When utilities muddle through: Pro-poor governance in Bangalore's public water sector

Environment and Urbanization

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 201-217

  Connors, Genevieve ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INFORMAL SETTLEMENT; LOW INCOME POPULATION; SEWAGE; UTILITY SECTOR; WATER SUPPLY;

ASIA; BANGALORE; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; INDIA; KARNATAKA; SOUTH ASIA; WORLD;

SLUM;

EID: 18144381946     PISSN: 09562478     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1630/0956247053633872     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. See, for example, Davis, J et al. (2002), In Search of Good Governance: Experiments from South Asia's Water and Sanitation Sector , Water and Sanitation Programme, New Delhi;
2. also Caseley, J (2003), "Blocked drains and open minds: multiple accountability relationships and improved service delivery in an Indian city", IDS Working Paper No 11, Institute for Development Studies, Brighton.
3. The classic text on muddling through is Lindblom, C (1959), "The science of muddling through", Public Administration Review No 19, pages 79-88.
4. Goal 7 of the Millennium Development Goals is to ensure environmental sustainability. One of its three targets is to halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation, and another is to achieve a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers.
5. Definition used by the Global Water Partnership as in Rogers, P and A W Hall (2003), "Effective water governance", TEC Background Paper No 7, Global Water Partnership, Stockholm.
6. Devas, N (2001), "Does city governance matter for the urban poor?", International Planning Studies Vol 6, No 4, pages 393-408.
7. Benjamin, S (2000), "Governance, economic settings and poverty in Bangalore", Environment and Urbanization Vol 12, No 1, April, pages 35-56.
8. The Bangalore Metropolitan Area consists of the core area of Bangalore City Corporation, eight surrounding urban local bodies and a further belt that demarcates the limits of the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA). The Bangalore urban agglomeration covers an area only slightly larger than the official metro area. Here, "corporation" and "municipal" are used interchangeably solely with reference to the corporation, which is known locally as the Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (BMP).
9. Ravindra, A (2000), "Management of large and small cities: the case of Bangalore", mimeo.
10. In India, "slums" are defined under Section 3 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956 as areas where buildings are unfit for human habitation or where there is "...dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement and design of such buildings, narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets, lack of ventilation, light, sanitation facilities or any combination of these factors which are detrimental to safety, health and morals."
11. AusAID Bangalore Masterplan Project (2002a), "Overview report on services to the urban poor. Stage 2", AusAID, Australia.
12. "Slum declaration" or "notification" is a lengthy and complex procedure to formalize the status of slums. Slums go through a series of stages as part of the process until they are fully declared. Declared slums are entitled to certain benefits and land rights, so "declared slum" status is coveted. Declared status, however, is not representative of actual development or of the assets and infrastructure in a given slum.
13. Most areas in the surrounding urban local bodies have yet to be networked by the BWSSB, which supplies in bulk to only some of these areas. This case study focuses on the municipal corporation area where the BWSSB's responsibility is clear - the delivery model for the peripheral areas is still evolving.
14. Schenk, H (2001), Living in India's Slums: A Case Study of Bangalore , Manohar, New Delhi.
15. See reference 13.
16. AusAID Bangalore Masterplan Project (2000), "Overview report on services to the urban poor. Stage 1", AusAID, Australia.
17. See reference 4, Rogers and Hall (2003).
18. The Constitution (74th) Amendment Act was passed in 1992 and came into full effect in 1993. The amendment serves as the urban counterpart to the 73rd Amendment, which promotes decentralization in rural areas. The aim of the amendment is to increase the effectiveness of urban local bodies as democratic units of self-government, and it makes provision for the devolution by the state legislature to the municipalities of powers and responsibilities with respect to economic development and social justice. States retain a great deal of power concerning the degree to which they actually implement the suggested provisions, and retain the right to keep representation in local government, to monitor the election of the chairman of the municipality, etc.
