Aristotle's agathon

Review of Metaphysics

Volumn 57, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 515-536

  Mirus, Christopher V ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 1842591944     PISSN: 00346632     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (98)

1. Allan Gotthelf, "The Place of the Good in Aristotle's Natural Teleology" (hereafter, "Place of the Good"), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 4 (1988): 130-1.
2. Edward Halper, "The Substance of Aristotle's Ethics," in The Cross-roads of Norm and Nature: Essays on Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics, ed. May Sim (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 3-28. Unlike Gotthelf s brief comments (see n. 1), Halper's arguments concerning ethical and political goodness do not include an explicit claim that Aristotle identifies goodness and actuality in general. However, his more focused discussion shows how the general account of goodness with which I am concerned can be used to understand the goodness of two particular entities, human individuals and states.
3. Thomas Aquinas, In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio, bk. 1, lect. 1, nn. 11-12; compare Summa theologiae I, q. 5, a. 1.
4. Thomas Aquinas, In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio, bk. 1, lect. 1, nn. 11-12; compare Summa theologiae I, q. 5, a. 1.
5. Metaphysics 12.10.1075a37. All translations of Aristotle are mine; I have tried to be as literal as possible. I have occasionally consulted the Loeb and revised Oxford translations of the various texts.
6. NE 1.1.1094a3.
7. This does not mean that we cannot understand Aristotle's teleology without explicit reference to the good. Rather, the concept of actuality undergirds both Aristotle's teleology and his understanding of goodness (compare Gotthelf, "Place of the Good," 130-1).
8. Physics 2.2.194a32-3; compare Politics 1.2.1253al-2. The statement from Physics 2.2 follows Aristotle's well-known denial that death is an end, despite the fact that it is obviously last. In a related passage from Metaphysics 5.16, he states more fully that death, and in general the outcome of passing away, can be called an end only metaphorically (1021b23-30).
9. Physics 2.2.194a32-3; compare Politics 1.2.1253al-2. The statement from Physics 2.2 follows Aristotle's well-known denial that death is an end, despite the fact that it is obviously last. In a related passage from Metaphysics 5.16, he states more fully that death, and in general the outcome of passing away, can be called an end only metaphorically (1021b23-30).
10. Pysics 2.7.198b5-9.
11. Metaphysics 3.2.996a23-7. This assertion occurs in the course of an aporia that is raised again in 11.1 (1059a34-8). It is risky to attribute to Aristotle claims that occur in the statement of an aporia. However, this particular puzzle turns out to be caused not by the premise quoted but by the erroneous equation of -with which goodness and thus that for the sake of which are correlative (see the clear statement at 13.3.1078a31-2) - with motion. In 9.6, Aristotle argues that must be distinguished into (motions, or actions that involve motion) and (actualities, or activities that do not involve motion) (1048b18-30). This distinction helps him to retain the connection between the good and that for the sake of which, while also holding that not every good thing is subject to change.
12. Metaphysics 2.2.994b9-13.
13. Metaphysics 1.7.988b6-16.
14. The most important variants of this view are well expressed by Allan Gotthelf, "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality," with "Postscript 1986," in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 204-42; David Charles, "Aristotle on Hypothetical Necessity and Irreducibility," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1988): 1-53; Michael Bradie and Fred D. Miller, Jr., "Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle," History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1984): 133-46; and Susan Sauvé Meyer "Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction," Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 791-825. For a good review of the literature on Aristotle's teleology see Allan Gotthelf, "Understanding Aristotle's Teleology," in Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs., ed. Richard F. Hassing, vol. 30 in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 71-82.
15. The most important variants of this view are well expressed by Allan Gotthelf, "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality," with "Postscript 1986," in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 204-42; David Charles, "Aristotle on Hypothetical Necessity and Irreducibility," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1988): 1-53; Michael Bradie and Fred D. Miller, Jr., "Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle," History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1984): 133-46; and Susan Sauvé Meyer "Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction," Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 791-825. For a good review of the literature on Aristotle's teleology see Allan Gotthelf, "Understanding Aristotle's Teleology," in Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs., ed. Richard F. Hassing, vol. 30 in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 71-82.
