The inevitability of genetic enhancement technologies

Bioethics

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 1-26

  Baylis, Françoise ^a   Robert, Jason Scott ^a  

^a DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BIOTECHNOLOGY; ETHICS; EVOLUTION; GENETIC ENHANCEMENT; GENETIC PROCEDURES; GENETIC TRAIT; HUMAN; REVIEW;

EID: 1842473093     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00376.x     Document Type: Review

References (104)

1. See, for instance: B. Stableford. 1984. Future Man. New York. Crown; and A. Sandberg (n.d.). Genetic Modifications. Available online at: http://www.aleph.se/Trans/Individual/Body/genes.html (accessed 7 February, 2002).
2. See, for instance: B. Stableford. 1984. Future Man. New York. Crown; and A. Sandberg (n.d.). Genetic Modifications. Available online at: http://www.aleph.se/Trans/Individual/Body/genes.html (accessed 7 February, 2002).
3. For instance: L.J. Kass. 1985. Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs. New York. Free Press; and L.J. Kass. The Wisdom of Repugnance. New Republic 1997; 216: 17-27.
4. For instance: L.J. Kass. 1985. Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs. New York. Free Press; and L.J. Kass. The Wisdom of Repugnance. New Republic 1997; 216: 17-27.
5. L. Walters & J.G. Palmer. 1997. The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy. New York. Oxford University Press.
6. Generally, see: E. Parens, ed. 1999. Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. Washington. Georgetown University Press. For considerations of justice specifically, see, for instance: N. Holtug. Does Justice Require Genetic Enhancements? Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 137-143; and A. Buchanan, D.W. Brock, N. Daniels & D. Wikler. 2000. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. New York. Cambridge University Press.
7. Generally, see: E. Parens, ed. 1999. Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. Washington. Georgetown University Press. For considerations of justice specifically, see, for instance: N. Holtug. Does Justice Require Genetic Enhancements? Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 137-143; and A. Buchanan, D.W. Brock, N. Daniels & D. Wikler. 2000. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. New York. Cambridge University Press.
8. Generally, see: E. Parens, ed. 1999. Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. Washington. Georgetown University Press. For considerations of justice specifically, see, for instance: N. Holtug. Does Justice Require Genetic Enhancements? Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 137-143; and A. Buchanan, D.W. Brock, N. Daniels & D. Wikler. 2000. From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. New York. Cambridge University Press.
9. A.D. Dreger, personal communication.
10. J.S. Robert. Interpreting the Homeobox: Metaphors of Gene Action and Activation in Evolution and Development. Evolution & Development 2001; 3: 287-295.
11. J.W. Gordon. Genetic Enhancement in Humans. Science 1999; 283: 2023-2024.
12. A caveat about the human genome: at the genetic level, humans differ from each other by 1/10 of 1%, but it is not the case that there is some one genome shared by all humans that is 99.9% identical. There is no single human genome representative of all humans, for genetic variation is the norm. See: A.L. Tauber & S. Sarkar. The Human Genome Project: Has Blind Reductionism Gone too Far? Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 1992; 35: 220-235, at 228; see also E.A. Lloyd. 1994. Normality and Variation: The Human Genome Project and the Ideal Human Type. In Are Genes Us? The Social Consequences of the New Genetics. C.F. Cranor, ed. New Brunswick, NJ. Rutgers University Press: 99-112; and J.S. Robert. Illich, Education, and the Human Genome Project: Reflections on Paradoxical Counterproductivity. Bulletin of Science, Technology, and Society 1998; 18: 228-239, at 229-230.
13. A caveat about the human genome: at the genetic level, humans differ from each other by 1/10 of 1%, but it is not the case that there is some one genome shared by all humans that is 99.9% identical. There is no single human genome representative of all humans, for genetic variation is the norm. See: A.L. Tauber & S. Sarkar. The Human Genome Project: Has Blind Reductionism Gone too Far? Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 1992; 35: 220-235, at 228; see also E.A. Lloyd. 1994. Normality and Variation: The Human Genome Project and the Ideal Human Type. In Are Genes Us? The Social Consequences of the New Genetics. C.F. Cranor, ed. New Brunswick, NJ. Rutgers University Press: 99-112; and J.S. Robert. Illich, Education, and the Human Genome Project: Reflections on Paradoxical Counterproductivity. Bulletin of Science, Technology, and Society 1998; 18: 228-239, at 229-230.
