The bail-in problem: Systematic goals, ad hoc means

Economic Systems

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 3-32

  Eichengreen, Barry ^a   Rühl, Christof ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b WORLD BANK   (United States)

Author keywords

Crises; Debt; F3; IMF

Indexed keywords

EID: 18044404576     PISSN: 09393625     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0939-3625(00)00002-9     Document Type: Article

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