16. The most important variants of this view are well expressed by Allan Gotthelf, "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality," with "Postscript 1986," in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 204-42; David Charles, "Aristotle on Hypothetical Necessity and Irreducibility," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1988): 1-53; Michael Bradie and Fred D. Miller, Jr., "Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle," History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1984): 133-46; and Susan Sauvé Meyer "Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction," Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 791-825. For a good review of the literature on Aristotle's teleology see Allan Gotthelf, "Understanding Aristotle's Teleology," in Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs., ed. Richard F. Hassing, vol. 30 in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 71-82.
17. The most important variants of this view are well expressed by Allan Gotthelf, "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality," with "Postscript 1986," in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 204-42; David Charles, "Aristotle on Hypothetical Necessity and Irreducibility," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1988): 1-53; Michael Bradie and Fred D. Miller, Jr., "Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle," History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1984): 133-46; and Susan Sauvé Meyer "Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction," Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 791-825. For a good review of the literature on Aristotle's teleology see Allan Gotthelf, "Understanding Aristotle's Teleology," in Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs., ed. Richard F. Hassing, vol. 30 in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 71-82.
18. The most important variants of this view are well expressed by Allan Gotthelf, "Aristotle's Conception of Final Causality," with "Postscript 1986," in Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biology, ed. Allan Gotthelf and James G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 204-42; David Charles, "Aristotle on Hypothetical Necessity and Irreducibility," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1988): 1-53; Michael Bradie and Fred D. Miller, Jr., "Teleology and Natural Necessity in Aristotle," History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1984): 133-46; and Susan Sauvé Meyer "Aristotle, Teleology, and Reduction," Philosophical Review 101 (1992): 791-825. For a good review of the literature on Aristotle's teleology see Allan Gotthelf, "Understanding Aristotle's Teleology," in Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs., ed. Richard F. Hassing, vol. 30 in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 71-82.
19. See Metaphysics 1.2.982a19-b10, 1.3.984b8-22, 2.2.994b9-16, 12.7, 12.10, 13.3.1078a31-b5.
20. This argument can be found my dissertation: "Teleology in Generation and Corruption and the Meteorology," chap. 1 in "Aristotle's Teleology and Modern Mechanics" (Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 2004). I focus on these two works, as opposed to De caelo, because although it is generally acknowledged that for Aristotle the cosmos as a whole is goal-directed, this direction is sometimes considered too closely related, or at least too strongly analogous, to that found in the biology for it to conflict with the biological interpretation of Aristotle's teleology. The main texts that I examine are GC 1.7.324b14-20, GC 2.6.333b5-20, GC 2.9, Meteorology 4.2.379b18-80a1, and Meteorology 4.12.
21. For nature and that for the sake of which, see chapter 3 of my dissertation, "Teleology and Continuous Change," which addresses Aristotle's views on what sorts of change are for the sake of their outcomes.
22. PA 1.1.642a25-7. The context makes clear that Aristotle is referring primarily, at least, to the early naturalists, whom he thinks routinely failed to recognize the actual ontological structure of living substances and thus misinterpreted the phenomena of their coming to be.
