Intertemporal diversification in financial intermediation

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 965-991

  Niinimaki J P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI   (Finland)

Author keywords

Bank regulation; D92; Financial intermediaries; G21; G28; Liquidity; Moral hazard; OLG models

Indexed keywords

EID: 18044403475     PISSN: 03784266     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4266(00)00106-0     Document Type: Article

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