14. A caveat about the human genome: at the genetic level, humans differ from each other by 1/10 of 1%, but it is not the case that there is some one genome shared by all humans that is 99.9% identical. There is no single human genome representative of all humans, for genetic variation is the norm. See: A.L. Tauber & S. Sarkar. The Human Genome Project: Has Blind Reductionism Gone too Far? Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 1992; 35: 220-235, at 228; see also E.A. Lloyd. 1994. Normality and Variation: The Human Genome Project and the Ideal Human Type. In Are Genes Us? The Social Consequences of the New Genetics. C.F. Cranor, ed. New Brunswick, NJ. Rutgers University Press: 99-112; and J.S. Robert. Illich, Education, and the Human Genome Project: Reflections on Paradoxical Counterproductivity. Bulletin of Science, Technology, and Society 1998; 18: 228-239, at 229-230.
15. In a broad discussion of genetic engineering, Heta Häyry has warned against a particular kind of defeatist pessimism, one that we avoid here. That attitude 'cynically assumes that nothing can be done', and that 'the total prohibition of gene-splicing activities is the only way to save humankind from the slippery slope to which mad scientists and big corporations are leading us. ' Such pessimism may be self-fulfilling, in the sense that 'ordinary citizens' may decide not even to bother attempting to influence the development and use of genetic engineering technologies. Our inevitability claim, as will become evident below, is a different sort of claim altogether; it does not rest on slippery-slope foundations, and its objective is rather to spur attention to the question of how best to mediate the consequences of the development of genetic enhancement technologies. See: H. Häyry. 1994. How to Assess the Consequences of Genetic Engineering? In Ethics and Biotechnology. A. Dyson & J. Harris, eds. New York. Routledge: 144-156, at 152. See also note 52, below.
16. Sandberg, op. cit. note 1.
17. Stableford, op. cit. note 1; see also hints in this direction offered by Joseph Rosen in: L. Slater. Dr. Daedalus: A Radical Plastic Surgeon Wants to Give You Wings. Harper's Magazine 2001; July: 57-67.
18. Stableford, op. cit. note 1; see also hints in this direction offered by Joseph Rosen in: L. Slater. Dr. Daedalus: A Radical Plastic Surgeon Wants to Give You Wings. Harper's Magazine 2001; July: 57-67.
19. F. Baylis. Human Cloning: Three Mistakes and an Alternative. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 2002; 27: 319-337.
20. See, for instance: J. Glover. 1984. What Sort of People Should There Be? Genetic Engineering, Brain Control and Their Impact on Our Future World. New York. Penguin Books; J. Harris. 1992. Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford. Oxford University Press; D. Heyd. 1992. Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People. Berkeley. University of California Press; J. Wood-Harper. 1994. Manipulation of the Germ Line: Towards Elimination of Major Infectious Diseases? In Ethics and Biotechnology, op. cit. note 9, pp. 121-143; P. Kitcher. 1996. The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities. New York. Simon & Schuster; Walters & Palmer, op. cit. note 4, especially Chapter 4; and M-W. Ho. 1999. Genetic Engineering: Dream or Nightmare? Second edition. New York. Continuum.8
21. See, for instance: J. Glover. 1984. What Sort of People Should There Be? Genetic Engineering, Brain Control and Their Impact on Our Future World. New York. Penguin Books; J. Harris. 1992. Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford. Oxford University Press; D. Heyd. 1992. Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People. Berkeley. University of California Press; J. Wood-Harper. 1994. Manipulation of the Germ Line: Towards Elimination of Major Infectious Diseases? In Ethics and Biotechnology, op. cit. note 9, pp. 121-143; P. Kitcher. 1996. The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities. New York. Simon & Schuster; Walters & Palmer, op. cit. note 4, especially Chapter 4; and M-W. Ho. 1999. Genetic Engineering: Dream or Nightmare? Second edition. New York. Continuum.8
