How Autonomous Are the National Autonomous Areas of the PRC? An Analysis of Documents and Cases

Issues and Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 7, 1996, Pages 83-106

  Phan, Binh G ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Autonomy; CCP; Constitutions; Law on Regional National Autonomy; Minority nationality

Indexed keywords

EID: 1842584826     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. Li Weihan, "Regional Autonomy for Nationalities," Chinese Law and Government 14, no. 4 (Winter 1981-82): 14.
2. Zhang Youyu, "On the Law of Regional National Autonomy," Faxue yanjiu (Studies in Jurisprudence), 1984, no. 4:1-7, translated as "Law of Regional National Autonomy Discussed," in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), January 29, 1985, 55. Emphasis added.
3. Zhang Youyu, "On the Law of Regional National Autonomy," Faxue yanjiu (Studies in Jurisprudence), 1984, no. 4:1-7, translated as "Law of Regional National Autonomy Discussed," in Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS), January 29, 1985, 55. Emphasis added.
4. Anthony Dicks, "New Lamps for Old: The Evolving Legal Position of Islam in China, With Special Reference to Family Law," in Islamic Family Law, ed. Chibli Mallat and Jane Connors (London: Graham & Trotman, 1990), 355.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 362-63.
7. June Teufel Dreyer, China's Forty Millions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 10.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., 12-13.
10. Colin Mackerras, China's Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1994), 53.
11. Ibid., 54-55.
12. Ibid., 55. This doctrine clearly has a Sino-centric if not a flagrant racist undertone. The ethnic minorities were seen as obstacles to the Chinese nation-building process, and therefore they should be "eliminated" via Sinicization.
13. It is doubtful that Sun failed to discern that American society was dominated by Anglo-Saxons. Thus, in advocating the American paradigm of racial/ethnic assimilation, Sun clearly envisioned the same dominating role for the Han in China as their Anglo-Saxon counterpart in the United States. His talk of Han people merging with the national minorities (see below) was political rhetoric. Given that over 90 percent of the Republic's population was of Han ethnicity, assimilation by definition meant the Sinicization of the national minorities.
14. Sun Yat-sen, "The Three Principles of the People," in Prescriptions for Saving China: Selected Writings of Sun Yat-sen, ed. Julie Lee Wei, E-su Zen, and Linda Chao (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1994), 224-25.
15. Quoted in Mackerras, China's Minorities, 57. Emphasis added.
16. Sun Yat-sen, "Fundamentals of National Reconstruction for the National Government of China," in Fundamentals of National Reconstruction (Taipei: China Cultural Service, 1953), 10.
17. Mackerras, China's Minorities, 58.
18. Chiang could point to the same speech given by Sun (see above) to justify the flag replacement. Sun had referred to the five-color flag as a "divisive bureaucrat flag . . . [which] has been the cause of all the Republic's misfortunes. No sooner had we discarded the Ch'ing dynasty's imperial yellow-dragon flag than the five-color flag of its military officials was adopted in its stead! It is little wonder that we were able to overthrow the Ch'ing emperor but have found it difficult to extinguish the despotism of the Ch'ing military." Sun, "The Three Principles of the People," 225.
19. Mackerras, China's Minorities, 58.
20. Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, With Notes and Commentary by Philip Jaffe (London: Dobson, 1947), 39-40. Emphasis added.
21. Mackerras, China's Minorities, 59.
22. Ibid.
23. V. I. Lenin, "The Significance of the Right to Self-Determination and Its Relation to Federation," in Collected Works, vol. 22 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 146.
24. Dreyer, China's Forty Millions, 47. In this respect, Lenin deviated from Orthodox Marxism, which saw political oppression as an offshoot of economic oppression.
25. Ibid., 53.
26. Ibid., 55.
27. Known in the literature as Leninist or Stalinist autonomy.
28. Dreyer, China's Forty Millions, 55.
29. "A Brief Account of CPC's Implementation of Its National Regional Autonomy Policy," Liaowang (Outlook Weekly), 1985, no. 28:17, translated as "History of National Regional Autonomy Traced," in JPRS, October 10, 1985, 50.
30. "A Brief Account of CPC's Implementation of Its National Regional Autonomy Policy," Liaowang (Outlook Weekly), 1985, no. 28:17, translated as "History of National Regional Autonomy Traced," in JPRS, October 10, 1985, 50.
31. Michael Palmer, Anthony Dicks, and Yuan Cheng, Modern Chinese Law: Legislation and Related Materials, 9 vols. (London: Department of Law, School of Oriental and African Studies, 1992), 1:1. Emphasis added.
32. This is known as jiuguo or saving the country.
33. Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 1:2.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. At present, the PRC has 116 NAAs which consist of 5 provincial-level autonomous regions, 31 autonomous prefectures, and 80 autonomous counties or banners. see History of National Regional Autonomy Traced," 51.
