The theory of social choice since 1951

Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik

Volumn 217, Issue 6, 1998, Pages

  Gaertner, Wulf ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSNABRÜCK   (Germany)

Author keywords

Arrow social welfare functions; Individual rights; Manipulability; Utility comparisons

Indexed keywords

EID: 18144442093     PISSN: 00214027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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