23. Physics 2.7.198a24-7.
24. Physics 2.2.194a27-b9.
25. PA 1.1.639b15-17.
26. De anima 2.4.415b10-22.
27. GC 2.6.333b16-19.
28. Physics 1.9.192a16-25.
29. Aristotle's attribution of goodness to form has two interesting corollaries worth nothing here. The first has to do with the relation between Aristotle's conception of goodness and that of Plato; the second with the goodness peculiar to living things. First, then, Aristotle consistently characterizes as a motionless cause of change. By definition, indeed, that for the sake of which is not something that changes but rather an end, or limit, of change. Therefore, unlike the principle from which change proceeds, it causes change without itself being subject thereto (Physics 2.7.198a35-b5; Physics 5.1.224a34-b13; De anima 3.10.433b13-16; Metaphysics 11.11.1067b7-12; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b1-3). This does not necessarily mean that every good, as an end, is eternal, but that any noneternal form must come to be and cease to be without undergoing a process of change (see Metaphysics 7.8.1033a24-b19; 8.3.1043b15-18). We might want to resist saying that Aristotle identifies goodness with being as opposed to becoming, but the temptation is strong. Second, in his discussion of unity in Metaphysics 5.6, Aristotle gives special attention to what he calls "wholes", explaining that there is a sense of "one" that applies only to what has a single form, and therefore qualifies as a whole (1016b11-17). His examples are a shoe and a circle: the former is organized functionally, and the parts of the latter are neatly embraced in a single formula. This relation of parts to whole is later summarized, conversely, in terms of unity: a whole in the relevant sense, we read in 5.26 (1023b27-8), is something that contains its parts in such a way that they constitute a single thing. In chapter 27, on "mutilation," it becomes clear that this type of unity has evaluative implications. Aristotle explains that a thing can be mutilated only if it is, to put it briefly, a divisible whole whose unlike but continuous parts differ essentially in position (Metaphysics 5.27.1024a11-28). In other words, there is a kind of damage that can befall only things whose forms give them an above average degree of unity. In De iuventute, correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes animals that are divisible from those whose functional diversity of parts makes possible "the greatest possible unity," as he puts it (luv. 2.468b9-13). He refers to the latter also as "best constituted", and it is clearly this more perfect, because more unified, constitution that makes such animals capable of suffering harms like mutilation. The cause of this unity is a form that subjects the various parts, with their capacities, to the animal as a whole.
30. Aristotle's attribution of goodness to form has two interesting corollaries worth nothing here. The first has to do with the relation between Aristotle's conception of goodness and that of Plato; the second with the goodness peculiar to living things. First, then, Aristotle consistently characterizes as a motionless cause of change. By definition, indeed, that for the sake of which is not something that changes but rather an end, or limit, of change. Therefore, unlike the principle from which change proceeds, it causes change without itself being subject thereto (Physics 2.7.198a35-b5; Physics 5.1.224a34-b13; De anima 3.10.433b13-16; Metaphysics 11.11.1067b7-12; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b1-3). This does not necessarily mean that every good, as an end, is eternal, but that any noneternal form must come to be and cease to be without undergoing a process of change (see Metaphysics 7.8.1033a24-b19; 8.3.1043b15-18). We might want to resist saying that Aristotle identifies goodness with being as opposed to becoming, but the temptation is strong. Second, in his discussion of unity in Metaphysics 5.6, Aristotle gives special attention to what he calls "wholes", explaining that there is a sense of "one" that applies only to what has a single form, and therefore qualifies as a whole (1016b11-17). His examples are a shoe and a circle: the former is organized functionally, and the parts of the latter are neatly embraced in a single formula. This relation of parts to whole is later summarized, conversely, in terms of unity: a whole in the relevant sense, we read in 5.26 (1023b27-8), is something that contains its parts in such a way that they constitute a single thing. In chapter 27, on "mutilation," it becomes clear that this type of unity has evaluative implications. Aristotle explains that a thing can be mutilated only if it is, to put it briefly, a divisible whole whose unlike but continuous parts differ essentially in position (Metaphysics 5.27.1024a11-28). In other words, there is a kind of damage that can befall only things whose forms give them an above average degree of unity. In De iuventute, correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes animals that are divisible from those whose functional diversity of parts makes possible "the greatest possible unity," as he puts it (luv. 2.468b9-13). He refers to the latter also as "best constituted", and it is clearly this more perfect, because more unified, constitution that makes such animals capable of suffering harms like mutilation. The cause of this unity is a form that subjects the various parts, with their capacities, to the animal as a whole.