36. Ibid. At present, the PRC has 116 NAAs which consist of 5 provincial-level autonomous regions, 31 autonomous prefectures, and 80 autonomous counties or banners. see History of National Regional Autonomy Traced," 51.
37. Together, these NAAs amount to 6.1 million km of land, or 60 percent of the PRC's total territory. See Zhang, "On the Law of Regional National Autonomy," 55.
38. For example, NAAs could consist of areas inhabited by one shaoshu minzu; by one large shaoshu minzu and other smaller minzu who would also exercise autonomy; or jointly by more than one group. See "General Program of the People's Republic of China for the Implementation of Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities," Chinese Law and Government 14, no. 4 (Winter 1981-82): 28-35.
39. Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 2:1.
40. Ibid. Emphasis added.
41. Ibid.
42. A similar provision under the more moderate 1954 Constitution called for the higher state organs to assist the national minorities in their political, economic, and cultural development.
43. The 1975 Constitution did not even bother to include this constitutional nicety.
44. Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 2:3. Emphasis added.
45. The protection of national minority interests is also found in a provision of the Criminal Law, 1979. Article 147 imposes criminal detention or imprisonment for not more than two years on "any state functionary who unlawfully deprives . . . legitimate freedom of religious belief and infringes upon the customs and habits of minority nationalities." Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 6:7.
46. Deng Xiaoping, "On Minority Nationalities," Chinese Law and Government 14, no. 4 (Winter 1981-82): 68.
47. Even though the radical Maoists, including Madame Mao, were politically crushed by the time the 1978 Constitution was adopted, Hua Guofeng (Mao's hand-picked successor) nevertheless could not completely turn against his embalmed patron. After all, Hua's political claim to power was his association with Mao. Hence, it was not until the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping, a victim of the Cultural Revolution, that we can identify a complete reversal of the Cultural Revolution policies. This volte-face manifests itself (among other areas) in the constitutional treatment of the national minorities and the NAAs.
48. Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 2:4.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Zhang, "On the Law of Regional National Autonomy," 57.
52. Article 2 (3) unambiguously declares that "all national autonomous areas are integral parts of the People's Republic of China." See Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 2:13.
53. Ibid. Emphasis added.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid. During the Deng decade of economic reforms, local administrative units, including the NAAs, have enjoyed greater autonomy vis-à-vis the center in the regions of economic and development affairs. But as suggested below (see case studies below), this power is not absolute and is subject to central control.
57. Quoted in Dicks, "New Lamps for Old," 379.
58. Reporting to the people's congresses, until recently, was a mere formality since they served at the pleasure of those Party cadres in the government.
59. Much ink has been spilt in the social science literature on the actual "reach of the state." The literature seems to agree that since the post-1978 reforms, the projective capacity of the central Party-state has significantly been reduced. For instance, see Susan Shirk's The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (1993); Jean C. Oi's seminal work State and Peasant in Contemporary China (1989); and Binh G. Phan's conclusion in "The Deng Xiaoping Years: Reform and Rural Discontent" (Unpublished manuscript, 1995). But most definitely, the central authorities' ability to strike down on any one wayward NAA is unquestionable.
60. Much ink has been spilt in the social science literature on the actual "reach of the state." The literature seems to agree that since the post-1978 reforms, the projective capacity of the central Party-state has significantly been reduced. For instance, see Susan Shirk's The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (1993); Jean C. Oi's seminal work State and Peasant in Contemporary China (1989); and Binh G. Phan's conclusion in "The Deng Xiaoping Years: Reform and Rural Discontent" (Unpublished manuscript, 1995). But most definitely, the central authorities' ability to strike down on any one wayward NAA is unquestionable.
61. Much ink has been spilt in the social science literature on the actual "reach of the state." The literature seems to agree that since the post-1978 reforms, the projective capacity of the central Party-state has significantly been reduced. For instance, see Susan Shirk's The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (1993); Jean C. Oi's seminal work State and Peasant in Contemporary China (1989); and Binh G. Phan's conclusion in "The Deng Xiaoping Years: Reform and Rural Discontent" (Unpublished manuscript, 1995). But most definitely, the central authorities' ability to strike down on any one wayward NAA is unquestionable.
62. Dicks, "New Lamps for Old," 379.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Liu Shusheng, "Realistically and Conscientiously Carry out the Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities," Yunnan shehui kexue (Social Sciences in Yunnan), 1984, no. 5:10-13, translated as "Law on Minority Regional Autonomy Discussed," in JPRS, February 5, 1985, 84.
67. Liu Shusheng, "Realistically and Conscientiously Carry out the Law on Regional Autonomy for Minority Nationalities," Yunnan shehui kexue (Social Sciences in Yunnan), 1984, no. 5:10-13, translated as "Law on Minority Regional Autonomy Discussed," in JPRS, February 5, 1985, 84.
