Just diagnosis? Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and injustices to disabled people

Journal of Medical Ethics

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 231-234

  Petersen, Thompet S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABORTION; AMNIOCENTESIS; ARTICLE; CHILD WELFARE; CHILDHOOD DISEASE; DISEASE SEVERITY; ECHOGRAPHY; GENETIC DISORDER; GENETIC SCREENING; HEALTH BEHAVIOR; HUMAN; JUSTICE; MEDICAL DECISION MAKING; MEDICAL ETHICS; MEDICAL RESEARCH; MORALITY; PHYSICAL DISABILITY; PREDICTION; PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS; PROBABILITY; REPRODUCTION; RISK ASSESSMENT; SCREENING TEST;

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION;

DISABLED PERSONS; ETHICS, CLINICAL; GENETIC SCREENING; HUMANS; MORALS; PATIENT RIGHTS; PREIMPLANTATION DIAGNOSIS;

EID: 17444365492     PISSN: 03066800     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1136/jme.2003.006429     Document Type: Article

References (30)

1. ESHRE Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Consortium, steering committee: data collection III (May 2001), Hum Reprod 2002; 17 233-46, for the clinical outcome of PGD.
2. Munthe C. Pure Selection. Götenborg: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, vol. 9, Chapter 4, 1999. For contemporary discussions of ethical considerations connected with PGD (and other kinds of prenatal diagnosis) and of consequences of PGD for disabled people,
3. see for example, ibid;
4. Kuhse H. Preventing genetic impairments. In: Thompson J, Chadwick R, eds. Genetic Information. New York: Kluwer Academic Press 1999;
5. Gillam L. Prenatal diagnosis and discrimination against the disabled. J Med Ethics 1999;25:163-71;
6. Buchanan A. Choosing who will be disabled: genetic intervention and the morality of inclusion. Soc Philos Policy 1996;13:18-46;
7. and Parens E, Asch A, eds. Prenatal Testing and Disability Rights. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000.
8. Steinbock B. Disability, prenatal testing, and selective abortion. In: Asch A, Parens E, eds, 2000:108-23,
9. and Kuhse H, 1999 (see reference 2).
10. For very different beliefs about what constitutes a severe genetic disease, see the references in Wertz DCDrawing lines: notes for policymakers. In: Parens E, Asch A, eds, 2000: 261-87 (see reference 2).
11. Asch A, Parens E, eds. 2000;
12. Buchanan A, 1996;
13. and Gillam L, 1999 (see reference 2).
14. Cf. King DS. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the "new" eugenics. J Med Ethics 1999;25:176-82;
15. and Testart J. The new eugenics and medicalized reproduction. Camb Q Healthc Ethics 1996;4:304-12.
16. Freeman JS. Arguing along the slippery slope of human embryo research. J Med Philos 1996;21:1, 79.
17. In fact Freeman does not argue specifically against the use of PGD, but against some of the preconditions for PGD being part of public healthcare, namely federal funding of embryo research. See reference 7: 61, 73.
18. Wertz DC. Eugenics is alive and well. Sci Context 1998;3-4:493-510.
19. Wertz DC. Drawing lines: notes for policymakers. In Asch A, Parens E, eds, 2000 (reference 2);
20. and Wertz DC. Society and the not-so-new-genetics: what are we afraid of, Some predictions from a social scientist. J Contemp Health Law Policy 1997;13:299-346.
21. Most European countries follow, for instance, the World Health Organization, Hereditary Diseases Programme: Proposed International guidelines on Ethical Issues in Medical Genetics and Genetics Services. Geneva, Switzerland: WHO, 1998.
22. Harper PS, Clarke AJ. Genetics, Society and Clinical Practice. Oxford: BIOS Scientific Publishers 1997;
23. and Munthe C, 1999, 82 (see reference 2).
24. King DS. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis and the "new" eugenics. J Med Ethics 1999;25:176-82.
25. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for directing my attention to these important worries.
26. Walton D. Slippery Slope Argument. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992:74.
27. For views like this, see Buchanan A 1996: 22;
28. and Kuhse H 1999: 23-5 (see reference 2).
29. Furthermore, if potential parents only want to have a disabled child and will not have a healthy child, say they want a deaf child, I believe they should be allowed to use PGD to choose for a child that is deaf. The parents' autonomy is satisfied and we can expect that the life of the child will be well worth living. Note that the alternative, as the case is described, is no child at all.
30. For reasoning very similar to this, see Parfit D Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, Chapter 16.