Learning from the west: Policy transfer and political parties

Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics

Volumn 21, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 33-47

  Paterson, William E ^a   Sloam, James ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^b KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

PARTY POLITICS; POLICY MAKING; POLITICAL SYSTEM; POST-COMMUNISM; WESTERN WORLD;

CENTRAL EUROPE; EASTERN EUROPE; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; WORLD;

EID: 17244381049     PISSN: 13523279     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13523270500055322     Document Type: Article

References (88)

1. See, for example, R. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning across Times and Space (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993);
2. D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, 'Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer Literature', Political Studies, Vol.44, No.2 (1996), pp.343-57;
3. C. Bennett, 'Understanding Ripple Effects: The Cross-National Adoption of Policy Instruments for Bureaucratic Accountability', Governance Vol.10, No.3 (1997), pp.213-31;
4. D. Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines', Politics, Vol.19, No.1 (1999), pp.51-9;
5. M. Evans and J. Davies, 'Understanding Policy Transfer: A Multi-Level, Multi-Disciplinary Perspective', Public Administration, Vol.77, No.2 (1999), pp.361-85;
6. E. Page, 'Future Governance and the Literature on Policy Transfer and Lesson Drawing', prepared for the ESRC Future Governance Workshop on Policy Transfer, available at , accessed 1 Nov. 2004;
7. K. Mossberger and H. Wolman, 'Policy Transfer as a Form of Prospective Policy Evaluation', Future Governance Paper 2, available at , accessed 1 Nov. 2004;
8. W. Jacoby, 'Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites, and Western Models', Governance, Vol.14, No.2 (2001), pp.169-200;
9. H. Wolman and E. Page, 'Policy Diffusion Among Local Governments: An Information-Theory Approach', Governance, Vol.15, No.4 (2002), pp.477-501;
10. S. Padgett, 'Between Synthesis and Emulation: EU Policy Transfer in the Power Sector', Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.10, No.2 (2003), pp.227-45.
11. See R. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy.
12. See G. Pridham, 'Uneasy Democratizations: Pariah Regimes, Political Conditionality and Reborn Transitions in Central and Eastern Europe', Democratization, Vol.8, No.4 (2001), pp.65-94;
13. M. Zaborowski, 'Westernizing the East: External Influences in the Post-Communist Transformation of Eastern and Central Europe', in the present collection, pp.20-36.
14. See R. Gillespie and W.E. Paterson (eds.), Rethinking Social Democracy in Western Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1993).
15. This approach is used here and - in greater depth - elsewhere in this collection to evaluate SDPs as a model for the CSPs of Eastern and Central Europe since 1990
16. D. Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy', p.51 (original emphasis).
17. For analysis of external influences, see M. Zaborowski, 'Westernizing the East'. For more on the policy transfer continuum, see D. Dolowitz, and D. Marsh, 'Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy Making', Governance, Vol.13, No.1 (2001), pp.5-24.
18. K. Mossberger and H. Wolman, 'Policy Transfer as a Form of Prospective Policy Evaluation', pp.2-4.
19. R. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy.
20. R. Eyestone, 'Confusion, Diffusion, and Innovation', American Political Science Review, Vol.71, No.2 (1977), p.441.
21. C. Bennett, 'How States Utilise Foreign Evidence', Journal of Public Policy, Vol.11, No.1 (1991), pp.31-54;
22. K. Mossberger and H. Wolman, 'Policy Transfer as a Form of Prospective Policy Evaluation'.
23. H. Wolman and E. Page, 'Policy Diffusion Among Local Governments', p.480.
24. See J. Sloam, 'West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer'.
25. See M. Zaborowski, Westernizing the East.
26. For an explanation of institutional isomorphism, see P. Dimaggio and W. Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields', American Sociological Review, Vol.48, No.1 (1983), pp.147-60;
27. C.M. Radaelli 'Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy', Governance, Vol.13, No.1 (2000), pp.25-43.
28. J. Walker, 'Innovation in State Politics', in H. Jacobs and K. Vines (eds.), Politics in the American States (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971), pp.377-8.
29. W. Jacoby, 'Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites, and Western European Models', Governance, Vol.14, No.2 (2001), pp.169-200, at p.171. The possibility of institutional isomorphism is borne in mind in the country case studies later in this collection. That offer a broader analysis of the external influences on CSPs than this essay on party-to-party transfer. Where 'influence' is clearly identifiable but 'policy transfer' is not, 'policy learning' is generally referred to.
30. See R. Ladrech, 'Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis', Keele European Parties Research Unit Working Paper, No.7, Keele University, 2003. The idea of 'Europeanization' refers more correctly to 'EU-ization' - the process of adaptation to increasing European integration.
31. See also S. Bulmer, D. Dolowitz, P. Humphreys and S. Padgett, 'Electricity and Communications: Fit for the European Union?', in K. Dyson and K. Goetz (eds.), Germany in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.251-69.
32. See R. Ladrech, 'Europeanization and Political Parties'
33. S. Bulmer et al., 'Electricity and Communications'.
34. I. Bache and A. Marshall, 'Europeanization and Domestic Change: A Governance Approach to Institutional Adaptation in Britain', available at .
35. I. Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric Tanenbaum, Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
36. See W.E. Paterson, 'Political Parties and the Making of Foreign Policy', Review of International Studies, Vol.7, No.1 (1981), pp.227-35;
37. J. Sloam, The European Policy of the German Social Democrats: Interpreting a Changing World (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004).
38. J. Bara and I. Budge, 'Party Policy and Ideology: Still New Labour?', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol.54, No.4 (2001), p.591.