22. See, for instance: J. Glover. 1984. What Sort of People Should There Be? Genetic Engineering, Brain Control and Their Impact on Our Future World. New York. Penguin Books; J. Harris. 1992. Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford. Oxford University Press; D. Heyd. 1992. Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People. Berkeley. University of California Press; J. Wood-Harper. 1994. Manipulation of the Germ Line: Towards Elimination of Major Infectious Diseases? In Ethics and Biotechnology, op. cit. note 9, pp. 121-143; P. Kitcher. 1996. The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities. New York. Simon & Schuster; Walters & Palmer, op. cit. note 4, especially Chapter 4; and M-W. Ho. 1999. Genetic Engineering: Dream or Nightmare? Second edition. New York. Continuum.8
23. See, for instance: J. Glover. 1984. What Sort of People Should There Be? Genetic Engineering, Brain Control and Their Impact on Our Future World. New York. Penguin Books; J. Harris. 1992. Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford. Oxford University Press; D. Heyd. 1992. Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People. Berkeley. University of California Press; J. Wood-Harper. 1994. Manipulation of the Germ Line: Towards Elimination of Major Infectious Diseases? In Ethics and Biotechnology, op. cit. note 9, pp. 121-143; P. Kitcher. 1996. The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities. New York. Simon & Schuster; Walters & Palmer, op. cit. note 4, especially Chapter 4; and M-W. Ho. 1999. Genetic Engineering: Dream or Nightmare? Second edition. New York. Continuum.8
24. See, for instance: J. Glover. 1984. What Sort of People Should There Be? Genetic Engineering, Brain Control and Their Impact on Our Future World. New York. Penguin Books; J. Harris. 1992. Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford. Oxford University Press; D. Heyd. 1992. Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People. Berkeley. University of California Press; J. Wood-Harper. 1994. Manipulation of the Germ Line: Towards Elimination of Major Infectious Diseases? In Ethics and Biotechnology, op. cit. note 9, pp. 121-143; P. Kitcher. 1996. The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities. New York. Simon & Schuster; Walters & Palmer, op. cit. note 4, especially Chapter 4; and M-W. Ho. 1999. Genetic Engineering: Dream or Nightmare? Second edition. New York. Continuum.8
25. See, for instance: J. Glover. 1984. What Sort of People Should There Be? Genetic Engineering, Brain Control and Their Impact on Our Future World. New York. Penguin Books; J. Harris. 1992. Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford. Oxford University Press; D. Heyd. 1992. Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People. Berkeley. University of California Press; J. Wood-Harper. 1994. Manipulation of the Germ Line: Towards Elimination of Major Infectious Diseases? In Ethics and Biotechnology, op. cit. note 9, pp. 121-143; P. Kitcher. 1996. The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities. New York. Simon & Schuster; Walters & Palmer, op. cit. note 4, especially Chapter 4; and M-W. Ho. 1999. Genetic Engineering: Dream or Nightmare? Second edition. New York. Continuum.8
26. See, for instance: J. Glover. 1984. What Sort of People Should There Be? Genetic Engineering, Brain Control and Their Impact on Our Future World. New York. Penguin Books; J. Harris. 1992. Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology. Oxford. Oxford University Press; D. Heyd. 1992. Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People. Berkeley. University of California Press; J. Wood-Harper. 1994. Manipulation of the Germ Line: Towards Elimination of Major Infectious Diseases? In Ethics and Biotechnology, op. cit. note 9, pp. 121-143; P. Kitcher. 1996. The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities. New York. Simon & Schuster; Walters & Palmer, op. cit. note 4, especially Chapter 4; and M-W. Ho. 1999. Genetic Engineering: Dream or Nightmare? Second edition. New York. Continuum.8
27. Nils Holtug has noted that intuitive worries about human gene therapy are generally of the slippery slope variety and, moreover, he has argued that such slippery slope arguments can generally be overcome in the context of human gene therapy. We have thus striven to avoid explicit slippery slope objections to genetic enhancement technologies (though some of the objections may be reconstructed in slippery slope terms). See: N. Holtug. Human Gene Therapy: Down the Slippery Slope? Bioethics 1993; 7: 402-419. See also note 52, below.