19. Slum dwellers also cast their vote in state and national elections. Their state representatives are the members of the legislative assembly, from whose ranks the chief minister of the state appoints his cabinet. Depending on their portfolios and political experience, members of the legislative assembly can also hold considerable political sway over both the governance and the employees of parastatals.
20. See reference 15.
21. The BWSSB does pay for some capital works on water source development and major rehabilitation works through a dedicated capital account, but not for street-level infrastructure.
22. AusAID Bangalore Masterplan Project (2001), "Study report on willingness to pay of households in Bangalore city", AusAID, Australia.
23. When BWSSB employees explicitly take payments from slum dwellers or politicians for allowing illegal connections, they might be considered "corrupt". However, when they simply knowingly turn a blind eye, they might more aptly be termed "negligent" with respect to their duties and the long-term health of the utility; but perhaps "loyal" to local allegiances, or even "sympathetic" to the needs of the poor. In many instances, the engineers allow illegal connections unknowingly, a behaviour pattern which reflects their general unwillingness to go into slums. For an analysis of corruption in the water and sanitation sectors, see Davis, J (2004), "Corruption in public service delivery: experience from South Asia's water and sanitation sector", World Developmmt Vol 32, No 1, pages 53-71.
24. Paul, S and S Sekhar (2000), "Benchmarking urban services: the second report card on Bangalore", Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore.
25. Most water vendors are private operators who deliver water as a business either through tankers or in pots mounted on bicycles. The BWSSB also sends tankers to slums, supposedly free of cost, but the drivers and operators frequently charge for the water upon delivery.
26. See World Bank (2003), World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People, The World Bank, Washington DC.
27. See reference 21.
28. The current exchange rate is Rs 45 = US$ 1.00.
29. AusAID Bangalore Masterplan Project (2002b), "Project proposal extension of services to the poor: Kaveri Agamana", AusAID, Australia.
30. Water tariffs do not allow for full cost-recovery of water supplied either. The total production cost of water in Bangalore is Rs 16 per kilo-litre (kL), but the tariff for the lowest domestic slab is Rs 6 per kL. Water is therefore highly cross-subsidized - tariffs for non-domestic consumption greatly exceed the production costs, with an industrial tariff of Rs 60 per kL.
31. A house with an area of 150 square feet is now required to pay only the meter cost of Rs 550; houses measuring between 151 and 600 square feet pay Rs 800; and houses larger than 600 square feet pay the regular fee of Rs 1,800.
32. The Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Act, 1964, Chapter 38, "Public water supply".
33. There are in fact about 21,000 known public taps, of which 6,000 have been disconnected or plugged. About 15,000 known taps are still operational, of which just under 7,000 are legally connected with the express permission of the BWSSB. The remaining taps are connected illegally.
34. The BWSSB lets 25,000 million litres per month (m1m) of water into the system. Roughly 65 per cent, or 16,000 mlm, is accounted for. Of the accounted-for water, public taps consume 5,000 mlm (30 per cent), while domestic consumption totals 8,900 m1m (55 per cent). Defence, nondomestic uses, industry and railways consume the remaining 15 percent.
35. In May 2003, the state federation of slum dwellers, KKNSS, organized a protest outside the BWSSB when they feared that the Board would actually shut down all public taps. It called on the Board to measure the impact on slum dwellers before shutting them down, and asked what size the revenue loss for ongoing public taps would really be, compared to high levels of corruption surrounding contracts and tenders.
36. The three packages were awarded to three separate contractors for a total sum of approximately Rs 1,200 million, or US$ 26 million. The fourth package, for the partially added wards, was worth just under US$ 4 million.
37. See, for example, Paul, S (2002), Holding the State to Account: Citizen Monitoring in Action, Books for Change, Bangalore.
38. Heitzman, J (2004), Network City: Planning the Information Society in Bangalore, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
39. A complete application file consists of: a BWSSB application form with photograph; a photocopy of an acceptable ID card; a floor plan of the house with an address; a road-cutting exemption form; and a cash payment of Rs 550 or Rs 800 depending on the size of the house.
40. The NGOs do not present a united front either, particularly with respect to acceptable water pricing.
41. Dove, L (2004), "Providing environmental urban services to the poor in Andhra Pradesh", Environment and Urbanization Vol 16, No 1, April, pages 95-106.
42. See, for example, World Bank (1994), World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development, The World Bank, Washington DC.
43. Internal memorandum of the BWSSB, emphasis added.