31. Aristotle's attribution of goodness to form has two interesting corollaries worth nothing here. The first has to do with the relation between Aristotle's conception of goodness and that of Plato; the second with the goodness peculiar to living things. First, then, Aristotle consistently characterizes as a motionless cause of change. By definition, indeed, that for the sake of which is not something that changes but rather an end, or limit, of change. Therefore, unlike the principle from which change proceeds, it causes change without itself being subject thereto (Physics 2.7.198a35-b5; Physics 5.1.224a34-b13; De anima 3.10.433b13-16; Metaphysics 11.11.1067b7-12; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b1-3). This does not necessarily mean that every good, as an end, is eternal, but that any noneternal form must come to be and cease to be without undergoing a process of change (see Metaphysics 7.8.1033a24-b19; 8.3.1043b15-18). We might want to resist saying that Aristotle identifies goodness with being as opposed to becoming, but the temptation is strong. Second, in his discussion of unity in Metaphysics 5.6, Aristotle gives special attention to what he calls "wholes", explaining that there is a sense of "one" that applies only to what has a single form, and therefore qualifies as a whole (1016b11-17). His examples are a shoe and a circle: the former is organized functionally, and the parts of the latter are neatly embraced in a single formula. This relation of parts to whole is later summarized, conversely, in terms of unity: a whole in the relevant sense, we read in 5.26 (1023b27-8), is something that contains its parts in such a way that they constitute a single thing. In chapter 27, on "mutilation," it becomes clear that this type of unity has evaluative implications. Aristotle explains that a thing can be mutilated only if it is, to put it briefly, a divisible whole whose unlike but continuous parts differ essentially in position (Metaphysics 5.27.1024a11-28). In other words, there is a kind of damage that can befall only things whose forms give them an above average degree of unity. In De iuventute, correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes animals that are divisible from those whose functional diversity of parts makes possible "the greatest possible unity," as he puts it (luv. 2.468b9-13). He refers to the latter also as "best constituted", and it is clearly this more perfect, because more unified, constitution that makes such animals capable of suffering harms like mutilation. The cause of this unity is a form that subjects the various parts, with their capacities, to the animal as a whole.
32. Aristotle's attribution of goodness to form has two interesting corollaries worth nothing here. The first has to do with the relation between Aristotle's conception of goodness and that of Plato; the second with the goodness peculiar to living things. First, then, Aristotle consistently characterizes as a motionless cause of change. By definition, indeed, that for the sake of which is not something that changes but rather an end, or limit, of change. Therefore, unlike the principle from which change proceeds, it causes change without itself being subject thereto (Physics 2.7.198a35-b5; Physics 5.1.224a34-b13; De anima 3.10.433b13-16; Metaphysics 11.11.1067b7-12; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b1-3). This does not necessarily mean that every good, as an end, is eternal, but that any noneternal form must come to be and cease to be without undergoing a process of change (see Metaphysics 7.8.1033a24-b19; 8.3.1043b15-18). We might want to resist saying that Aristotle identifies goodness with being as opposed to becoming, but the temptation is strong. Second, in his discussion of unity in Metaphysics 5.6, Aristotle gives special attention to what he calls "wholes", explaining that there is a sense of "one" that applies only to what has a single form, and therefore qualifies as a whole (1016b11-17). His examples are a shoe and a circle: the former is organized functionally, and the parts of the latter are neatly embraced in a single formula. This relation of parts to whole is later summarized, conversely, in terms of unity: a whole in the relevant sense, we read in 5.26 (1023b27-8), is something that contains its parts in such a way that they constitute a single thing. In chapter 27, on "mutilation," it becomes clear that this type of unity has evaluative implications. Aristotle explains that a thing can be mutilated only if it is, to put it briefly, a divisible whole whose unlike but continuous parts differ essentially in position (Metaphysics 5.27.1024a11-28). In other words, there is a kind of damage that can befall only things whose forms give them an above average degree of unity. In De iuventute, correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes animals that are divisible from those whose functional diversity of parts makes possible "the greatest possible unity," as he puts it (luv. 2.468b9-13). He refers to the latter also as "best constituted", and it is clearly this more perfect, because more unified, constitution that makes such animals capable of suffering harms like mutilation. The cause of this unity is a form that subjects the various parts, with their capacities, to the animal as a whole.