28. P. Ramsey. 1970. Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control. New Haven. Yale University Press; N. Messer. Human Cloning and Genetic Manipulation: Some Theological and Ethical Issues. Studies in Christian Ethics 1999; 12: 1-16.
29. P. Ramsey. 1970. Fabricated Man: The Ethics of Genetic Control. New Haven. Yale University Press; N. Messer. Human Cloning and Genetic Manipulation: Some Theological and Ethical Issues. Studies in Christian Ethics 1999; 12: 1-16.
30. R. Trigg. 1988. Ideas of Human Nature: An Historical Introduction. Oxford. Basil Blackwell.
31. As documented in: C. Merchant. 1989. The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution. New York. Harper and Row.
32. G.E. Pence. 1998. Who's Afraid of Human Cloning? Lanham, MD. Rowman and Littlefield: 129-131.
33. D.T. Suzuki & P. Knudtson. 1990. Genethics: The Ethics of Engineering Life. Revised edition. Toronto. Stoddart.
34. G.B. Pier, M. Grout, T. Zaidi, G. Meluleni, S.S. Mueschenborn, G. Banting, R. Ratcliff, M.J. Evans & W.H. Colledge. Salmonella typhi Uses CFTR to Enter Intestinal Epithelial Cells. Nature 1998; 393: 79-82.
35. th Session of the General Conference. Paris. Available online at: http: //unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001096/109687eb.pdf (accessed 7 February, 2002); see also: C. Byk. A Map to a New Treasure Island: The Human Genome and the Concept of Common Heritage. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1998; 23: 234-246.
36. th Session of the General Conference. Paris. Available online at: http: //unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001096/109687eb.pdf (accessed 7 February, 2002); see also: C. Byk. A Map to a New Treasure Island: The Human Genome and the Concept of Common Heritage. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1998; 23: 234-246.
37. Anonymous. Editorial: The Big Test. New Republic 2001; 223: 9. Of course, it is worth emphasising again that there is no such thing in nature as the human genome, given the predominance of genetic variability; moreover, there is no such thing in nature as the human genome, given that humans share significant DNA sequences with virtually all extant and extinct creatures from apes to amoebae.
38. J. Harris. Intimations of Immortality. Science 2000; 288: 59.
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40. Robert, op. cit. note 8, p. 229; see also: I. Illich. 1978. Toward a History of Needs. Berkeley. Heyday: 35, 117.
41. Robert, op. cit. note 8, p. 229; see also: I. Illich. 1978. Toward a History of Needs. Berkeley. Heyday: 35, 117.
42. I. Illich. 1977. Disabling Professions. In Disabling Professions. I.K. Illich, I.K. Zolal, J. McKnight, J. Caplan & H. Shaiken, eds. New York. Marion Boyars: 11-39, at 28-31.
43. On 'detrimental enhancements', see: D. Shickle. Are 'Genetic Enhancements' Really Enhancements? Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2000; 9: 342-352, at 344-345.
44. D.W. Brock. 1998. Enhancements of Human Function: Some Distinctions for Policymakers. In Enhancing Human Traits, op. cit. note 4, pp. 48-69, at 59.
45. See, for instance: A. Lippman. Led (Astray) by Genetic Maps: The Cartography of the Human Genome and Health Care. Social Science and Medicine 1992; 35: 1469-1476.
46. M.H. Shapiro. The Impact of Genetic Enhancement on Equality. Wake Forest Law Review 1999; 34: 561-637; L.M. Silver. 1997. Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World. New York. Avon Books.
47. M.H. Shapiro. The Impact of Genetic Enhancement on Equality. Wake Forest Law Review 1999; 34: 561-637; L.M. Silver. 1997. Remaking Eden: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World. New York. Avon Books.
48. M.J. Mehlman. How Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement? Wake Forest Law Review 1999; 34: 671-714, at 687.
49. D. Shenk. Biocapitalism: What Price the Genetic Revolution? Harper's 1997; December: 37-45, at 45.
50. L.M. Silver. 9 November, 1999. Reprogenetics: How Do a Scientist's Own Ethical Deliberations Enter into the Process? Paper presented at the conference: Humans and Genetic Engineering in the New Millenium - How Are We Going to Get 'Genethics' Just in Time? Available online at: http://www. etiskraad.dk/publikationer/genethics/ren.htm#kap02 (accessed 7 February, 2002).
