Strategic liquidity supply and security design

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 72, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 615-649

  Biais, Bruno ^a   Mariotti, Thomas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MARKET CONDITIONS;

EID: 17544367207     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00345.x     Document Type: Article

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