33. Aristotle's attribution of goodness to form has two interesting corollaries worth nothing here. The first has to do with the relation between Aristotle's conception of goodness and that of Plato; the second with the goodness peculiar to living things. First, then, Aristotle consistently characterizes as a motionless cause of change. By definition, indeed, that for the sake of which is not something that changes but rather an end, or limit, of change. Therefore, unlike the principle from which change proceeds, it causes change without itself being subject thereto (Physics 2.7.198a35-b5; Physics 5.1.224a34-b13; De anima 3.10.433b13-16; Metaphysics 11.11.1067b7-12; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b1-3). This does not necessarily mean that every good, as an end, is eternal, but that any noneternal form must come to be and cease to be without undergoing a process of change (see Metaphysics 7.8.1033a24-b19; 8.3.1043b15-18). We might want to resist saying that Aristotle identifies goodness with being as opposed to becoming, but the temptation is strong. Second, in his discussion of unity in Metaphysics 5.6, Aristotle gives special attention to what he calls "wholes", explaining that there is a sense of "one" that applies only to what has a single form, and therefore qualifies as a whole (1016b11-17). His examples are a shoe and a circle: the former is organized functionally, and the parts of the latter are neatly embraced in a single formula. This relation of parts to whole is later summarized, conversely, in terms of unity: a whole in the relevant sense, we read in 5.26 (1023b27-8), is something that contains its parts in such a way that they constitute a single thing. In chapter 27, on "mutilation," it becomes clear that this type of unity has evaluative implications. Aristotle explains that a thing can be mutilated only if it is, to put it briefly, a divisible whole whose unlike but continuous parts differ essentially in position (Metaphysics 5.27.1024a11-28). In other words, there is a kind of damage that can befall only things whose forms give them an above average degree of unity. In De iuventute, correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes animals that are divisible from those whose functional diversity of parts makes possible "the greatest possible unity," as he puts it (luv. 2.468b9-13). He refers to the latter also as "best constituted", and it is clearly this more perfect, because more unified, constitution that makes such animals capable of suffering harms like mutilation. The cause of this unity is a form that subjects the various parts, with their capacities, to the animal as a whole.
34. Aristotle's attribution of goodness to form has two interesting corollaries worth nothing here. The first has to do with the relation between Aristotle's conception of goodness and that of Plato; the second with the goodness peculiar to living things. First, then, Aristotle consistently characterizes as a motionless cause of change. By definition, indeed, that for the sake of which is not something that changes but rather an end, or limit, of change. Therefore, unlike the principle from which change proceeds, it causes change without itself being subject thereto (Physics 2.7.198a35-b5; Physics 5.1.224a34-b13; De anima 3.10.433b13-16; Metaphysics 11.11.1067b7-12; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b1-3). This does not necessarily mean that every good, as an end, is eternal, but that any noneternal form must come to be and cease to be without undergoing a process of change (see Metaphysics 7.8.1033a24-b19; 8.3.1043b15-18). We might want to resist saying that Aristotle identifies goodness with being as opposed to becoming, but the temptation is strong. Second, in his discussion of unity in Metaphysics 5.6, Aristotle gives special attention to what he calls "wholes", explaining that there is a sense of "one" that applies only to what has a single form, and therefore qualifies as a whole (1016b11-17). His examples are a shoe and a circle: the former is organized functionally, and the parts of the latter are neatly embraced in a single formula. This relation of parts to whole is later summarized, conversely, in terms of unity: a whole in the relevant sense, we read in 5.26 (1023b27-8), is something that contains its parts in such a way that they constitute a single thing. In chapter 27, on "mutilation," it becomes clear that this type of unity has evaluative implications. Aristotle explains that a thing can be mutilated only if it is, to put it briefly, a divisible whole whose unlike but continuous parts differ essentially in position (Metaphysics 5.27.1024a11-28). In other words, there is a kind of damage that can befall only things whose forms give them an above average degree of unity. In De iuventute, correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes animals that are divisible from those whose functional diversity of parts makes possible "the greatest possible unity," as he puts it (luv. 2.468b9-13). He refers to the latter also as "best constituted", and it is clearly this more perfect, because more unified, constitution that makes such animals capable of suffering harms like mutilation. The cause of this unity is a form that subjects the various parts, with their capacities, to the animal as a whole.
