Advance price or purchase commitments to create markets for treatments for diseases of poverty: Lessons from three policies

Bulletin of the World Health Organization

Volumn 83, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 301-307

  Towse, Adrian ^a   Kettler, Hannah ^b  

^a Office of Health Economics   (United Kingdom)

^b BILL AND MELINDA GATES FOUNDATION   (United States)

Author keywords

Case reports; Contract services; Drug costs; Motivation; Orphan drug production economics; Poverty; Prospective payment system; Research support economics

Indexed keywords

MENINGITIS VACCINE; NEW DRUG; VACCINE;

DISEASE CONTROL; HEALTH POLICY;

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE; COST CONTROL; COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS; GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH PROGRAM; LAW; LOWEST INCOME GROUP; POVERTY; REVIEW; SOCIAL MARKETING;

BIOTERRORISM; CONTRACT SERVICES; DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; DRUG COSTS; DRUGS, INVESTIGATIONAL; GREAT BRITAIN; HEALTH CARE SECTOR; HEALTH POLICY; HUMANS; MENINGOCOCCAL VACCINES; ORGANIZATIONAL CASE STUDIES; ORPHAN DRUG PRODUCTION; POVERTY; REIMBURSEMENT, INCENTIVE; RESEARCH SUPPORT; UNITED STATES;

EID: 17244374106     PISSN: 00429686     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

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