68. Dicks, "New Lamps for Old," 379.
69. China Statistical Yearbook: 1992 (Beijing: China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service Center, 1992), 60.
70. Ibid. Calculated by the author.
71. Ibid.
72. Li Xianguo, "Reverberations of the 'Autonomy Law' on Both Sides of the Tianshan Mountains," Liaowang, 1985, no. 28:16-17, translated as "Impact of Autonomy Law in Xinjiang Discussed," in JPRS, October 10, 1985, 53-54.
73. Li Xianguo, "Reverberations of the 'Autonomy Law' on Both Sides of the Tianshan Mountains," Liaowang, 1985, no. 28:16-17, translated as "Impact of Autonomy Law in Xinjiang Discussed," in JPRS, October 10, 1985, 53-54.
74. Ibid., 53.
75. "Ningxia: 1993 Statistical Communiqué," SWB Weekly Economic Report: Special Supplement, May 4, 1994, 3.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 7:2, 11, 14, 15, 17; 8:12.
79. Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 7:2, 11, 14, 15, 17; 8:12.
80. The legal age for marriage under the 1980 PRC Marriage Law (Article 5) is twenty-two for men and twenty for women.
81. Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 7:3. Xinjiang AR SP Article 2; Tibet AR SP Article 1; Ningxia AR SP Article 2; Inner Mongolia AR SP Article 3; Liangshan Autonomous Prefecture (Sichuan) SP Article 5.
82. Article 180 of the PRC Criminal Law (1979) metes out criminal sanctions for polygamists and polyandrists.
83. Professor Dicks notes that this rule "continues to have important repercussions" in Contemporary China and thus the need for Article 6. See Dicks, "New Lamps for Old," 366.
84. There is a potential conflict of law here. Does this SP reinforce the right to free marriage guaranteed by the 1980 PRC Marriage Law and backed up by the 1979 Criminal Law or does it violate the LRNA and constitutional protection of minority cultures and customs? The question becomes more complicated when we consider the Supreme People's Court's ruling in the 1956 Hu Xiuqin case that in cases of interethnic marriages, it was important to respect "the habits and customs of the minority nationalities for the benefit of national unity." Quoted in Dicks, "New Lamps for Old," 381.
85. Article 6 (1) of the 1980 PRC Marriage Law forbids such marriages. Sun Hongshu and He Zhaoguo, "Our Region Attains Success in Implementing the Law on Regional National Autonomy," Ningxia ribao (Ningxia Daily), June 13, 1985, 1, translated as "Ningxia Successfully Implements PRC Autonomy Law," in JPRS, July 30, 1985, 67.
86. Article 6 (1) of the 1980 PRC Marriage Law forbids such marriages. Sun Hongshu and He Zhaoguo, "Our Region Attains Success in Implementing the Law on Regional National Autonomy," Ningxia ribao (Ningxia Daily), June 13, 1985, 1, translated as "Ningxia Successfully Implements PRC Autonomy Law," in JPRS, July 30, 1985, 67.
87. Mackerras, China's Minorities, 157.
88. Thomas Heberer, China and Its National Minorities (London: Sharpe, 1989), 46.
89. China Today, December 12, 1994, 7.
90. "Tibetan Leaders Condemn 'Serious Political Incidents' in Lhasa," Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), October 2, 1987, FE/8688/BII/1.
91. Between 1987 and the imposition of martial law on March 8, 1989, there were eighteen "violent disturbances" staged by separatists. "Lhasa Press Briefing on Situation in Tibet," SWB, April 4, 1989, FE/0425/B2/1.
92. See note 81 above.
93. "Tibetan Leaders Meet Monks: Condemn 'Handful of Bad People'," SWB, October 3, 1987, FE/8689/BII/1.
94. "Accounts of Lhasa Independence Demonstrations and Their Aftermath," SWB, October 5, 1987, FE/8690/BII/1.
95. Tenzing Chimey, "640 Arrested in Lhasa since October," Tibetan Review, February 1988, 4.
96. "Amnesty Fears Summary Executions," Tibetan Review, July 1989, 4-5. Article 106 of the Criminal Law metes out among other punishments the death penalty for crimes endangering public security or safety. Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 6:7.
97. "Amnesty Fears Summary Executions," Tibetan Review, July 1989, 4-5. Article 106 of the Criminal Law metes out among other punishments the death penalty for crimes endangering public security or safety. Palmer, Dicks, and Cheng, Modern Chinese Law 6:7.
98. Mackerras, China's Minorities, 161.
99. Ibid.
100. "Accounts of Lhasa Independence Demonstrations and Their Aftermath," BII/3.
101. "Further Report on April 5-6 Rebellion in Xinjiang," SWB, April 24, 1990, FE/0746/B2/1.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., B2/2.
104. Mackerras, China's Minorities, 163.