35. Aristotle's attribution of goodness to form has two interesting corollaries worth nothing here. The first has to do with the relation between Aristotle's conception of goodness and that of Plato; the second with the goodness peculiar to living things. First, then, Aristotle consistently characterizes as a motionless cause of change. By definition, indeed, that for the sake of which is not something that changes but rather an end, or limit, of change. Therefore, unlike the principle from which change proceeds, it causes change without itself being subject thereto (Physics 2.7.198a35-b5; Physics 5.1.224a34-b13; De anima 3.10.433b13-16; Metaphysics 11.11.1067b7-12; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b1-3). This does not necessarily mean that every good, as an end, is eternal, but that any noneternal form must come to be and cease to be without undergoing a process of change (see Metaphysics 7.8.1033a24-b19; 8.3.1043b15-18). We might want to resist saying that Aristotle identifies goodness with being as opposed to becoming, but the temptation is strong. Second, in his discussion of unity in Metaphysics 5.6, Aristotle gives special attention to what he calls "wholes", explaining that there is a sense of "one" that applies only to what has a single form, and therefore qualifies as a whole (1016b11-17). His examples are a shoe and a circle: the former is organized functionally, and the parts of the latter are neatly embraced in a single formula. This relation of parts to whole is later summarized, conversely, in terms of unity: a whole in the relevant sense, we read in 5.26 (1023b27-8), is something that contains its parts in such a way that they constitute a single thing. In chapter 27, on "mutilation," it becomes clear that this type of unity has evaluative implications. Aristotle explains that a thing can be mutilated only if it is, to put it briefly, a divisible whole whose unlike but continuous parts differ essentially in position (Metaphysics 5.27.1024a11-28). In other words, there is a kind of damage that can befall only things whose forms give them an above average degree of unity. In De iuventute, correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes animals that are divisible from those whose functional diversity of parts makes possible "the greatest possible unity," as he puts it (luv. 2.468b9-13). He refers to the latter also as "best constituted", and it is clearly this more perfect, because more unified, constitution that makes such animals capable of suffering harms like mutilation. The cause of this unity is a form that subjects the various parts, with their capacities, to the animal as a whole.
36. Aristotle's attribution of goodness to form has two interesting corollaries worth nothing here. The first has to do with the relation between Aristotle's conception of goodness and that of Plato; the second with the goodness peculiar to living things. First, then, Aristotle consistently characterizes as a motionless cause of change. By definition, indeed, that for the sake of which is not something that changes but rather an end, or limit, of change. Therefore, unlike the principle from which change proceeds, it causes change without itself being subject thereto (Physics 2.7.198a35-b5; Physics 5.1.224a34-b13; De anima 3.10.433b13-16; Metaphysics 11.11.1067b7-12; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b1-3). This does not necessarily mean that every good, as an end, is eternal, but that any noneternal form must come to be and cease to be without undergoing a process of change (see Metaphysics 7.8.1033a24-b19; 8.3.1043b15-18). We might want to resist saying that Aristotle identifies goodness with being as opposed to becoming, but the temptation is strong. Second, in his discussion of unity in Metaphysics 5.6, Aristotle gives special attention to what he calls "wholes", explaining that there is a sense of "one" that applies only to what has a single form, and therefore qualifies as a whole (1016b11-17). His examples are a shoe and a circle: the former is organized functionally, and the parts of the latter are neatly embraced in a single formula. This relation of parts to whole is later summarized, conversely, in terms of unity: a whole in the relevant sense, we read in 5.26 (1023b27-8), is something that contains its parts in such a way that they constitute a single thing. In chapter 27, on "mutilation," it becomes clear that this type of unity has evaluative implications. Aristotle explains that a thing can be mutilated only if it is, to put it briefly, a divisible whole whose unlike but continuous parts differ essentially in position (Metaphysics 5.27.1024a11-28). In other words, there is a kind of damage that can befall only things whose forms give them an above average degree of unity. In De iuventute, correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes animals that are divisible from those whose functional diversity of parts makes possible "the greatest possible unity," as he puts it (luv. 2.468b9-13). He refers to the latter also as "best constituted", and it is clearly this more perfect, because more unified, constitution that makes such animals capable of suffering harms like mutilation. The cause of this unity is a form that subjects the various parts, with their capacities, to the animal as a whole.
