The contested sovereignty of the firm

Review of Political Economy

Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 193-209

  Dietrich, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17544365740     PISSN: 09538259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09538250220126519     Document Type: Review

References (46)

1. Albert, M. (1993) Capitalism against Capitalism (London, Whurr).
2. Alchian, A. A. & Demsetz, H. (1972) Production, information costs, and economic organization, American Economic Review, 62, pp. 777-795.
3. Aoki, M., Gustafsson, B. & Williamson, O. (Eds) (1990) The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties (London, Sage).
4. Arthur, W. B. (1988) Self-reinforcing mechanisms in economics, in: P. W. Anderson, K. J. Arrow & D. Pines (Eds) (1988) The Economy as an Evolving Complex System (Redwood City, Addison-Wesley).
5. Baumol, W. J. (1982) Contestable markets: an uprising in the theory of industrial structure, American Economic Review, 72, pp. 1-15.
6. Boyer, R. (1991) The transformation of modern capitalism: by the light of the 'regulation' approach and other political economy theories, CEPREMAP Occasional Paper No. 9134, Paris.
7. Coase, R. H. (1937) The nature of the firm, Economica, 4, pp. 386-405.
8. Coase, R. H. (1960) The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, pp. 1-44.
9. Commons, J. R. (1924) Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1968).
10. Commons, J. R. (1934) Institutional Economics (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1961).
11. Commons, J. R. (1950) The Economics of Collective Action (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press).
12. Cyert, R. M. & March, J. G. (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall).
13. Dahl, R. A. (1985) A Preface to Economic Democracy (Cambridge, Polity Press).
14. Demsetz, H. (1967) Towards a theory of property rights, American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 57, pp. 347-359.
15. Dietrich, M. (1993) Total quality control, just-in-time management, and the economics of the firm, Journal, of Economic Studies, 20, pp. 17-31.
16. Dietrich, M. (1994) Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond: towards a new economics of the firm (London, Routledge).
17. Dietrich, M. (1996) Opportunism, learning and organisational evolution: transaction costs and beyond, in: J Groenewegen (Ed.) Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond (Boston, Kluwer).
18. Donaldson, T. & Preston, L. E. (1995) The stakeholder theory of the corporation: concepts, evidence, and implications, Academy of Management Review, 20, pp. 65-91.
19. Dow, G. K. (1987) The function of authority in transaction cost economics, Journal, of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 8, pp. 13-38.
20. Dugger, W. M. (1993) Transaction cost economics and the state, in: C. Pitelis (Ed.) Transaction Costs, Markets and Hierarchies (Oxford, Blackwell).
21. Earl, P. E. (1990) Economics and psychology: a survey, Economic Journal, 100, pp. 718-755.
22. Fitzroy, F. R. & Kraft, K. (1985) Unionization, wages and efficiency, Kyklos, 38, pp. 537-554.
23. Fitzroy, F. R. & Kraft, K. (1987) Efficiency and internal organisation: works councils in West German firms, Economica, 54, pp. 493-504.
24. Galbraith, J. K. (1974) The New Industrial State, 2nd edn (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books).
25. Hart, O. (1995) Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford, The Clarendon Press).
26. Hayek, F. A. (1948) Individualism and Economics Order (London, Routledge).
27. Hodgson, G. M. (1999) Economics and Utopia: why the learning economy is not the end of history (London, Routledge).
28. Hutton, W. (1995) The State We're In (London, Jonathan Cape).
29. Kay, J. (1997) The stakeholder corporation, in: G. Kelly, D. Kelly & A. Gamble (Eds) Stakeholder Capitalism (Basingstoke, Macmillan).
30. Kirzner, I. M. (1973) Competition and Entrepreneurship (Chicago, University of Chicago Press).
31. Lazonick, W. (1991) Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
32. March, J. G. & Simon, H. A. (1958) Organizations (London, Wiley).
33. Marglin, S. A. (1974) What do bosses do? The origins and functions of hierarchy in capitalist production, part I, Review of Radical Political Economics, 6, pp. 60-112.
34. Marglin, S. A. (1982) Knowledge and power, in: F. H. Stephen (Ed.) Firms, Organization and Labour: approaches to the economics of work organization (London, Macmillan).
35. Marx, K. (1867) Capital, Vol. I (Harmondsworth, Penguin).
36. Nielsen, K. (1991) Towards a flexible future - theories and politics, in: B. Jessop, K. Neilsen, H. Kastendiek & O. K. Pedersen (Eds) The Politics of Flexibility: restructuring state and industry in Britain, Germany and Scandinavia (Aldershot, Edward Elgar).
37. North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
38. Perkin, H. (1989) The Rise of Professional Society (London, Routledge).
39. Pitelis, C. (1991) Market and Non-market Hierarchies: theory of institutional, failure (Oxford, Blackwell).
40. Polanyi, K. (1944) The Great Transformation (Boston, Beacon Press, 1957).
41. Sen, A. (1985) The moral standing of the market, in: E. F. Paul, J. Paul & F. D. Miller (Eds) Ethics and Economics (Oxford, Blackwell).
42. Simon, H. A. (1955) A behavioral model of rational choice, Quarterly Journal, of Economics, 69, pp. 99-118.
43. Tirole, J. (1988) The multicontract organization, Canadian Journal of Economics, 21, pp. 459-466.
44. Williamson, O. E. (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: analysis and anti-trust implications. A study in the economics of internal organization (New York, Free Press).
45. Williamson, O. E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: firms, markets, relational contracting (London, Macmillan).
46. Willman, P. (1983) The organisational failures framework and industrial sociology, in A. Francis, J. Turk & P. Willman (Eds) Power, Efficiency and Institutions (London, Heinemann).