51. See, for instance: S. Bordo. 1998. Braveheart, Babe, and the Contemporary Body. In Enhancing Human Traits, op. cit. note 4, pp. 189-221; M.O. Little. 1998. Cosmetic Surgery, Suspect Norms, and the Ethics of Complicity. In Enhancing Human Traits, op. cit. note 4, pp. 162-176.
52. See, for instance: S. Bordo. 1998. Braveheart, Babe, and the Contemporary Body. In Enhancing Human Traits, op. cit. note 4, pp. 189-221; M.O. Little. 1998. Cosmetic Surgery, Suspect Norms, and the Ethics of Complicity. In Enhancing Human Traits, op. cit. note 4, pp. 162-176.
53. K. Davis. 1995. Reshaping the Female Body: The Dilemma of Cosmetic Surgery. New York. Routledge.
54. B. Duden. 1993. Disembodying Women: Perspectives on Pregnancy and the Unborn. Translation by Lee Hoinacki. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; see also: Robert, op. cit. note 4; and J.S. Robert. Moral Truthfulness in Genetic Counseling. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 1998; 17: 73-93.
55. B. Duden. 1993. Disembodying Women: Perspectives on Pregnancy and the Unborn. Translation by Lee Hoinacki. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; see also: Robert, op. cit. note 4; and J.S. Robert. Moral Truthfulness in Genetic Counseling. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 1998; 17: 73-93.
56. B. Duden. 1993. Disembodying Women: Perspectives on Pregnancy and the Unborn. Translation by Lee Hoinacki. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; see also: Robert, op. cit. note 4; and J.S. Robert. Moral Truthfulness in Genetic Counseling. Business and Professional Ethics Journal 1998; 17: 73-93.
57. W. Gardner. Can Human Genetic Enhancement Be Prohibited? Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1995; 20: 65-84.
58. Brock, op. cit. note 28; see also R. Cole-Turner. 1998. Do Means Matter? In Enhancing Human Traits, op. cit. note 4, pp. 151-161; E. Parens. Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project. Hastings Center Report 1998; 28: S1-S15; S. Goering. Gene Therapies and the Pursuit of a Better Human. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2000; 9: 330-341; and Shickle, op. cit. note 27.
59. Brock, op. cit. note 28; see also R. Cole-Turner. 1998. Do Means Matter? In Enhancing Human Traits, op. cit. note 4, pp. 151-161; E. Parens. Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project. Hastings Center Report 1998; 28: S1-S15; S. Goering. Gene Therapies and the Pursuit of a Better Human. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2000; 9: 330-341; and Shickle, op. cit. note 27.
60. Brock, op. cit. note 28; see also R. Cole-Turner. 1998. Do Means Matter? In Enhancing Human Traits, op. cit. note 4, pp. 151-161; E. Parens. Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project. Hastings Center Report 1998; 28: S1-S15; S. Goering. Gene Therapies and the Pursuit of a Better Human. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2000; 9: 330-341; and Shickle, op. cit. note 27.
61. Brock, op. cit. note 28; see also R. Cole-Turner. 1998. Do Means Matter? In Enhancing Human Traits, op. cit. note 4, pp. 151-161; E. Parens. Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project. Hastings Center Report 1998; 28: S1-S15; S. Goering. Gene Therapies and the Pursuit of a Better Human. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2000; 9: 330-341; and Shickle, op. cit. note 27.
62. Brock, op. cit. note 28; see also R. Cole-Turner. 1998. Do Means Matter? In Enhancing Human Traits, op. cit. note 4, pp. 151-161; E. Parens. Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project. Hastings Center Report 1998; 28: S1-S15; S. Goering. Gene Therapies and the Pursuit of a Better Human. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2000; 9: 330-341; and Shickle, op. cit. note 27.
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64. Glover, op. cit. note 13, p. 43.
65. G. Becker. 2000. The Elusive Embryo: How Women and Men Approach New Reproductive Technologies. Berkeley. University of California Press.
66. Gardner, op. cit. note 37, pp. 72-75.
67. Mehlman, op. cit. note 31.
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70. For a slate of examples of the unforeseen consequences of technological innovations, see: E. Tenner. 1996. Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences. New York. Knopf.