37. Aristotle's attribution of goodness to form has two interesting corollaries worth nothing here. The first has to do with the relation between Aristotle's conception of goodness and that of Plato; the second with the goodness peculiar to living things. First, then, Aristotle consistently characterizes as a motionless cause of change. By definition, indeed, that for the sake of which is not something that changes but rather an end, or limit, of change. Therefore, unlike the principle from which change proceeds, it causes change without itself being subject thereto (Physics 2.7.198a35-b5; Physics 5.1.224a34-b13; De anima 3.10.433b13-16; Metaphysics 11.11.1067b7-12; Metaphysics 12.7.1072b1-3). This does not necessarily mean that every good, as an end, is eternal, but that any noneternal form must come to be and cease to be without undergoing a process of change (see Metaphysics 7.8.1033a24-b19; 8.3.1043b15-18). We might want to resist saying that Aristotle identifies goodness with being as opposed to becoming, but the temptation is strong. Second, in his discussion of unity in Metaphysics 5.6, Aristotle gives special attention to what he calls "wholes", explaining that there is a sense of "one" that applies only to what has a single form, and therefore qualifies as a whole (1016b11-17). His examples are a shoe and a circle: the former is organized functionally, and the parts of the latter are neatly embraced in a single formula. This relation of parts to whole is later summarized, conversely, in terms of unity: a whole in the relevant sense, we read in 5.26 (1023b27-8), is something that contains its parts in such a way that they constitute a single thing. In chapter 27, on "mutilation," it becomes clear that this type of unity has evaluative implications. Aristotle explains that a thing can be mutilated only if it is, to put it briefly, a divisible whole whose unlike but continuous parts differ essentially in position (Metaphysics 5.27.1024a11-28). In other words, there is a kind of damage that can befall only things whose forms give them an above average degree of unity. In De iuventute, correspondingly, Aristotle distinguishes animals that are divisible from those whose functional diversity of parts makes possible "the greatest possible unity," as he puts it (Iuv. 2.468b9-13). He refers to the latter also as "best constituted", and it is clearly this more perfect, because more unified, constitution that makes such animals capable of suffering harms like mutilation. The cause of this unity is a form that subjects the various parts, with their capacities, to the animal as a whole.
38. NE 1.7.1098a5-7, 1098b32-9a3.
39. De somno 3.455b13-28.
40. NE 1.7.1097b22-8a18.
41. NE 6.2.1139a16-17.
42. See Meteorology 4.12.
43. This goodness would, of course, be not absolute goodness but goodness relative to the natural capacities of the substance in question: see Physics 2.7.198b5-9.
44. De caelo 2.12.292a19-b25.
45. De anima 2.4.415a27-b8.
46. NE 1.1.1094a3.
47. De anima 2.1.412a20-9.
48. Physics 1.7.190b28.
49. Given the context, it seems possible that Aristotle borrows this concept of order from Democritus. See Physics 1.5.188a24.
50. Metaphysics 8.2, esp. 1043a4-9.
51. In other contexts the term is sometimes translated "noble" or "fine," but for present purposes "beauty" is clearly correct.
52. Metaphysics 13.3.1078a31-2.
53. See n. 9.
54. In fact, Aristotle's comments about goodness and beauty in Metaphysics 13 are made with a view to the place of beauty in mathematics. He wants to deny the contention that the good cannot be a universal principle because it is not found in mathematical objects (see the aporia posed in Metaphysics 3.2.996a21-b1). In his response he suggests that beauty, rather than goodness in the strict sense, will do.
55. Metaphysics 13.3.1078a36-b5.
56. PA 1.5.45a25-7.
57. Metaphysics 1.3.984b11-18. With regard to the cosmos as a whole, this passage is echoed in terms of goodness and order in Physics 2.4.196a24-b5 and Metaphysics 12.10.1075a11-25.