39. The SPD's Agenda 2010 proposed a wide range of significant reforms for the German welfare state, labour market and tax system, and was launched by the party leadership in 2003 (shortly after the 2002 federal elections), but bore little relation to the treatment of these policy areas in the election campaign and manifesto.
40. M. Dauderstät, A. Gerrits and G.G. Markus, How Social Democrats, After the Collapse of Communism, Face the Task of Constructing Capitalism (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1999), pp.60-61.
41. See K. Lawson and P. Merkl (eds.), When Parties Fail (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988);
42. R. Inglehart, Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977);
43. A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity, 1991).
44. The gauche plurielle was a leftist alliance including the Greens, Communists and other smaller groups.
45. A. Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
46. G. Sani and G. Sartori, 'Polarization, Fragmentation and Competition in Western Democracies', in H. Daalder and P. Mair (eds.), Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change (London: Sage, 1983), pp.307-40.
47. François Hollande, cited in Le Monde, 6 Aug. 2002, available at .
48. See Labour Party, 2001, Ambitions for Britain, at ;
49. Parti Socialiste, 2002, Choisissons le progres-en avant le gauche, at ;
50. SPD, 2002, Emeuerung und Zusammenhalt - Wir in Deutschland, SPD-Vorstand, at .
51. A. Panebianco, Political Parties.
52. See C. Hay, 'Structure and Agency', in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), Theories and Methods in Political Science (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp.189-206.
53. The Labour Party nevertheless left its major increases in public spending until its second term (beginning in 2001), after the public debt had been reduced from 60.8 per cent to 50.4 per cent of GDP: OECD, 2004, Economic Outlook No.75, Annexes, at accessed 1 July 2004.
54. I b i d.
55. W.E. Paterson and A.H. Thomas, The Future of Social Democracy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), p.16.
56. Labour Party, Ambitions for Britain; SPD, Erneuerung und Zusammenhalt; PS, Choisissons le progress.
57. See J. Sloam, 'West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer'.
58. See I. Budge et al., Mapping Policy Preferences.
59. The choice of documents may be open to the charge of selectivity when compared with the consistent use of election manifestos across time. Yet, as programmes have a different value in different parties and reflect alternative configurations of opinion within the party structure (explored in a contextual analysis), a more open approach to what constitutes a programme is required.
60. T. Diez, Die EU Lesen: Diskursive Knotenpunkte in der britischen Europadebatte (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1999), p.610.
61. A. Hoffman and V. Knowles, 'Germany and the Reshaping of Europe: Identifying Interests - The Role of Discourse Analysis', ESRC-IGS Discussion Paper Series, 99/9, University of Birmingham, 1999, pp.33-4.
62. I. Budge et al., Mapping Policy Preferences.
63. W. Grant, 'Elite Interviewing: A Practical Guide', Institute for German Studies Discussion Paper, 2000/11, University of Birmingham, 2000.
64. Although interviewees may not acknowledge the broader framework for policy making (as they may be 'locked into path dependency' - that is, have only one policy alternative - from their own perspectives), attempts should be made to bring the various layers of policy context (actors and structures) into the discussions.
65. D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, 'Learning from Abroad';
66. C. Bennett, 'Understanding Ripple Effects';
67. M. Evans and J. Davies, 'Understanding Policy Transfer';
68. W. Jacoby, 'Tutors and Pupils'.
69. See J. Sloam, 'West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer'.
70. For similar arguments, see R. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy
71. and S. Padgett, 'Between Synthesis and Emulation'.
72. D. Dolowitz and D. Marsh, 'Learning from Abroad', claim that such 'interdependence' leads to indirect coercive transfer.
73. S. Eyre and M. Lodge, 'National Tunes and a European Melody? Competition Law Reform in the UK and Germany', Journal of European Public Policy Vol.7, No.1 (2000), pp.63-79, at p.64.
74. See J. Sloam, 'West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer'.
75. See R. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy. Communist 'retreatist' parties have been drawn towards the German Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) for similar reasons: see D. Hough and V. Handl, 'The (Post-) Communist Left and the European Union: The Czech KSČM and the German PDS', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.37, No.3 (2004), pp. 333-6.
76. See R. Rose, Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy, p.5.
77. P. Dimaggio and W. Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited', pp.150-52.
78. See J. Sloam, 'West European Social Democracy as a Model for Transfer'.
79. H. Wolman and E. Page, 'Policy Diffusion Among Local Governments'.
80. M. Evans and J. Davies, 'Understanding Policy Transfer', pp.374-6. The networks described in this volume are far from rigid, which makes sense of a focus on interactions between key actors (the 'hubs' of these networks) as reference points for the research.
81. P. Sabatier and H. Jenkins-Smith (eds.), Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993), pp.16-20.
82. P. Haas (ed.), Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), p.3.
83. Interviews in 2003 with a number of officials and politicians from the three social-democratic parties and the Party of European Socialists confirmed the informal and ad hoc nature of these networks.
84. P. Haas, Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, p.4;
85. Virginia Gray claims that interaction increases the likelihood of the diffusion of policies: see V. Gray, 'Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study', American Political Science Review, Vol.67, No.4 (1973), pp.1174-85.
86. J. Walker, 'The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States', American Political Science Review, Vol.63, No.3 (1969), pp.880-99.
87. Interaction in these networks is similar to the concept of 'normative isomorphism', where trans-organizational networks provide arenas through which 'new models diffuse rapidly': see P. Dimaggio and W. Powell, 'The Iron Cage Revisited', pp.150-52.
88. See V. Handl and V. Leška, 'Between Emulation and Adjustment'.