How individuals learn to take turns: Emergence of alternating cooperation in a congestion game and the prisoner's dilemma

Advances in Complex Systems

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 87-116

  Helbing, Dirk ^a   Schönhof, Martin ^a   Stark, Hans Ulrich ^a   Holyst, Janusz A ^b  

^a DRESDEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Germany)

^b WARSAW UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Poland)

Author keywords

Game theory; Multi agent simulation; Reinforcement learning

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER SIMULATION; DATA COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS; DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS; LEARNING SYSTEMS; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; SOCIAL ASPECTS; STRATEGIC PLANNING; TELECOMMUNICATION TRAFFIC;

COMPLEX DYNAMICS; DATA NETWORKS; MULTI-AGENT SIMULATION; REINFORCEMENT LEARNING;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 17644369611     PISSN: 02195259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1142/S0219525905000361     Document Type: Article

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