58. Metaphysics 1.3.984b11-18. With regard to the cosmos as a whole, this passage is echoed in terms of goodness and order in Physics 2.4.196a24-b5 and Metaphysics 12.10.1075a11-25.
59. Metaphysics 1.3.984b11-18. With regard to the cosmos as a whole, this passage is echoed in terms of goodness and order in Physics 2.4.196a24-b5 and Metaphysics 12.10.1075a11-25.
60. PA 1.1.641b16-24.
61. GA 5.1.778b2-7.
62. De caelo 3.2.300b32-301a12.
63. Meteorology 1.1.338b20-2.
64. Metaphysics 1.2.982a19-b10.
65. Metaphysics 3.2.996a21-9; 11.1.1059a34-8.
66. GC 2.10, 336b25-7a1.
67. Michael Loux has suggested in conversation that Aristotle's phrase -literally, "to say (something) in many ways" - should not be taken to imply that the term in question has several senses, but rather that it is true, in a single sense, of things that share no common nature, such as items from different categories (see De sophisticis elenchis 11.172a36-7, for possible textual support). If this is the case, then the claims I make here and in section 4 about the senses of "being" and "good" may be restated as claims about the kinds of things of which "being" and "good" are said.
68. GA 2.1.731b24-2a10.
69. Unfortunately, Aristotle's account of sexual generation provides one of the clearest examples of how an individual's or culture's understanding of gender can influence scientific theory.
70. The argument for this claim, along with possible qualifications to it, is found in Metaphysics 7.7-9.
71. See De anima 2.4.415b10-22.
72. PA 1.5.644b22-6.
73. See GC 2.11.337b35-8a4.
74. Metaphysics 12.7.1072b10-30.
75. Metaphysics 14.4.1091b16-21; on self-sufficiency as characteristic of "the end and the best," see also Politics 1.2.1253a1-2.
76. Metaphysics 14.4.1091b16-21; on self-sufficiency as characteristic of "the end and the best," see also Politics 1.2.1253a1-2.
77. See, for example, De anima 2.1.412a6-10.
78. See the above discussions of GC 2.10.336b25-7a1, and GA 2.1.731b24-732a10.
79. See the above discussions of GC 2.10.336b25-7a1, and GA 2.1.731b24-732a10.
80. Actuality is prior to potentiality "also in substance, first because things later in coming to be are prior in form and in substance, as man is to child and human being to seed, for the former has the form already whereas the latter does not; and second because everything coming to be proceeds to a principle and an end (for that for the sake of which is a principle, and coming to be is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is an end, and the potentiality is received for the sake of this" (Metaphysics 9.8.1050a4-10).
81. Not that potentiality is bad, but its goodness depends on that of the corresponding actuality. Compare Metaphysics 9.8.1050a4-b1, on the ontological priority of actuality to potentiality, as well as 9.9.1051a4-21, on the superiority of good actuality to good potentiality.
82. Once again, see NE 1.7.1098a5-7, 1098b32-9a3; De somno 3.455b13-28.
83. Once again, see NE 1.7.1098a5-7, 1098b32-9a3; De somno 3.455b13-28.
84. Metaphysics 9.8.1049b5-10.
85. Metaphysics 9.8.1050a4-10.
86. See NE 1.7; 2.5; 6.2.1139a16-17; compare also Metaphysics 5.14.1020b13-25.
87. See NE 1.7; 2.5; 6.2.1139a16-17; compare also Metaphysics 5.14.1020b13-25.
88. Metaphysics 9.8.1050b6-8.
89. See n. 23.
90. De anima 2.1.412a28-b6.
91. See PA 1.5.645b15-6a2; 2.1, 646a12-7a3.
92. Meteorology 4.12.
93. NE 1.6.1096a17-24.
94. NE 1.6.1096a24-9.
95. See above, as well as Metaphysics 4.2.1003a33-b10, 6.1.1028a10-21, 8.1.1045b27-32.
96. NE 1.6.1096b13-30.
97. NE 1.6.1096a29-30.
98. Metaphysics 9.6.1048b6-9.