," Munhwa Ilbo, May 12, 2003.
7. Park Chu-hyun, "Early Start on Self-Reliant Defense Posture and Spending," seminar presentation at Chosun Hotel, reported in the Chosun Ilbo, Seoul, July 9, 2003.
8. Brian Lee, "Officers Complain of Poor Conditions and Old Equipment," JoongAng Daily, June 30, 2003, p. 8.
9. ROK military spending has been 2.8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (US$14.5 billion) (See Lee Chul-hee article), with proposals to increase that spending in fiscal year 2004 to 3 percent. In comparison, North Korea, whose GDP is 1/27th of that of South Korea, is suspected to spend about 33 percent of its GNP on its military. In comparison, the United States spends around 3 percent of its GDP on its military forces. In fiscal year 2003, the U.S. administration has asked congress for authority to spend $391 billion on defense, See "Facts about the Military Budget," available at http://www.clw.org/milspend/fy03facts.html.
10. Brian Lee, "Officers Complain of Poor Conditions and Old Equipment."
11. Peter G. Tsouras, Warrior's Words: A Dictionary of Military Quotations (London: Cassell, 1992) p.266.
12. Lee Chul-hee, "Military Term to be Gradually Reduced," JoongAng Ilbo, March 17, 2003.
13. Limb Jae-un, "Reservist's Life: dozing in defense of the homeland," JoongAng Ilbo, Nov. 7, 2002, p. 1.
14. The subject of coalition warfare is beyond the scope of this article. Typically coalition operations do not involve integrated staffs and integrated operations, but instead rely on separate operational sectors and liaison officers to deconflict operations. Unity of effort, not unity of command is the rule where the forces of sovereign nations fight side by side. Even though the mutual defense arrangement between the United States and the Republic of Korea provides for United States command and ROK deputy command of their Combined Forces Command, in reality forces are provided under operational control of the other, and not true command. This poses additional problems for joint and combined operations since the nominal commander lacks the authority of true command over the subordinates working for him.
15. This statement excludes the Combined Forces Command (CFC), which is under the joint direction of the ROK JCS and U.S. JCS. It is not a ROK military unit and while it is staffed with members of the several ROK and U.S. services, it seems to provide only a limited opportunity for ROK service members to gain joint experience. There is no apparent program in the ROK military to develop the joint skills learned in CFC assignments and then to guide the career progression of ROK officers who have served there.
16. When selecting officers and enlisted service members for joint duty, ROK leaders have cultural challenges to overcome. Korea is a Confucian society in which age and superior position are given great respect amounting almost to reverence. When senior military officers are appointed, officers junior in age or who graduated from an earlier military academy class to newly appointed commanders are expected to retire. It is unseemly for an officer junior in age or military class standing to command officers who are senior to him. Another effect of this hierarchy is that commissioned officers are deemed to be worth much more than enlisted soldiers, which reduces the effectiveness of the ROK Non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps. With a weak NCO corps, the ROK enlisted force lacks leadership examples with which to develop strong junior leaders. The prejudice against enlisted soldiers coupled with heavy reliance on a conscripted enlisted force puts the capability of the ROK military into question. This prejudice also limits the ROK soldier's ability to develop the individual ingenuity on the battlefield that so widely respected in the U.S. service member's ability to accomplish a difficult mission even when commissioned leaders are absent. ROK leaders should consider moving to a merit-based, rather than seniority-based system. A second cultural aspect that challenges merit-based promotion and assignment is chemyon, or "face," which requires one to preserve dignity in front of superiors and not admit mistakes. ROK soldiers often avoid accepting responsibility for even the smallest decisions. Issues are either passed up the line until someone makes a decision, or are glossed over without the responsible leader ever being aware of an issue. The fear of displeasing one's superiors leads to always telling leaders what they want to hear, and that must be good, no matter how bad the facts. One advance in U.S. military training is the After-Action Review, in which all participants, leaders, officers, NCOs and soldiers participate in a thorough and honest evaluation of a just-completed mission. Everyone contributes because the observations of the newest private may hold the key to what could have been done to improve mission performance. This type of Socratic exchange, where subordinates are free to admit errors without retribution in order to improve performance of the whole force is developing in the ROK military, but it needs encouragement.
17. Locher, James R. III, Victory on the Potomac: the Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station, Texas; Texas A&M University Press, 2002).
18. Han Yong-sup, "South Korea's Strategy of Conflict."
19. See footnote 9.