71. L. Gannett. What's In a Cause? The Pragmatic Dimensions of Genetic Explanations. Biology and Philosophy 1999; 14: 349-374.
72. Lippman, op. cit. note 29
73. See Strohman, op. cit. note 44; and Bains, op. cit. note 44.
74. See Strohman, op. cit. note 44; and Bains, op. cit. note 44.
75. Parens, op. cit. note 38.
76. J. Stevens. 1989. Storming Heaven: LSD and the American Dream. London. Flamingo.
77. Baylis, op. cit. note 12.
78. An anonymous reviewer suggested that we expand on our notion of inevitability, especially to distinguish it from other arguments for inevitability. There is, for instance, a large literature on slippery-slope arguments for inevitability, ably summarised in Holtug, op. cit. note 14. Holtug follows W. van der Burg (The Slippery Slope Argument. Ethics 1999; 102: 42-65) in distinguishing between logical and empirical versions of the slippery slope argument. Some commentators would, of course, respond to our question ('why is the development and use of genetic enhancement technologies inevitable?') by invoking an argument to the effect that no line (or no principled line) can be drawn to prevent particular enhancements once genetic enhancement technologies have been developed (a logical slippery slope argument), or to the effect that the mere possibility of developing a technology leads to the development of that technology, and further that the mere existence of a technology leads to its inevitable use (and, possibly, abuse) (the technological imperative - an empirical slippery slope argument). It should be evident that our notion of inevitability is not of the slippery slope variety - in fact, we are not certain that there is anything at the bottom of the slope toward which to slip! Rather, we interpret inevitability in the sense of political immunity to moral criticism, on the basis of common views of the nature of humans and/in the contemporary world. This is, of course, an empirical claim; we hope to be shown to be wrong (and if we are wrong, then, ironically, our aim will have been accomplished). But it is not a pessimistic claim in the sense objected to by Häyry; and it is not a slippery-slope claim in any of the senses addressed by Holtug.
79. An anonymous reviewer suggested that we expand on our notion of inevitability, especially to distinguish it from other arguments for inevitability. There is, for instance, a large literature on slippery-slope arguments for inevitability, ably summarised in Holtug, op. cit. note 14. Holtug follows W. van der Burg (The Slippery Slope Argument. Ethics 1999; 102: 42-65) in distinguishing between logical and empirical versions of the slippery slope argument. Some commentators would, of course, respond to our question ('why is the development and use of genetic enhancement technologies inevitable?') by invoking an argument to the effect that no line (or no principled line) can be drawn to prevent particular enhancements once genetic enhancement technologies have been developed (a logical slippery slope argument), or to the effect that the mere possibility of developing a technology leads to the development of that technology, and further that the mere existence of a technology leads to its inevitable use (and, possibly, abuse) (the technological imperative - an empirical slippery slope argument). It should be evident that our notion of inevitability is not of the slippery slope variety - in fact, we are not certain that there is anything at the bottom of the slope toward which to slip! Rather, we interpret inevitability in the sense of political immunity to moral criticism, on the basis of common views of the nature of humans and/in the contemporary world. This is, of course, an empirical claim; we hope to be shown to be wrong (and if we are wrong, then, ironically, our aim will have been accomplished). But it is not a pessimistic claim in the sense objected to by Häyry; and it is not a slippery-slope claim in any of the senses addressed by Holtug.
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81. As cited in Shenk, op. cit. note 32, p. 41.
82. I b i d.
83. Gardner, op. cit. note 37.
84. See, for instance: R. Sandbrook. Neoliberalism's False Promise. Literary Review of Canada 2000; 8: 20-24.
85. As cited in: Anonymous. The Politics of Genes: America's Next Ethical War. Economist 2001; 14 April: 21-24, at 21.
86. Ibid. p. 22.
87. We make this claim with some hesitation, in as much as Buchanan et al., in From Chance to Choice (op. cit. note 4), offer a sophisticated defence of liberalism generative of the result that genetic enhancements should in principle be permissible (subject to the satisfaction of particular requirements of justice).
88. Gordon, op. cit. note 7, p. 2024.
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97. Ibid. p. 58.
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