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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 47, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 200-220
Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
Author keywords

Bargaining; Complexity; Delay; Justifiability; Nash equilibrium
Indexed keywords

EID: 1842554295     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00180-5     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (12)
References (10)
  • 1
    • 0000926141 scopus 로고
    • The structure of Nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata
    • Abreu, D., Rubinstein, A., 1988. The structure of Nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata. Econometrica 56, 1259-1282.
    • (1988) Econometrica , vol.56 , pp. 1259-1282
    • Abreu, D.1    Rubinstein, A.2
  • 2
    • 0002244902 scopus 로고
    • Repeated games, finite automata and complexity
    • Banks, J., Sundaram, R., 1990. Repeated games, finite automata and complexity. Games Econ. Behav. 2, 97-117.
    • (1990) Games Econ. Behav. , vol.2 , pp. 97-117
    • Banks, J.1    Sundaram, R.2
  • 3
    • 0008872307 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Multiperson bargaining and strategic complexity
    • Chatterjee, K., Sabourian, H., 2000. Multiperson bargaining and strategic complexity. Econometrica 68, 1491-1509.
    • (2000) Econometrica , vol.68 , pp. 1491-1509
    • Chatterjee, K.1    Sabourian, H.2
  • 4
    • 0010401443 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecast
    • in press
    • Eliaz, K., 2001. Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecast. Games Econ. Behav. in press.
    • (2001) Games Econ. Behav.
    • Eliaz, K.1
  • 5
    • 0001278813 scopus 로고
    • Finite rationality and interpersonal complexity in repeated games
    • Kalai, E., Stanford, W., 1988. Finite rationality and interpersonal complexity in repeated games. Econometrica 56, 397-410.
    • (1988) Econometrica , vol.56 , pp. 397-410
    • Kalai, E.1    Stanford, W.2
  • 6
    • 1842565302 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Learning to be simple: Adaptation and complexity in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
    • Mimeo. PSU
    • Maenner, E., 2001. Learning to be simple: Adaptation and complexity in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Mimeo. PSU.
    • (2001)
    • Maenner, E.1
  • 7
    • 38249013131 scopus 로고
    • Finite automata equilibria with discounting
    • Piccione, M., 1992. Finite automata equilibria with discounting. J. Econ. Theory 56, 180-193.
    • (1992) J. Econ. Theory , vol.56 , pp. 180-193
    • Piccione, M.1
  • 8
    • 0000336211 scopus 로고
    • Finite automata play a repeated extensive game
    • Piccione, M., Rubinstein, A., 1993. Finite automata play a repeated extensive game. J. Econ. Theory 61, 160-168.
    • (1993) J. Econ. Theory , vol.61 , pp. 160-168
    • Piccione, M.1    Rubinstein, A.2
  • 9
    • 46149134052 scopus 로고
    • Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
    • Rubinstein, A., 1986. Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma. J. Econ. Theory 39, 83-96.
    • (1986) J. Econ. Theory , vol.39 , pp. 83-96
    • Rubinstein, A.1
  • 10
    • 0036655506 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Equilibrium in justifiable strategies: A model of reason-based choice in extensive-form games
    • Spiegler, R., 2002. Equilibrium in justifiable strategies: A model of reason-based choice in extensive-form games. Rev. Econ. Stud. 69, 691-706.
    • (2002) Rev. Econ. Stud. , vol.69 , pp. 691-706
    • Spiegler, R.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.