Policy design and conservation compliance on highly erodible lands

Land Economics

Volumn 81, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 20-33

  Giannakas, Konstantinos ^a   Kaplan, Jonathan D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN   (United States)

^b CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL POLICY; COMPLIANCE; ERODIBILITY; EROSION CONTROL; GAME THEORY; LAND MANAGEMENT;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES; WESTERN HEMISPHERE; WORLD;

EID: 17644368859     PISSN: 00237639     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3368/le.81.1.20     Document Type: Article

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